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IN THE DISTRICT~~~~COND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
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I have read the attached rule permitting cameras in the 
courtroom and will comply in all respects with the Rule and Order 






The Court, having considered the request under the rule 
permitting cameras in the trial courtrooms, hereby orders that 
permission to broadcast and/or photograph the above hearing is: 
~ Granted under the following restrictions: 
[ J Denied. d ~8 
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. . AND ORDER 
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APPROVAL TO BROADCAST 
AND/OR PHOTOGRAPH A 
COURT PROCEEDING 
I hereby request approval to broadcast and/or photograph the 






I have read the attached rule permitting cameras in the 
courtroom and will comply in all respects with the Rule and Order 






The Court, having considered the request under the rule 
permitting cameras in the trial courtrooms, hereby orders that 
perm~i~n to broadcast and/or photograph the above hearing is: 
~ Granted under the following restrictions: 
] Denied. 
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Judge 
Request to Obtain Approval to Broadcast 
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Second Judicial District Court - Nez Perce County 
Minutes Report 
Case: CR-2007-0008107 
Defendant: Branigh, Leotis Brannon III 
Selected Items 
User: JANET 
Hearing type: Hearing on Motions Minutes date: 11/25/2008 
09:09 AM 
10:27 AM 
Assigned judge: Jeff M. Brudie Start time: 
Court reporter: Carlton End time: 
Minutes clerk: JANET Audio tape number: C1 
Prosecutor: Daniel L Spickler 
Defense attorney: Charles Kovis 
Tape Counter: 90911 
Tape Counter: 91119 
Tape Counter: 91138 
Tape Counter: 91535 
Tape Counter: 91734 
Tape Counter: 91838 
Tape Counter: 91931 
Tape Counter: 91959 
Tape Counter: 92305 
T ape Counter: 92557 
Tape Counter: 92064 
Tape Counter: 92929 
Tape Counter: 93102 
Tape Counter: 93158 
Tape Counter: 93316 
Tape Counter: 93323 
Def present and in custody. Crt reviews file and pretrial mtns filed: Mtn to dismiss, 
renewed mtn to dismiss, mtn for the Crt to det the competency of a State's witness, 2 
mtns in limine, 1 re cell phone records, the other prior bad acts, and final mtn to compel 
info. Crt will take mtns in this order: mtn to dismiss, mtn for change of venue, mtn re 
competencyof 81's witness, mtns in limine, and mtn to compel. 
Crt add mtn to dismiss re double jeopardy. 
Mr. Kovis presents argument. 
State presents argument. 
Mr. Kovis presents rebuttal argument. 
Crt presents comments. Crt takes mtn under advisement. Crt will enter a written ruling. 
Crt add mtn for change of venue. 
Mr. Kovis presents argument. 
State presents argument. 
Mr. Kovis has nothing further 
Crt presents comments. Crt denies mtn for change of venue. Crt presents add comments. 
Crt add mtn re the competency of a State's witness, Desarie Anderson. Crt presents 
comments. Mr. Kovis has previously filed an affid in support of this mtn and the Crt has 
reviewed that. 
Mr. Kovis presents argument. 
State presents argument. 
Mr. Kovis has nothing further. 
Crt presents comments. Crt grants mtn in part. Crt will make inquiry outside the presence 
of the jury re the competency of Desarie Anderson. Crt will not order a mental health eva!. 
COURT MINUT!fSdenies that portion of the mtn. 
Tape Counter: 93511 Crt add 1 st mtn in limine re cell records. Crt presents comments. 
70/ 
Date: 12/1/2008 
Time: 12:57 PM 
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Tape Counter: 93558 
Tape Counter: 94338 
Tape Counter: 94526 
Tape Counter: 95148 
Tape Counter: 95329 
Tape Counter: 95453 
Tape Counter: 95701 
Tape Counter: 95934 
Tape Counter: 100212 
Tape Counter: 100308 
Tape Counter: 100311 
Tape Counter: 100422 
Tape Counter: 100436 
Tape Counter: 100534 
Tape Counter: 100553 
Tape Counter: 100612 
Tape Counter: 100641 
Tape Counter: 100656 
Tape Counter: 100800 
Tape Counter: 100827 
Second Judicial District Court - Nez Perce County 
Minutes Report 
Case: CR-2007-0008107 
Defendant: Branigh, Leotis Brannon III 
Selected Items 
Mr. Kovis presents argument. 
Crt questions Mr. Kovis. 
Mr. Kovis responds. 
Court questions Mr. Kovis. 
Mr. Kovis responds 
State presents argument. 
Crt questions State. 
State responds. 
User: JANET 
Crt presents comments. Crt questions State re evidence from any cell phone account of 
def. 
State responds. 
Mr. Kovis presents rebuttal argument. 
State presents rebuttal argument. 
Crt presents comments. Crt takes mtn under advisement. Crt will issue a written ruling. 
Crt addresses 2nd mtn in limine re 404B re any prior bad acts of def. 
Mr. Kovis presents argument. 
State is in agreement. 
Crt presents comments. Crt will make inquiry outside the presence of the jury and then 
make ruling. 
Crt grants 2nd mtn in limine. Crt q State re ruling. 
State understands ruling. 
Crt addresses mtn to compel. Crt q Mr. Kovis re disclosure. 
Mr. Kovis indicates some are still at issue. 
Crt addresses mental health records of Ms. Anderson. 
Mr. Kovis has received the police records but did not receive any records from any 
doctors or hospitals. 
State indicates he has provided all the records the State has. 
Mr. Kovis indicates a release was signed for the State to get the records. 
Crt presents comments. Crt denies Mtn to Compel re mental health records on Ms. 
Anderson from any doctor or hospital. 
Crt addresses Defs Mtn to Compel re personnel records of police officers involved in this 
investigation. 
Mr. Kovis presents argument. 
Tape Counter: 100859 State has previously objected to all of these motions as being overly broad. State 
presents argument re personnel records of police officers. 
COURT MINUTES 
Date: 12/1/2008 
Time: 12:57 PM 
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Tape Counter: 101146 
Tape Counter: 101243 
Tape Counter: 101302 
Tape Counter: 101334 
Tape Counter: 101434 
Tape Counter: 101515 
Tape Counter: 101533 
Tape Counter: 101553 
Tape Counter: 101641 
Tape Counter: 101706 
Tape Counter: 101745 
Tape Counter: 101811 
Tape Counter: 101832 
Tape Counter: 102120 
Tape Counter: 102229 
Tape Counter: 102301 
Tape Counter: 102456 
Tape Counter: 102531 
Second judicial District Court - Nez Perce County 
Minutes Report 
Case: CR-2007 -0008107 
Defendant: Branigh, Leotis Brannon III 
Selected Items 
User: JANET 
Crt indicates any police officer being called by the State to testify that has training 
materials is to be disclosed to Mr. Kovis. There has been no authority given for 
disciplinary records or personnel records and the Crt denies that request. 
Crt addresses Mtn to Compel re all reports available on suspected criminal history on 
Michael Johnston. 
Mr. Kovis has not received any materials re the Federal gov criminal history. 
State indicates the Federal gov has not been very cooperative and not made their 
material available to the State. State has disclosed all other documents in its possession. 
Crt denies Request #5 re that portion of the mtn to compel dealing the the Federal gov. 
Crt addresses Defs Mtn to Compel re Request #6 re police reports on Michael Johnson 
re possession of a fire arm in a vehicle from 1994. 
Mr. Koivs has not been provided any records on this. 
State has objected as being irrelevant and beyond the scope of discovery. State presents 
argument. 
Mr. Kovis responds. 
Crt presents comments. Crt grants Defs Mtn to Compel re #6 if any police reports exist 
on that incident, the State needs to provide them to Mr. Kovis. 
Crt addresses Defs Mtn to Compel #8 all information in cell phone records in evidence 
including call histories, contact listsand, voice mail records. 
Mr. Kovis indicates they do not have any information from Desarie Anderson's cell phone. 
State has provided everything they have except contact lists as those are overall broad 
and undue invasion of privacy of people on those lists. State presents argument. 
Mr. Kovis responds. 
Crt q Mr. Kovis. 
Mr. Kovis presents argument. 
State responds. Voice mail msg are not available, they do not keep those histories. 
Crt q State re call histories and text msg histories. 
State"responds. 
Crt presents comments. Crt reviews call histories on 2 cell phones. Crt orders State to 
provide call histories on 2 cell phones for the months of Sept and Oct 2007, including any 
text msg history for the same time period. State does not have to provide the contact 
history. 
State q Crt re call histories. State never requested those. State did request the text msg 
history. State will check to see if they can get the call history. 
Crt indicates that concludes the pretrial motions at this time. Crt will speak with counsel in 
Chambers re the questionnaire and trial procedures. 
Tape Coun<;;;<?lf~MINUW.~ovis q Crt re hearing the Defs pro se motions. 
Tape Counter: 102626 Crt will not address those motions at this time. cf1f 'will address later. 7{)3 
Charles E. Kovis 
Attorney at Law 
312 South Washington Street 
Post Office Box 9292 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
Telephone: (208) 882-3939 
Fax: (208) 882-5379 
I.S.B. # 4700 
ckovis@turbonet.com 
Attorney for Defendant 
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IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE SECOND mDICIAL DISTRlCT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LEOTIS B. BRANIGH III, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
:ss. 










CASE NO. CR-07-8107 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHARLES E. KOVIS IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DETERMINE 
COMPETENCY 
Charles E. Kovis, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am the Court-appointed attorney for Mr. Leotis Branigh. 
2. Attached to this affidavit at Exhibit "A" are true and accurate copies of police reports 
received by Mr. Branigh and me. These reports were received from the State of 
AFFIDA VIT OF CHARLES E. KOVIS 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DETERMINE 
COMPETENCY 
Idaho after discovery requests in the above-entitled action. 
3. All documents attached to this affidavit at Exhibit "A" are incorporated herein as 
though fully set forth. 
1 tjrtJ-
DATED this d-. day of November 2008. 
(lt~7?" ~~-
Charles E. Kovis 
SUBSCRlBED and SWORN to before me this _2-_Lf_day of November 2008. 
Notary Public in an 
Residing at Moscow therein. 
My commission expires: _L(-,-,-A_~_'tJ--<f,---____ _ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
·111 
I hereby certify that on the;L Y '-day of November, 
2008, a true and correct copy of this Affidavit of Charles 
E. Kovis in Support of Motion To Determine Competency 
was hand-delivered to: 
DANIEL SPICKLER 
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
P.O. BOX 1267 
LEWI ON, IDAHO 83501 \ 
, . ~
Charles E. Kovis 
AFFIDA VIT OF CHARLES E. KOVIS 




10:37 LAW Incident Table: Page: 1 
Incident Number: 06-L20590 
Nature: Suicidal Person Case Number: Image: 
Addr= ; #23 Area: D5E E OF 10TH, ORC 
City: Lewiston ST: ID Zip: 83501 Contact: Inland 
+- Complainant& 29521 -----------------------------------------------------+ 
I Lst: JOHNSTON Fst: MICHAEL Mid: SCOTT I 
I DOB:  SSN:  Adr:  I 
I Rac: W SX: M Tel:  Cty: Lewiston ST: ID Zip: 83501 I 
+------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----+ 
Offense Codes: SUIS Reported: SUIC Observed: SUIS 
Circumstances: 
Piche' Ted Rspndg Officers: Pedersen Mike 
Rspnsbl Officer: Piche' Ted 
Received By: Schaffner J 
How Received: 9 911 Line 
Agency: LPDl CAD Call ID: 854550 
Last RadLog: 13:23:58 11/23/2006 CMPLT 
When Reported: 12:55:51 11/23/2006 
Occurrd between: 12:55:40 11/23/2006 
and: 12:55:51 11/23/2006 
MO: 







Type Record # Date Description 
NM 28187 11/23/2006 ANDERSON, NADINE BEVERLEY 
NM 29521 11/23/2006 JOHNSTON, MICHAEL SCOTT 
NM 122506 11/23/2006 JOHNSTON, DESIREE DAWNE 
VH 107940 11/23/2006 RED 1996 FORD MUSTANG ID 
Written Incident Repo 
Disp Date: 11/23/2006 
Relationship 
Mother of desiree 
* Compl ainant 
Involved 
Involved 
CA 854550 11/23/2006 12:55 11/23/2006 Suicidal Pers *Initiating Call 
LAW Incident Offenses Detail: 
Offense Codes 
Seq Code 
1 SUIS Suicidal Subject 
LAW Incident Responders Detail 
Responding Officers 
Seq Name Unit 
1 Pedersen Mike 159 
2 Piche' Ted 214 
Main Radio Log Table: 
Time/Date Typ 
13:23:58 11/23/2006 I 










LPD1 (MDC) Completed call incid#=06 
LPD1 incid#=06-L20590 status check 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHARLES E. KOVIS IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION TO DETERMINE COMPETENCY EXHIB 
1123 
Time/Date Typ Unit Code Zone Agnc Description 
13: 14: 51 11/23/2006 1 214 4 D5E LPD1 incid#=06-L20590 status check 
13:10:30 11/23/2006 1 159 23 D5E LPD1 incid#=06-L20590 with 214/and 
13:10:04 11/23/2006 1 214 23 D5E LPD1 incid#=06-L20590 2100 burrelle 
13:07:55 11/23/2006 1 159 17 D5E LPD1 incid#=06-L20590 2100 grelle a 
13:07:55 11/23/2006 1 214 17 D5E LPD1 incid#=06-L20590 2100 grelle a 
13:07:42 11/23/2006 1 214 4 D5E LPD1 west bound grelle ave 2100 blk 
13:06:50 11/23/2006 1 159 28 D5E LPD1 n101348 
13:02:13 11/23/2006 1 214 ARRVD D5E LPD1 (MDe) Arrived on 
12:59:35 11/23/2006 1 159 4 D5E LPD1 9th and preston 
12:59:10 11/23/2006 1 159 ENRT D5E LPD1 incid#=06-L20590 
12:59:10 11/23/2006 1 214 ENRT D5E LPD1 incid#=06-L20590 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHARLES E. KOVIS IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION TO DETERMINE COMPETENCY 
scene incid#= 
Enroute to a 





Sgt. Ted piche' #214 
November 23, 2006 
Typed by: #364 
Lewiston Police Department 
On 11/23/06 at about 1255 hours, the Communications center broadcast a 
suicidal person that had just left the area of 1029 Cedar Avenue #23 in 
Lewiston. The suspect was reported to be a Desiree Johnston, aka 
Desiree Anderson. The complainant, Michael Johnston, provided 
information that his ex-wife was suicidal and possibly going to her 
residence to take an overdose of pills. 
Officers started checking the area for the red Mustang that Desiree 
Anderson was reported to be driving. Approximately 5 minutes later, a 
deputy from the Nez Perce County Sheriff's Department located the 
vehicle in the 2200 block of Grelle. I requested that he stop the 
vehicle and contact the driver. Shortly after that, I met with Deputy 
Santos at the location, 2200 Grelle. Deputy Santos had already 
contacted Desiree Johnston. 
While talking with Johnston, she stated that she is not suicidal and 
that she had only had a dispute with her husband. Desiree stated that 
her husband had changed plans for Thanksgiving dinner today and that it 
upset her and the children. She stated that the dinner was supposed to 
be at her residence and he changed that plan to his residence. 
I talked with Desiree and she stated that she is not suicidal, only 
upset with her ex-husband. She stated that she is taking some 
prescription medication, however, has no intention of harming herself. 
Desiree stated that she just wanted to be left alone. Desiree stated 
that she was going to go to her residence, where she could clean up, as 
she had been crying over this incident. Desiree said that she had a 
friend that she would go see and that she did not need any counseling or 
police intervention. 
Desiree Johnston left my location. I requested that the Communications 
Center contact the complainant and a family member to let them know that 
we had located Johnston. 
End of Report. 
Sgt. Ted Piche' #214 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHARLES E. KOVIS IN SUPPORT 





Incident Number: 07-L5527 
LAW Incident Table: 





Addr= ;#17 Area: D5E E OF 10TH, ORC 
City: Lewiston ST: ID Zip: 83501 Contact: 
+- Complainant& 28187 -----------------------------------------------------+ 
I Lst: ANDERSON Fst: NADINE Mid: BEVERLEY I 
I DOB:  SSN:  Adr= ; #17 I 
I Rac: W SX: F Tel:  Cty: Lewiston ST: ID Zip: 83501 I 
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ 







Agency: LPD1 CAD Call ID: 864111 














Narrative: (See below) 
Supplement: (See below) (See below) 
= = = = = = = = = = = = 
INVOLVEMENTS: 
Type Record # Date 
NM 18742 04/01/2007 
NM 28187 04/01/2007 
NM 29521 04/01/2007 
NM 173947 04/01/2007 
VH 110732 04/01/2007 
Description 
ANDERSON, DESIREE DAWNE 
ANDERSON, NADINE BEVERLEY 
JOHNSTON, MICHAEL SCOTT 
UNICEL, 
Written Incident Repo 







CA 864111 04/01/2007 
BLU 1989 NISS MAX ID 
11:08 04/01/2007 Suicidal Pers *Initiating Call 
LAW Incident Offenses Detail: 
Offense Codes 
Seq Code 
1 SUIS Suicidal Subject 
2 MPER Missing Person 
LAW Incident Responders Detail 
Responding Officers 
Seq Name Unit 
1 Hopple Brandon 368 
Main Radio Log Table: 





11:58:54 04/01/2007 1 368 
Code Zone 
CMPLT D5E LPD1 (MDC) Completed call incid#=07 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHARLES E. KOVIS IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION TO DETERMINE COMPETENCY 
70'/ 1126 
Time/Date Typ Unit Code Zone Agnc Description 
11:42:24 04/01/2007 I 368 NMINQ D4D LPD1 MDC: name =l>.NDERS ON I DES* 
11:21:33 04/01/2007 I 368 ARRVD D5E LPD1 (MDC) Arrived on scene incid#= 
11:17:27 04/01/2007 I 368 ENRT D5E LPD1 (MDC) Enroute to a call incid# 
11:15:52 04/01/2007 I 368 ASSGN D5E LPD1 incid#=07-L5527 Assigned to a 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHARLES E. KOVIS IN SUPPORT 




Officer Hopple, #368 
01 April 07 
Typed by: #366 
Lewiston Police Department 
On 04-01-07 at approximately 1108 hours, I was dispatched to 1029 Cedar 
Avenue #17 in reference to a report of a suicidal person. Dispatch 
advised I would be contacting the victim's mother, Nadine Anderson. 
Nadine was reluctant to give out too much information over the phone as 
the victim's child was at the residence. When I arrived I made contact 
with Nadine who wanted to report her daughter, Desiree Anderson, as 
possibly bei~g suicidal. Nadine told me Desiree's ex-husband, who lives 
just across the road in another trailer, had the voice mail messages 
from Desiree on his phone. 
At about this time, Desiree's ex-husband, Michael Johnston, came over 
and met with me. Johnston told me on yesterday's date he had received 
several voice mail messages from Desiree that were suicidal in nature. 
Johnston told me he did not check the messages until today and at that 
time notified her mother who in turned called the police. 
Johnston allowed me to listen to the messages on his cell phone. The 
first message came in on 03-31-07 at approximately 1530 hours. At that 
time she only left a voice mail message stating that she wanted him to 
turn on his phone. The message was mainly requesting him to turn on his 
phone, and based on her voice I could tell she was mad. The second voice 
mail message came in at 2016 hours. Based on her voice, it sounded like 
she was upset and depressed. She made comments such as she was on her 
way out of town and she felt helpless and alone. She requested Johnston 
take care of the boys and not to screw them up anymore than she had. She 
also told them goodbye and that she loved them. 
The next message came in at 2025 hours. She stated that she did not feel 
love or caring. She stated that she loved him and hopes that she misses 
them very much. She had mentioned that she had hoped to talk to him at 
least one more time. She again requested that he take care of their boys 
and to be safe and have a safe life. 
The next message came in at 2036 hours. On this message she states that 
she hopes that whatever she does, that it works this time. She told 
Johnston that she won't be in his yard this time and it would be awhile 
before anyone knows where she went. Johnston told me about 5 or 6 months 
ago, Desiree had attempted suicide by taking a bunch of pills and 
alcohol. He stated he had found her on his front lawn during the winter 
time without a jacket on. 
The next message that is left on the cell phone, Desiree requests that 
he tells her sister that she loves her and that he makes sure the boys 
write to her. She also told him to tell her sister that she was sorry. 
I asked Johnston if he believed she was just saying this as she was just 
going to leave town and not come back or if he believed that she was 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHARLES E. KOVIS IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION TO DETERMINE COMPETENCY 
71/ 1128 
suicidal. Johnston told me he believed she was suicidal. I asked 
Johnston and Nadine where she may have possibly gone. Both told me she 
may possibly go up to Waha near Zaza Road because that's where they used 
to go and party in high school. They also mentioned they had family 
property in Pomeroy, Washington. Nadine told me the family is not there 
at this time and she may possibly go there. I later had dispatch contact 
Garfield County Sheriff's Office and request they check the property for 
Desiree and/or her vehicle. I also later contacted Nez Perce County and 
requested that they check the Waha area for Desiree. 
I questioned Nadine and Johnston about any information they could give 
me to help me locate Desiree. They were unable to give me any additional 
information. I asked Johnston when the last time he saw Desiree. He told 
me he saw her on yesterday's date at approximately 1530 hours. He stated 
he saw her in her vehicle driving down Thain Road. I asked Nadine the 
last time she saw Desiree. Nadine told me Desiree had shown up at her 
residence last night at approximately 1930 hours. She stated Desiree 
told her that she was moving out of her aunt's residence on Lindsey 
Creek Road. She stated she requested her mother take her plants or she 
would have to take throw them away. Nadine told me Desiree was at her 
house approximately 10 minutes and then she left. She stated a short 
while later she received a phone call from Desiree asking if she could 
come back to the house to use the restroom. She stated that Desiree 
showed UPI used the restroom and left and hasn't been seen since. 
I asked Nadine if Desiree said anything about suicide or being depressed 
and she told me no. 
I obtained all the necessary information to complete a missing person 
report form. I responded to the station and gave the form to dispatch so 
that they could enter Desiree in to NCIC for an attempt to locate. I had 
previously questioned Johnston about attempting to contact Desiree on 
her cell phone. Johnston told me every time he calls the phone rings 
once and then it goes to her voice mail. I asked Johnston if he had left 
any encouraging messages on his voice mail and he told me yes. He stated 
messages such as they want her to come home and that everybody loves 
her. 
I gave the information on Desiree's cell phone to include cell phone 
provider to dispatch and request dispatch contact the cell phone 
provider to see if they could track her phone. Dispatch advised that 
Unicel l (the cell phone provider,) requested they fax a copy to them 
with the information. Dispatch later received information that Unicel 
could not specifically track her down unless she calls again. 
I re contacted Johnston and asked him about any friends she might go to 
or any friends she could have spoken with about being depressed and 
suicidal. Johnston told me she already contacted two of her friends and 
advised they had not heard from her. I asked Johnston if Desiree was 
currently working and he told me no. He stated she had been working at 
the Holiday Inn Express, but he heard she had quit yesterday. 
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I responded to the Holiday Inn Express and spoke with the front desk 
clerk. The front desk clerk as well as Desiree's immediate supervisor, 
both told me Desiree was in there yesterday and she did not quit her 
job. I asked both of them if she appeared to be depressed or had 
mentioned anything about suicide and both of them told me no. Both did 
tell me they had little contact with Desiree. I requested both of them 
to contact LPD if they hear from her and they told me they would. 
At approximately 1530 hours I received a phone call from Johnston who 
stated that he had just received a phone call from Desiree. He stated 
Desiree told him that she was back in town and had to stop and go buy 
some cigarettes. He said she told him that she was on her way back to 
where she had come from. I asked him if she had told him where she had 
been. He stated that she had only mentioned that she was on her way back 
to the mountains. I asked Johnston if she had given ~ny more information 
as to what she was doing or where she was going and he told me no. I 
requested Johnson contact us again if she contacts by phone and he told 
me I would. 
At approximately 1700 hours, dispatch advised me Desiree had shown up at 
her mother's residence and everything was ok. I did request swing shift 
to send an officer to Nadine's trailer to speak with Desiree to check 
her welfare. 
Dispatch has removed Desiree from NCIC. 
End of report 
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Law Supplemental Narrative: 
Supplemental Narratives 
Seq Name Date Narrative 
1 Hesler Sue 17:01:53 04/01/2007 
1702 hrs compl called and adv Desiree is now at her residence and is OK 
- no more contact needed #322 ncic.atl canceled #322 
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Law Supplemental Narrative: 
Seq Name 
2 Krakalia Nick 
07-L5527 
Ofc N. Krakalia #237 





Lewiston Police Supplemental Narrative 
When I arrived at work this date, I had a conversation with Officer 
Hopple who requested I do some follow up on a suicidal subject call he 
had earlier today at 1029 Cedar Avenue #17 involving Nadene Anderson as 
the complaina~t and her adult daughter Desiree rillderscn, being the 
possible suicidal subject. He further advised that an ATL had been put 
out on Desiree and it appears she has returned home and he just wanted 
to insure she was not going to attempt to hurt herself. 
After briefing I went to 1029 Cedar Avenue #17 and contacted the mother, 
Nadine Anderson. She stated her daughter, Desiree, was across the court 
visiting at another trailer and she appeared to be fine and as far as 
she knew was not thinking of hurting herself any longer. I then told 
her I needed to speak to her daughter, Nadine then became hesitant and 
stated that she had not told her daughter that the police had been 
called and had been looking for her today. I then suggested she phone to 
the trailer where she's as so I could hear the phone conversation and 
have her ask Desiree if she had any intentions of hurting herself and 
the mother complied. 
I was able to hear the phone conversation and Nadine asked her daughter 
how she was doing, her daughter in a cheerful voice said she was doing 
fine. Her mother then asked her if she any thoughts of hurting herself 
any longer today or tomorrow. Desiree clearly stated no, her answer 
still cheerful and seemed sincere. I then cleared. 
End of report. 
Ofc N. Krakalia #237 
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494 11/14/2008 
10:39 LAW Incident Table: Page: 1 
Incident Number: 06-L18374 
Nature: Welfare Check Case Number: Image: 
Addr= ; #1 Area: ORCES ORCHARD ELEMEN 
City: Lewiston ST: ID Zip: 83501 Contact: desirae anderson 
+- Complainant& 29521 ------------------- ---------------------------------+ 
I Lst: JOHNSTON Fst: MICHAEL Mid: SCOTT 
I DOB:  SSN:  Adr: 1029 CEDfo~ AVE#23 
I Rac: W SX: M Tel:  Cty: Lewiston ST: ID Zip: 83501 
+-------------- ------ --------------------------------------------------------+ 
Offense Codes: WELF Reported: WELF Observed: 
Circumstances: 
Rspndg Officers: Hill George 
Rspnsbl Officer: 
Metcalf Jim W 
Metcalf Jim W 
Schaffner J 











Narrative: (See below) 
Supplement: 
INVOLVEMENTS: 






Disp Date: 10/18/2006 








JOHNSTON, MICHAEL SCOTT 
JOHNSTON, DESIREE DAWNE 
CA 851968 10/18/2006 15:47 10/18/2006 Welfare Check 
LAW Incident Offenses Detail: 
Offense Codes 
Seq Code 
1 WELF Welfare Check 
LAW Incident Responders Detail 
Responding Officers 
Seq Name Unit 
1 Metcalf Jim W T326 
2 Hill George 296 
Main Radio Log Table: 
Time/Date Typ Unit 
16:15:10 10/18/2006 1 T326 










LPD1 (MDC) Completed 
LPD1 (MDC) Completed 
call 
call 




16:08:05 10/18/2006 I T326 ARRVD D5E LPD1 (MDC) Arrived on scene incid#= 
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Time/Date Typ Unit Code Zone Agnc Description 
16:07:51 10/18/2006 1 296 CMPLT D5E LPD1 (MDC) Completed call incid#=06 
16:04:56 10/18/2006 1 296 23 D5E LPD1 incid#=06-L18374 
16:04:04 10/18/2006 I T326 ENRT D5E LPD1 (MDC) Enroute to 
16:03:28 10/18/2006 1 T326 ASSGN D5E LPD1 incid#=06-L18374 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHARLES E. KaVIS IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION TO DETERMINE COMPETENCY 
Arrived at Bc 
a call incid# 
Assigned to a 
//71134 
Narrative: 
16:14:48 10/18/2006 - Metcalf Jim W 
contacted Desiree Anderson, she seemed to be fine, stated she had not 
been useing drugs or alcohol. Her sonJohnny, 7yoa was also present. 
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Incident Number: 06-N2504 




Image: Nature: Wanted Person 
Addr= RESERVATION LINE Area: 
City: Lewiston 
+- Complainant& 
ST: ID Zip: 83501 Contact: 17 
211 ------------------------------ -------------------- -+ 
I Lst: NEZ PERCE 
I DOB: / / 
COUNTY SHERIFF Fst: Mid: I 
I 
I 
SSN: Adr= 1221 F Street 
I Rac: SX: Tel: (208) 799-3131 Cty: Lewiston ST: ID Zip: 83501 
+-- --------------------------------------- -----------------------------------+ 
Offense Codes: ATL Reported: ATL Observed: 
Circumstances: 
Rspndg Officers: Wilson Kevin 
Wilson Kevin 
Morrow Brenda 
Thomas Joe A Santos Patrick 
Rspnsbl Officer: Agency: NPCS CAD Call ID: 0604-0291 






































Written Incident Repo 










CA 0604-0291 04/15/2006 
Transport Broken Seal 
NEZ PERCE COUNTY SHERIFF, 
FRARY, ROBERT DION 
JOHNSTON, MICHAEL SCOTT 
VEVLE, WILLIAM ALLEN 
Transport Broken Seal 
Transport Broken Seal 
SIL 1985 FORD F1S ID 
12:31 04/15/2006 Wanted Person *Initiating Call 
LAW Incident Offenses Detail: 
Offense Codes 
Seq Code 
1 ATL Attempt to Locate 
LAW Incident Responders Detail 
Responding Officers 
Seq Name Unit 
1 Wilson Kevin 10 
2 Thomas Joe A 26 
3 Santos Patrick 13 
Amount 
0.00 
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Main Radio Log Table: 
Time/Date Typ Unit Code Zone Agnc Description 
13:36:02 04/15/2006 1 10 CMPLT NPCS3 NPCS incid#=06-N2504 Completed call 
13:10:29 04/15/2006 1 10 23 NPCS3 NPCS incid#=06-N2504 jail, em 42.8 
12:52:59 04/15/2006 1 10 82 NPCS3 NPCS incid#=06-N2504 bm32.5 call=4 
12:50:23 04/15/2006 1 10 14 NPCS3 NPCS incid#=06-N2504 frary bond/50 
12:35:42 04/15/2006 1 10 28 NPCS3 NPCS incid#=06-N2504 nll0320/ 1985 
12:34:21 04/15/2006 1 10 14 NPCS3 NPCS incid#=06-N2504 confirmed 29 
12:34:21 04/15/2006 1 10 14 NPCS3 NPCS + ohnston call=481 
12:33:21 04/15/2006 1 10 82 NPCS3 NPCS incid#=06-N2504 Prisoner in Cu 
12:32:22 04/15/2006 1 10 23 NPCS3 NPCS incid#=06-N2S04 Arrived at Sce 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHARLES E. KOVIS IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION TO DETERMINE COMPETENCY 
Narrative: 
Nez Perce County Sheriff's Department 
Date and Time: Sat Apr 15 13:38:06 PDT 2006 
Report Type: Wanted Person/Invalid Driver/Open Container x 3 
Reporting Officer: K. Wilson 
On the above date at about 1220 hours I was patrolling east 
bound in the 2800 block of Powers Ave. when I saw a silver 1985 Ford 
pickup traveling east in front of me in about the 2900 block. I saw that 
the vehicle was traveling over the posted speed limit of 35 miles per 
hour and estimated the vehicles speed to be between 55 and 60 miles per 
hour. After making sure there was no traffic behind me I stopped my 
patrol vehicle and activated my radar in a stationary mode. I obtained a 
radar reading of 60 miles per hour. There were no other vehicles 
traveling east or west when I obtained this speed. 
I activated my overhead emergency lights and attempted to catch 
up to the vehicle. I watched as the vehicle turned south onto 
Reservation Line Road. I saw that there were three subjects inside of 
the vehicle. I turned off of East Powers and saw that the vehicle was 
accelerating. I activated my audible siren and caught up to the vehicle 
bearing Idaho license plate NII0320 about 1/4 miles south on Manns Lake. 
While I was stopping the vehicle I saw the two passengers who 
were later identified as Michael S. Johnston d.o.b.  and William 
A. Vevle d.o.b.  make several furtive movements inside of the 
vehicle. I watched as both subjects reached down to the floor boards of 
the vehicle as if they were hiding something. I told the driver of the 
vehicle who was later identified as Robert D. Frary d.o.b.  to 
shut the vehicle off and to throw the keys out of the window. I 
contacted Frary and asked him to step from the vehicle. When Frary 
stepped from the vehicle I saw three opened cans of Keystone Light beer 
fall from an area on the floor board and pour out. I placed handcuffs on 
Frary and advised him that he was being detained at this time. I pat 
searched Frary and placed him in the back seat of my patrol vehicle. 
Deputy Thomas arrived on scene and contacted Vevle and Johnston. 
A drivers and records check on Frary showed that he has an invalid 
drivers license and that he also has a bench warrant through Lewis 
County. I had dispatch confirm the warrant and was advised that Lewis 
County would extradite. I advised Frary that he was under arrest for the 
warrant. I spoke to Johnston and Vevle and asked them who the open 
containers belonged too. Both subjects stated that they each had an open 
container. I saw that all three of the cans were about 3/4 empty, 
smelled of an alcoholic beverage and all cans were cold to the touch. I 
issued Vevle citation #26133 and Johnston citation #26134 charging both 
subjects with open container passenger. 
I asked Frary if he knew who the open containers belonged too 
and he stated that he and his passengers each had one can open. I asked 
Frary if he wanted one of the subjects to take control of the vehicle. 
Frary requested that Johnston take control of the vehicle. A search 
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incident to arrest revealed an open case of Keystone Light beer, l2 
ounce cans. I saw that there were 9 cans left in the case. The cans were 
cold to the touch. I transported Frary to the jail and issued him 
citation #26l35 charging him with having an invalid drivers license and 
open container. I read Frary warrant#Cr-2000-0000l90 and turned him over 
to jail staff for booking. 
See Deputy Thomas' report for further. 
Cpl. K. Wilson #25l7 
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Lewiston Police Department 
CAD Master Call Table: Page: 1 
Long-Term Call ID: 854550 
Active Call: Nature: Suicidal Person 
Address=   
Info: (See below) 




Type: I Priority: 1 
City: LEW Lewiston 
Alarm Number: 
+- Complainant& 29521 --------------------------------------------------+ 
I Lst: JOHNSTON Fst: MICHAEL Mid: SCOTT I 
I Adr:  DOB:  I 
I Cty: Lewiston ST: 1D Zip: 83501 SSN:  I 
I Tel:  Race: W Sex: M Pre v Calls& Wants& Adr& I 
I Alrt: DOMV,DUSR I 
+---------------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
Contact: Inland Tel: (208) 790-2740 
Address: 1552 Richardson Avenue - NW Sector 
Calls& Dupl& Names & w/Alrts& Wants& Prem& Adr& 
How Rcvd: 9 911 Line Occurred between: 12:55:40 11/23/2006 
Rcvd by: Schaffner J and: 12:55:51 11/23/2006 
HId Until: / / When Rptd: 12:55:51 11/23/2006 
====== 
'lJVOLVEMENTS: 






Call Taker Comments: 
Description 
Suicidal Person 




desiree anderson/johnston just left the above res and is poss suicidal. poss 
pills on her such as sleeping. she lives at the apts across from 
orchards elem same side of thain oposite side of orchards. driving a 
red ford mustang plate n1576. 
13:01:40 11/23/2006 - Schaffner J 
desiree is on cell phone with son at the cedar ave res 
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462 1/14/2008 
_0: 52 
Lewiston Police Department 
CAD Master Call Table: Page: 1 
Long-Term Call ID: 851965 
Active Call: Nature: Information Type: i Priority: 3 
Address=  City: LEW Lewiston 
Info; (See below) 
Between: 13TH ST & THAIN RD 
Zones: & & & Alarm Number: 
Directions: 
+- Complainant& 29521 --------------------------------------------------+ 
I Lst: JOHNSTON Fst: MICHAEL Mid: SCOTT I 
I Adr:  DOB:  I 
I Cty: Lewiston ST: ID Zip: 83501 SSN:  I 
I Tel:  Race: W Sex: M Prev Calls& Wants& Adr& I 
I Alrt: DOMV, DUSR I 
+---------------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
















Call Taker Comments: 
/ 
w/Alrts& Wants& Prem& Adr& 
Description 
Occurred between: 15:08:07 10/18/2006 
and: 15:08:07 10/18/2006 
When Rptd: 15:08:07 10/18/2006 
= = = = = = = = = = == = = = = = 
JOHNSTON, MICHAEL SCOTT 
Relationship 
*Complainant 
Called to adv his ex wife Desirae Anderson is suicidal, she took a bunch of 
pills last night and drank alcohol, he found her unc in his backyard when he 
carne home from work. He got her up and made her walk and vomit. She told him 
that she was going to attempt this night after night until she was successful. 
He just spoke to her approx 20 min ago at her residence. She has their 12 and 
7 year old sons living with her. She asked him if he wanted them for the 
evening. 
Johnston believes if we try to contact her it will make it worse, he did not 
specify worse by said he believed she would deny it. He did not call medics 
nor police on last nights incident. 
Johnstons cell # 790-2740 
work # 843-7260 ext 207 
Info given to Sgt Pedersen 
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Lewiston Police Department 
CAD Master Call Table: 
462 
Page: 1 
Long-Term Call ID: 851968 
Active Call: Nature: Welfare Check Type: 1 Priority: 1 
Address=  #1 
Info: (See below) 




City: LEW Lewiston 
Alarm Number: 
+- Complainant& 29521 --------------------------------------------------+ 
I Lst: JOHNSTON Fst: MICHAEL Mid: SCOTT I 
I Adr:  DOB:  I 
I Cty: Lewiston ST: ID Zip: 83501 SSN:  I 
I Tel:  Race: W Sex: M Prev Calls& Wants& Adr& I 
I Alrt: DOMV, DUSR I 
+---------------------------------------------------------------------------+ 










w/Alrts& Wants& Prem& Adr& 
Occurred between: 15:47:53 10/18/2006 
and: 15:47:53 10/18/2006 
When Rptd: 15:47:53 10/18/2006 
== ================ = == == == = == == = = == == == = == == == 
\JVOLVEMENTS: 






Call Taker Comments: 
Description 
Welfare Check 




Called to adv his ex wife Desirae Anderson is suicidal, she took a bunch of 
pills last night and drank alcohol, he found her unc in his backyard when he 
came home from work. He got her up and made her walk and vomit. She told him 
that she was going to attempt this night after night until she was successful. 
He just spoke to her approx 20 min ago at her residence. She has their 12 and 
7 year old sons living with her. She asked him if he wanted them for the 
evening. 
Johnston believes if we try to contact her it will make it worse, he did not 
specify worse by said he believed she would deny it. He did not call medics 
nor police on last nights incident. 
Johnstons cell # 790-2740 
work # 843-7260 ext 207 
Info given to Sgt Pedersen 
this was originally added as an informational call and per 159 to do a welfare 
check on subject after 1600 hours as the children should be gone by then. 
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IDAHO SECRETARY OF STATE 
Viewing Business Entity 
Ben Ysursa, Secretary of State 
[ New Search] [ Back to Summary ] 
[ Get a certificate of existence for NEXTEL WEST CORP. ] 
NEXTEL WEST CORP. 
6500 SPRINT PARKWAY 
OVERLAND PARK, KS USA 66251 
Type of Business: CORPORATION, GENERAL BUSINESS 
Status: GOODSTANDING, ANREPT SENT 03 Dec 2007 
State of Origin: DELAWARE 
Date of 24 Feb 1993 
Origination! Authorization: 
Current Registered Agent: CORPORATION SERVICE COMPANY 
1401 SHOREUNE DR STE 2 
BOISE, ID 83702 
Organizational ID / Filing C101198 
Number: 
Number of Authorized Stock 
Shares: 
Date of last Annual Report: 03 Jan 2008 
Original Filing: 
Filed 24 Feb 1993 CERTIFICATE 
OF AUTHORITY 
Amendments: 
Amendment Filed 15. Aug NAME CHANGED 
1994 TO ONECOMM 
CORPORATION, 
N.A. 
Amendment Filed 10 Jun NAME 
Annual Reports: 
1997 CHANGED TO 
NEXTEL WEST 
CORP. 
Report for year 2008 ANNUAL REPORT 
[ Help Me Print/view TIFF] 
View Image (PDF format) 
View I mage (TIFF format) 
[ Help Me Print/View TIFF] 
View Image (PDF format) 
View Image (TIFF format) 
View Image (PDF format) 
View Image (TIFF format) 
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View Document Online 
Report for year 2007 ANNUAL 
REPORT 
View Image (PDF format) View 
Image (TIFF format) 
Report for year 2006 ANNUAL REPORT View Document Online 
Report for year 2005 ANNUAL 
REPORT 
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IDSOS Viewing Business Entity http://www .aceessidaho.orlYpub liel sosl corpl search.html ?ScriptFom 
Report for year 2004 ANNUAL 
REPORT 
Report for year 2002 ANNUAL 
REPORT 
Report for year 2002 ANNUAL 
REPORT 
Report for year 2001 ANNUAL 
REPORT 
Report for year 2000 CHNG 
RA/RO 
Report for year 1999 ANNUAL 
REPORT 
Report for year 1998 ANNUAL 
REPORT 
Report for year 1998 CHNG 
RA/RO 
Report for year 1997 ANNUAL 
REPORT 
Report for year 1996 ANNUAL 
REPORT 
Report for year 1996 ANNUAL 
REPORT 
Report for year 1995 ANNUAL 
REPORT 
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Report for year 1994 ANNUAL 
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State of Idaho Home Page 
Comments, questions or suggestions can be emailed to: sosinfo@sos.idaho.qov 
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State of Idaho 
CERTIFICATE OF AUTIfORITY 
OF 
CENCALL, INC 
- I \..j 
I, PETE T. CENARRUSA, Secretary of State of the State of Idaho, hereby certify that 
duplicate originals of an Application of CENCALL, INC for a Certificate of Authority 
to transact business in this State, duly signed and verified pursuant to the provisions of 
the Idaho Business Corporation Act, have been received in this office and are found to 
conform to law. 
ACCORDINGLY and by virtue of the authority vested in me by law, I issue this 
Certificate of Authority to CENCALL, INC. to transact business in this State under the 
name CENCALL, INC and attach hereto a duplicate original of the Application for 
such Certificate. 
Dated: February 24, 1993 
~t1i'~ 
SECRETARY OF STATE 
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APPLlC4~~ FOR ~!RTIFIC~TE ~"VW~:~ 
Il ; " (PI' Corporati) ftREY AR'r Of ST.ITE 
(', 
To the s.er.tary of .... of IdItIo . 
Pur8uant 10 Sdon ao-1 ... 110.ldabo eo.. the ~ Ccrpondon ....." app8es tor. CeI1ifIcate of 
Authority to nnuct bwfftMlIn YCU'Statit. and for hi purpose aubmIta .. following statarnent: 
., 
1. The n ..... of the corpondon II _......;c::!:a~nC~;a~l~l~,....;:r!.!nc~. _____________ -_ 
2. "... nIIITIe which It hi t.-eln IdIho Is __________________ _ 
ero be UMd only wMn roquhd tD avoid • conftIct with • ...,........,. an ... Muat be ~ by a Board of 
~ IWOIuIJon iIdopIflD ~ natnlJln 1dIho.) 
3. It lllnoorporHJd under the IIlWII of _~Qaft).uIJUlflAa.&.lTftta.._ _____________ _ 
4. "... dale of Ita Incorpondon II _....atll&vL..ll;li&,S"" ..;I;l~9Sii:.;9~ ______ and the pertod of Ita tim!ldon Is 
Pf!!!p!tual. • 
5. The addrea of Ita ~ Gfb In .,. ... or eountry under 1M laws of whfch It fa incorporated Is 
Corpgration TXUft cUter, 1209 Orange Street, Wil.mington, Delaware 19801 
3200 Cherry Creek South Drive, Suite 230, Denver, Colorado 80209 
7. Th4t*"tllCll:h .. ofb~ ~officelnldlhola 702 Werst Idaho· Suire RIO 
_B;..;o_1;.;;.,I1.-& ,:....;..I;;.,D....,;;8.;;,3.;..70;..;2.;...-. _______________ • and.,.. name of Its ~ 
NgfltenKhgent In kl8ho IItIhllt addnJIsa Is Corpgratign Service Cmtny Slo Holdsm. Kidwtll., 
Hahn & Crapo 
8. TM purpose or pt.It'J)OW' wh6ctt It is ~ to ptnUO In the ~ of ~ In Idaho are: 
orarating and prov~4!Pf sP!9ialized mobile radio and tele~nicationB services. 
(Continued on reverse) 
Submit application and oerlfficate of status to: 
Ofb of the s.cm.y of Sbde 
DMslon of Corpondons 
_. _ahaYie, Room 203 
.. ' -..... Bofse.Idaho 83720 
~of ,_~"m' [I- 5IRJt. 
1~4 ogoo 5392f).l-
Ilt II S:S13 IlSTt 1 
t::nIIPIR4TIn l' 70.00- 70.00 
9. The nIInMIIlW ~ addrHIIo. of Ita dinK:Iors and oftbml are: 
I ", .~'. " 
HaM , ,., -1.",) ~ 
. l I i-' l 01 
RopIrt Ii'. 19DB)riie ';e"deDt. 
3200 Cherry Creek ~rive, 
Parow;« Colgndg BQ209 
3200 Cherry Creek South Drive, 
..;Mar-=;;;.;;k...;A_._·_P_e_ter=a~ __ ....Ih9I::;.;g:a,;r;etHy_""-___ Ilonver, CQlorn"o 8Q209 
3200 Cherry Creek South Drive, 




Stephen 1f. Behovee 
. ~f1 tieCnttive 3200 Cherry Creek Sop.~lDrive, Suite 230 
QfCiR1lr J?!pver c Colorado 80209 
--SEE EXHIBIT A--
----------------------------------------
10. The corporaIfon IICCOJ* lind ahaIII comply wIIh 1M provftdons of 1M ConstItutIon and the laws of 1M State of 
1dIho. 
11. ThIs tlpplcdon Is aooomp8'dCld by • c.rtmoat. of Corporate Status or E*atenoe, ctJly authenticated by the 
propw ofIklor of .. _. «oouWy undGr 1M laws of whk:h it Is Incorponded. 
Detod: hlwJ.aQ 15, 19i3 





I Ma ry K. Dee ........... .... hiIIo do to-hu ~ ....... . -----------------------------------I •. --,~.- .~~I~IU.,U~.,on 
15th February 93 this ______ day of --_....;.._____ ,19 __ _ 
.~~before 
me Robert F. McKenzie and Mark A. Peters : they • who befng by me tnt duly swom, dadlnd Ihat (W)tMt 
are 
ftKt President and S~retary respftiJt:.J.i.:.;ve;;.;l:.ol:y ____ -.:::.of.:.....:;C:.;;;e.:.:,n.:;:.:Call.Jl:..:.l..a. . _ILl.0l.l!c .... ' _____ _ 
they . 
that ('-1Igned the foregofng documents as Pres ldent and Secretary respe~~n and that 
the statements therein contained an true. 
My Commission Expires 6/22/94. 
~F MOTION TO DETERMINE COMPETENCY 
CENCALL, :mC. 
BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
Robert F. McKenzie 
CenCall, Ino. 
3200 Cherry creek South Drive 
suite 230 
Denver, Colorado 80209 
Greg HarJlal1 
SMR Network, Ino. 
1628 NW Everett st. 
Portland, oregon 97209 
Robert A. Brooks 
Brooks Teleoommunioations Corp. 
101 s. Hanley Road, 19th Floor 
st. Louis, Mi.souri 63105 
William A. Johnson 
Hanoock venture Partners 
One Finanoial center 
44th Floor 
Boaton, Massahu.etta 02111 
steven C. Balstedt (Chairman) 
The Centennial P'Unds 
1999 Broadway 
suite 2100 
Denver, Colorado 80202 
Robert K. Van Dagna 
Pleet Venture Partners 
111 Westminster st. 
Providenoe, Rhode Island 02903 
Richard J. Brekka 
CIBC Wood Gundy capital 
425 Lexinqton Avenue 
New York, New York 10011 
stephen W. Schave 
CenCal1 Holdings, Inc. 
3200 Cherry creek South Drive 
suite 230 
Denver, Colorado 80209 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHARLES E. KOVIS IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION TO DETERMINE COMPETENCY 
PAGE 
State of Delaware 
Office of the Secretary of State 
rtr, l~ i I I · ________________________ ~~  I 4. ~H jJ 
::,·;-<t~Ai<'r ;) 1= SlHE 
I, WILLIAM T. QUILLEN, SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE STATE OF 
DELAWARE, DO HEREBY CERTIFY CENCALL , INC. IS DULY INCORPORATED 
J 
1 
, · 1 , 
:1 
I . I '., 
.... .. .... 




. ' .... 
• William T. Quillen. Secrerary of State AlITHENTICAT10~3795526 
713054007 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHARLES E. KOVIS IN SUPPORT 





State of Idaho 
Al\.fENDED CERllF.lCATE OF AUTHORITY 
OF 
CENCALL,.INC. 
Fire Number C 101198 
I, PETE T. CENARRUSA, Seaetary of Stale of the State of Idaho, 
hereby certify that duplicate originaJis of an Applicafiol\ of CENCALL, INC. 
for an Amended Certificate of Authority to b'ansact business in this State, 
duly signed and Wri£ied pursuant to the provisions of the Idaho Business 
Corporation Ad .. have been :re£eived in. this office and are found to conform 
to Jaw. 
ACCORDINGLY and byvirttH- of the authority vested in me by 
law, I issue this Amended Certifi.cafe of Authority ~ ONECOMM: 
CORPORATION, N.A. to transact business in this State under the name 
ONECOMM CORroRATION, N.A. and attach hE$'eto a duplicate original of 
the Application fm such Amended Certificate. 
Dated: Au~t 15, 1994 
~(fi'~ 
SEGRETARYDF STATE 
DAVIT OF CHARLES E. KOVIS IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION TO DETERMINE COMPETENCY 
733 
. ~~ 
APPLICATIO'N FOR AM·EN~ CERTIFliCATE OF AUTHORITY , ~ a,;-PLJ 
, . ~ ~ . 
To the Sauetaly of S1atlt of Idal!l.o: S·,,~j· '\\,\ ,\. 
P"unJuarK 10 Section 3~1-118, Idaho C~~dtiSiGl!\ed Corporation hereby applies for an amended cer-
tificllllis' of .aullbarity to transact bUSin~ ~:J\\e~te of Idabo and fur that purpose submits the followin~ statement 
1. A. Certificate of Alillthority was issued to the cDrporation by your office on .1 ... eh_"._a..rv ___ 2"." _______ _ 
19 93 , authorfzlll1,O It to tran.ad b\illSin.eas in the State of Idaho under the flame of _______ _ 
ee.ca.l.l., :rnc. 
(NoI.8: II "'lit corpoafion n·am. "' ... 11'01 6 •• n chanSJ*d. Ned ·No chang .... } 
3. The name wJlich it s.hall use hereafter In the StaW. of Idaho is ___________ ...,.-____ _ 
It desires to pu.sue in"the tralll6aclioo of busiae.$ in the StaJte of Idaho plfH'POfJ.." other than or in addition 
to- those .et fOrth iJII its. prior application for certificate of . ,L/thoFily ••• follows.: 
s.pecify) 
I, . Gyy William. • a notary public, do heJeby certify that on 
this 2-211 J day of __ -:r;~IM __ -e_ ........ _____ , 19 .:1 q. . personally appeared befo,e 
me Hichael It t carp«r , who being by me fiiJst duly sworn, decllared that {s.)he 
of O:p.9CO,mm corpo;ra.tiOn. E.A. 
that (5)M siVnedi the foregoing documel'lbl. 8 • ..:V~i:.::o:.;:e:....::Pr.:;.;:.~.:.:::i.:::::d=.=n.:.::t'__ _______ of the corporation and 
that the s1ai m 1h 
S\lJlbmit appllicatiroR lind fililllg fee to: 
OflilC8 of Ute- Secrebl,ry of Stata· 
DiviSion of CQfpOOlltiOna. 
Staltehow"e. Room 203 
Bois,e,ldelilo 83720 
My Commission Expires 
Jan. 25.. 1997 
s:.cretuy of SI ... Me. oftlf 
I1AIl ~ARY IF STAlE 
19940815 0'.l00 20922: 2 
CK t: law llISTt 5835 
CORP 
1@ 30.00= 30. 00 
Fee: $30.09 
PAGE 1 
State of Delaware 
Office Of the Secretary of State 
I ~ w.rI..I..IAM. T. QIJILL139 E SERCRETARY OF STATE OF THE STATE OF 
DElAWARE, DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE SAID "'CDCALL, INC~ n, FILED 
A CERTIFICA'FE OF AMENDMENT, CHANGING ITS NAME TO "ONECOMK 
CORPORATION, H.A_". '.I.'KE THIRTKEN'TH DAY OF JUN.E,. A .• D. 199'4,. AT 
4:30 O'CLOCK P.M. 
AND I DO HEREBY FUR'l'HER CERTIFY 'l'HAT THE AFORESAID 
COlRPORA'l'TON :IS DULY INCORPORATED UNDER THE LAWS OF 'I'HR STATE OF 
DELAWARE .MID IS IN GOOO STAlIDINS AND HAS A LEGAL CORPORATE 
EXIS'l'E.tilCE MOT HA~· BEEN CANCELLED OR IJiISSOLVED SO FAR AS THE . , 
, 
RECOIRI)S OF THIS OFFICE SHOW.MID IS Duty AUTHORIZED ro TRANSACT 
BUSlNESS. 
William T. Quillen, Secretary of State 
2196·427 8320 AUTHENTICATION: 
AFFID~'¥JI2Q~ffIARLES E. KOVIS IN SUPPORT 




State of Idaho 
AMENDED CERTIFICATE OF AUTHORITY 
OF 
ONECOMM CORPORATION, N.A. 
FIle Number C 101198 
I, PETE T. CENARRUSA, Secretary of State of the State of Idaho, 
hereby certify that duplicate originals of an Application of ONECOMM 
CORPORATION, N.A. for an Amended Certificate of Authority to transact 
business in this State, duly executed pursuant to the provisions of the Idaho 
Business Corporation Act, have been received in this office and are found to 
conform. to law. 
ACCORDINGLY and by virtue of the authority vested in me by 
law, I issue this Amended Certificate of Authority to NEXTEL WEST CORP. 
to transact business in this State under the I'(ame NEXTEL WEST CORP. and 
I attach hereto a duplicate original of the Application for such Amended 
Certificate. 
Dated: June 10,1997 
~(J/'~ 
SECRETARY OF STATE 
By 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHARLES E. KOVIS IN SUPPORT 




; APPLICATION FOR AMENDED CERTIFICATE OF AUTHORITY 
• In 3 00 PM t91 
To the Secretaxy of State of the State of Idaho: SEC:: '..,. . . .. ' ':'-~ T c 
PlIrsuam to Section 30-1-118, Idaho Code, the undersigned Corporation hereby ~JP'lik~ fo~ an'~~nded 
cefiificate of authority to transact bu:siiness in the State of Idaho and for that purpose submits the following 
statemerit. 
1! • A Cert:iificate of Authority was issued to the corporation by your office on J \l- "...,jL L 1: 19, j tJ 
8JiJthorizing it to transact business in the State of Idaho under the name of ------------------------
VN£-COMM 
2. Its corporate name has been COaifl9led to ________________________________ _ 
N£)(T£L 
3. The nacne which it shall use h&eafter in the State of F{jaho is 
Ai £,xT£L- W6ST 
4. It desires to pursue m the traiflsactioll of bu:.smess in the State of Idaho purposes other than or in addition to 
those set fanh in its prior ap'plication 101' certificate of authority, as follows: -----------------------
Submit applicaJtiun ami filing fee to: 
Off'tce of the Secretary of State 
lJfvision of Corporations Secretary of State use amy ~ 
DATE 06./10/1997 
0256 100937 14-
ex I: 1005 OJSTI.l:9577 
IIIJfi WIT II!' :J}.OO= 30.00 
Rle uvm ctl<JIlies. 
If a llame c:hange, .. :!tach certificate to of Act from sate! of Incorporation. 
Fee: $30.00. 
-It-. 
7~50F MOTION TO DETERMINE COMPETENCY 
73 
PAGE 
State of Delaware 
Office of the Secretary of State 
~, EDWARD J. FREEL, SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE STATE OF 
DELAWARE, DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE SAID 'ONECOMM CORPORATION. 
N.A.", FILED A CERTIFICATE OF MERGER, CHANGING ITS NAME TO 
"NEXTEL WEST CORP.-, THE TWENTY-SECOND DAY OF MAY, A. D. 1997, AT 
2 t '7'6427 8320 e.· :t~JI~ ...... ~ :!dwzrd 1 Freel. Sccretruy of Stare- 8501 88 i 
AUI'HENI'ICATION: 06-09--'-17 '717 i 187377 
DATE: 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHARLES E, KOVIS IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION TO DETERMINE COMPETENCY 
10f2 
IDAHO SECRETARY OF STATE 
Viewing Business Entity 
Ben Ysursa, Secretary of State 
[ New Search] [ Back to Summary] 
[ Get a certificate of existence for NEXTEL WEST CORP. ] 
NEXTEL WEST CORP. 
6500 SPRINT PARKWAY 
OVERLAND PARK, KS USA 66251 
Type of Business: CORPORATION, GENERAL BUSINESS 
Status: GOODSTANDING, ANREPT SENT 03 Dec 2007 
State of Origin: DELAWARE 
Date of 24 Feb 1993 
Origination! Authorization: 
Current Registered Agent: CORPORATION SERVICE COMPANY 
1401 SHORELINE DR STE 2 
BOISE, ID 83702 
Organizational ID ! Filing C101198 
Number: 
Number of Authorized Stock 
Shares: 
Date of last Annual Report: 03 Jan 2008 
Original Filing: 
Filed 24 Feb 1993 CERTIFICATE 
OF AUTHORITY 
Amendments: 
Amendment Filed 15 Aug NAME CHANGED 
1994 TO ONECOMM 
CORPORATION, 
N.A. 
Amendment Filed 10 Jun NAME 
Annual Reports: 
1997 CHANGED TO 
NEXTEL WEST 
CORP. 
[ Help Me Print/View TIFF] 
View Image (PDF format) 
View Image (TIFF format) 
[ Help Me Print/View TIFF] 
View Image (PDF format) 
View Image (TIFF format) 
View Image (PDF format) 
View Image (TIFF format) 
Report for year 2008 ANNUAL REPORT 
[ Help Me PrintIView TIFF] 
View Document Online 
Report for year 2007 ANNUAL 
REPORT 
View Image (PDF format) View 
Image (TIFF format) 
Report for year 2006 ANNUAL REPORT View Document Online 
Report for year 2005 ANNUAL 
REPORT 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHARLES E. KOVIS IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION TO DETERMINE COMPETENCY 
View Image (PDF format) View 
Image (TIFF format) 
10/21/200810:37 A 
72..Q 
IDSOS Vlewmg .I3usmess EntIty http://wwW.accessldaho.orgJpubllc/sos/corp/searCh.html'!ScriptForm.. 
~2 
Report for year 2004 ANNUAL 
REPORT 
Report for year 2002 ANNUAL 
REPORT 
Report for year 2002 ANNUAL 
REPORT 
Report for year 2001 ANNUAL 
REPORT 
Report for year 2000 CHNG 
RA/RO 
Report for year 1999 ANNUAL 
REPORT 
Report for year 1998 ANNUAL 
REPORT 
Report for year 1998 CHNG 
RA/RO 
Report for year 1997 ANNUAL 
REPORT 
Report for year 1996 ANNUAL 
REPORT 
Report for year 1996 ANNUAL 
REPORT 
Report for year 1995 ANNUAL 
REPORT 
View Image (PDF format) View 
Image (TIFF format) 
View Image (PDF format) View 
Image (TIFF format) 
View Image (PDF format) View 
Image (TIFF format) 
View Image (PDF format) View 
Image (TIFF format) 
View Image (PDF format) View 
Image (TIFF format) 
View Image (PDF format) View 
Image (TIFF format) 
View Image (PDF format) View 
Image (TIFF format) 
View Image (PDF format) View 
Image (TIFF format) 
View Image (PDF format) View 
Image (TIFF format) 
View Image (PDF format) View 
Image (TIFF format) 
View Image (PDF format) View 
Image (TIFF format) 
View Image (PDF format) View 
Image (TIFF format) 
Report for year 1995 MISCELLANEOUS View Image (PDF format) 
View Image (TIFF format) 
Report for year 1994 ANNUAL 
REPORT 
Report for year 1993 ANNUAL 
REPORT 
Report for year 1993 CHNG 
RA/RO 
Report for year 1993 CHNG 
RA/RO 
Idaho Secretary of State's Main Page 
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Image (TIFF format) 
View Image (PDF format) View 
Image (TIFF format) 
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State of Idaho Home Page 
Comments, questions or suggestions can be emailed to: sosinfo@sos.idaho.gov 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHARLES E. KOVIS IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION TO DETERMINE COMPETENCY 
10/211209J)JJ] Ai 
State of Idaho 
Department of State 
CERTIFICATE OF AUIHORITY 
OF 
CENCALL, INC. 
I, PETE T. CENARRVSA, Secretary of State of the State of Idaho, hereby certify that 
duplicate originals of an Application of CENCALL, INC. for a Certificate of Authority 
to transact business in this State, duly signed and verified pursuant to the provisions of 
the Idaho Business Corporation Act, have been received in this office and are found to 
conform to law. 
ACCORDINGLY and by virtue of the authority vested in me by law, I issue this 
Certificate of Authority to CENCALL, INC. to transact business in this State under the 
name CENCALL, INC. and attach hereto a duplicate original of the Application for 
such Certificate. 
Dated: February 24, 1993 
~(J/'~ 
SECRETARY OF STATE 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHARLES E. KOVIS IN SUPPORT 
qF MOTION TO D~~E~INE COMPETENGY 
! . . ~it 
\ ~j 
7£/-1 
APP~IC~~~. FOR CERTIFICATE O~~~ORI:rv 
• ' "j ' (Profit ~ don) . i · . ' . 2.J AH 93 
. 11 ; .. rpoI ~£CRElARY OF Sur~ 
... ! .. 
To the a.a....'1 aI .... 01...,., 
Pur&w1IID Sec:Ian 30-1..110. ..... eo.. ... UlIdn9Ied ~ ~ IppIIee lor • CertItIcata of 
AuIhofty ID n..ct ..... In yaw ..... _ fa' .. pwpaee ..,., .... toIawIng ~ 
., 
1. The...,. of .. COlpOi"-' II _---.!C:::eoc::::.~l:.!l;L'....:I~n~c.:.. ______________ _ 
2. The,.,.~ ........ In IdIM 11 __________________ _ 
(To be UMd ant, when,.....," ..... oanIIcI ..... ,... ~ on •• Mull be .... , ... 1Ied by. 80MI of 
DhcU ...... 1IIDn 8ttc '.IO _ ...... ,...In 1dIho.) 
3. IIiIncat-poiMld undw lie .... '" _~Do ... ) ... ·~ .... T .... O"'__ _____________ _ 
.c. The did. of blnootpcnlon II _-""MI .. xl. .... lIlt5.L" .... 1w:?~89'--_______ .. pIdod of 1m cinIon II 
pupetaal.. 
5. 1M acIt* •• "' ... prtndpcI GfIIcc In ...... fIT COlftry w'Idar the Icw8 of wHctI •• Incorporated II 
COCPGntiOD T!!ft eaDt:er c 1209 Or!D7' Str_t, 1U.l..a1.nqton, Dela.are 19801 
t. The .tit=- to wHah 00i ....... 1hcdd be dR ••• d, • d ....... tram ... 1n Item 5. 
3200 Cberry Creek Soath Dx1."., Suite 230, Denver, Colorado 8D209 
...;B_o .... l ..... ..;.~ID_..;;.8 ... 3...;70;..;;2;...._. ______________ ,Ind the rwne of II propoced 
....... cdllQCf1llnldlho .. .,. ....... CoxponUog Service CORRIPY clo 801d,n, K1dwd;J,. 
Hahn & Crapo 
e. "."..,... fIT pwpowI wHch It .. P'upoeM to piftUe ~ the •• ......, aI buIIr.a In Idcho .. : . 
oent.iDg ADd Pro'f'!4!!I lpec;iall.ae4 .abUe radio aDd tel~nlcatiou lervice •• 
(ConCInucd on rcvcrM) 
Submit IA)bdon .nd ocrtfIcm. of ltatus 10: 
0fII0c of the Sea_, of ... 
DfvWon 01 CorpoIIIIb. 
. SIMwha_, Room 203 
. ". " BoIM. Idcho 83720 
"-,-19D224 0900 5lB '2 
at '1 ISlJ asr. I 
UMRnIO I' 70.000 70.00 
•• 
Cl'iI'I~1hI Status or Exls1eoce F .. :$eO 
3200 Cherry Creek ~ive, Suite 230 
Qanvm; 5 Cplgn"q BQ2Q9 
3200 Cherry Creek South Drive, Suite 230 
_Har ....... -.k .... A .... _· _p ... et.er .. ........ ___ ..Jh9J::.x.:::a.:.tarv.-: . .. ___ penye,r, Cplgn"g 8Q209 
3200 Cherry creek South Drive, Suite 230 
_.Mar ........ -.k_A_._P_eter __ -.s ___ '~zrm¥ar !)PDUr, rotor.do 8020' 
stephen If. Behove. 
, (:)d.t1 ~tive 3200 Cherry Creek Sop.th:i.Dr!ve, Suita 230 
OfUgflr DenVEr Colorado 80209 
--SEE EXHI~B~I~T~A~-_-__________________________ __ 
10. The corporatJon aacepta and ...... comply wfth the provislon1J of the CormltutIon and the laws of 1M Stat. of 
Idaho. 
11. ThIs appIIodon • aocomp8"IIed by • c.tfioat. of Corporate Status or &iatenoe, IiJIy ltl.IthanUcated by the 
prep« oftIoer til 1M ... fit ccxNy under Ih! laM of which It Is Inoofponld8d. 
o.t.d: Februart &5, 1923 
STATe OF _C_o_1o_r_a_d_o ___ _ 




I. ___ Ma_r.;;.y_K_,_De_e ____________ ," notary public. do hereby certify 1hat.on 
15th February 93 this ______ dIIy of ___________ .19 __ _ 
• pcnonaIy eppeared before 
me Robert F. McKenzie and Mark A. Peters 
are 
: they 
• who being by me rnt ddt swom, dadlnd that (l)C» 
Ifrh Pre? i dent and Slr!&Cretary res olijft ..... i ... ve_.,1.y ______ of.:.....o;C;.;;e.:.l,n .. CalO.ll.1..a.,_Il.Ioo/,¥co,&,' _____ _ 
they . 
that (~ aIgned the foregoing dcIcu'nentt as Pres 1 dent and Secretary respe~~n and that 
the statements Chenrin containtld .. true. 
My Commission Expires 6/22/94, 
~ . 
I'ftlIflt OF MOTION TO DETERMINE COMPETENCY 
CENCALL, INC. 
BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
Robert PO. RoKanzie 
canCall, Inc. 
3200 Cherry creek South Drive 
suite 230 
Denver, COlorado 80209 
Greg Heraan 
SKR Network, Inc. 
1628 NW Everett St. 
Portland, oregon 97209 
Robert A. Brooks 
Brooks Telecommunications Corp. 
101 S. Banley Road, 19th Floor 
st. Loui., Missouri 63105 
William A. Johnson 
Bancock venture Partners 
One Financial Center 
44th Floor 
Boston, Mas.cbu.etta 02111 
steven C. Halatadt (Chairman) 
'!'he centennial FUnds 
1999 Broadway 
SUite 2100 
Denver, Colorado 80202 
Robert K. Van Degna 
Fleet Venture Partnera 
111 We.tminster st. 
Providence, Rbode Island 02903 
Richard J. Brekka 
CIBC Wood Gundy capital 
425 Laxinqton Avenue 
New York, New York 10017 
Stephen w. Schov. 
CenCall Boldings, Inc. 
3200 Cherry Creek South Drive 
suite 230 
Denver, Colorado 80209 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHARLES E. KOVIS IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION TO DETERMINE COMPETENCY 
PAGE 
State of Delaware 
Office of the Secretary of State 
ttrl l.~ /J " ________________________ ~~  ~. ~M JJ 
: :. ·;-<t~Af<'t .)1= 51.HE 
I, WILLIAM T. QUILLEN/ SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE STATE OF 












I • ' 
..I",. I 
William T Quillen. Secretary of Stafe 
AUTHENTICATI01'1t3795526 
DATE: 02/23/1993 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHARLES E. KOVIS IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION TO DETERMINE COMPETENCY ,. 
,"-
7t1-S 
State of Idaho 
I I 




I, PEI'E T. CENAERUSA, Secretary of Stale of the State of Idaho, 
hereby certify that duplicate originalls of an Application of CENCALL, INC. 
fur an Amended Certificate of Authority to UansaQ: business· in this State, 
duly signed and. verified purswmt to the provisiomls of the Idaho Business 
Corporation Ad .. have been received in this office and are found to conform 
to Jaw. 
ACCORDINGLY and byvirtue of the authority vested in me by 
Jaw, I issue this Amended Certifica.re of Authority ~ ONECOM:M: 
CORPORATION, NA to transact busines iD. this State undler the name 
ONECOMM CORroRAll0N, N.A. and. attach hef:eto a duplicate original of 
f:he Application for such Amended. Certificate. 
Dated: Au~t 15, 1994 
~tJi'~ 
SECRETARY OF STATE 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHARLES E. KOVIS IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION TO DETERMINE COMPETENCY 
7ti-b 
. ~~ 
APPLICATEO'N FOR AM'E~'~ CERTIFICATE OF AUTHORITY 
, . ~ e· 
To the SeuetalY of State, of Id8lbo: S ',}J' '\\l ,\., 
PUnluant 10 Sectiion 30--1-116, Idaho Co(ec.Ul$dtfiigl!l,ed COfJll'Oration hereby applies fOJ an amended cer-
tificalt. of .autbon"ly to transacl: bUSin~ ~.~bt of Ida,ho and fen that pUlfPOse submits the folk>win~ abltenlent 
1. A Certificate of AlIJthoTtity was. iss.ued to the corporation by YOWlf olke on .. I',:JIie.b_DII ...' ... J: .... rvJl.-... 2 14 _______ _ 
19 93 , atJtbGri~ng it to tJ"ail'lsad bain.H8 in the state of Idaho under the l'Iame of _______ _ 
CeUCa11, Inc. 
2. • corponlte na,me hi .... .been chal!liQled to ODeComm Corporation, JJ .A. 
(Nole: If Ihe corporation ltame hu.nol 6 ... " chan~, mfHI ·No dutng ... -' 
3. The Ilame wllict! it shall use hereafter in the state of Idaho is ___________ ~----_ 
It deai.r ... tD pursue in"the trau.adion of busines .. in the SIatIt of Idaho ptlfPose. other than or in addition 
to tho ... set fo.rtlit illl ~ prior application for ceJtifica.te of authority ... Wows: 
STA 
~------




, a notary public, do hereby certify that on 
this ;i?2l'1 J day of __ ~"""-bVt __ -e _________ ' • 19 q q. , p8Jsonally appeared bafo,s 
l1li& Michael B, CaXP9r , whC!l being by m. fiJst duly sworn, declared that (a)he 
is till. Vict h •• id\I:Dt of OUComm Corpora.tiqn., B A. 
that (S)he sivned the foregoing documents as . ...:v;.,::i""o:;,;:.;..,.::P:.=·r"".;;.::.;,;:i;,;:d"".=l1""t'--________ of the corporation and 
Ihat the slate t& 
Submit application and filin,g fee to: 
Office of 01. S,ecrebl,ry of SIMa· 
Ow-iaion of Corpoostiona 
S,DltehOt.Pll.e, Room 2D3 
B.ois,e,ldebo 83nO 
My Commission Expifes 
Jan. 25, 1997 
SecteIlNy of S:1aSa .... eft., 
IiAIJ ~ARY [f STlI1£ 
1 '3940615 0IJl0 2092Z 2 
ex t~ 1~ 1llST1:i835 
CORP 
1@ 30. 00= 30. 00 
. 
ACA69~FFIDA ¥iJJ'~Ji~HAIFLli~.a,,~yJ£JN..swJ?~,1'hJm at.hI, of il:tcOtporlffiftn. Fee: $3Q,09 . 
Of)1>MOTIONsTO D~:rf.8ItMINE COMPETENCY 
C T 8¥eT!lrI' 
PAGE 1 
State of Delaware 
Office Of the Secretary of State 
I, WILLIAM T. QUILLEN £ SERCRET:ARY OF STATE OF THE STATE OF 
DELAWARE, DO HEREBY CERTIFY THiAT THE SAID NCENCALL'I INC. If, FILED 
A CERTIFICATE OF AHENDMENT I CHANGING ITS NAME TO "ONECOMM 
CORPORATION, N.A.". '!"'fIE THIRTEENTH DAY OF JIUN1i!, A.D. 1994,. AT 
4:30 O'CLOCK P.M. 
AND I DO HEREBy FURTHER C'ERJ'IFY '!'HAT THE AFORESAID 
CORPORA'J.''ION IS DULY INCORPORATED UNDER THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF 
DELAWARE .MID IS IN' OOOD STAlIDIBG AND HAS A LEGAL CORPORATE 
EXISTE'NCE: _0'1t' HAVDiIG :a,BEN" CANCELLED QlR D€I:SSOLVID SO FAR AS THE 
, . 
I 





:,:"") . ~ 
William T. Quillen, Secretary of State 
2196427 8320 AUTHENTICATION: 
AFFIDA,,~~gK1c;HARLES E. KOVIS IN SUPPORT 




State of Idaho 
AMENDED CERTIFICATE OF AUIHORITY 
OF 
ONECOMM CORPORATION, N.A. 
File Number C 101198 
I, PETE T. CENARRUSA, Secretary of State of the State of Idaho, 
hereby certify that duplicate originals of an Application of ONECOMM 
CORPORATION, N.A. for an Amended Certificate of Authority to transact 
business in this State, duly executed pursuant to the provisions of the Idaho 
Business Corporation Act, have been received in this office and are found to 
conform to law. 
ACCORDINGL Y and by virtue of the authority vested in me by 
law, I issue this Amended Certificate of Authority to NEXTEL WEST CORP. 
to transact business in this State under the :r(ame NEXTEL WEST CORP. and 
, attach hereto a duplicate original of the Application for such Amended 
Certificate. 
Dated: June 10, 1997 
~(//'~ 
SECRETARY OF STATE 
By 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHARLES E. KOVIS IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION TO DETERMINE COMPETENCY 
-=-··-': ~-~7_~, .:~ ". -"t> "(" _~.~~~'_J'?~~' . .::~,~_.: .;_> " . . _-~:I~ ': .  #;:';.;J::.'~ -'.:".:"';::; :", . ~:-:·1.' .~ .. ~.: -; ... ~ "." ;", ;: ~ ,'. _~~_ ~·,7_-/:,·_~.;,_.,·:·: ':'_~_~ :::.-.-,_ :~~:_:'_~·.i1'."-.~_·"'·:·::' ~ .". 
~~,-=-,~~ . ..:c::'- ,::;:'--'-' ~-" ... "' .. _:...,. -.S:·'i~" j,,"'-':':::--~.;::;'ii ':- : .• ::" " ; : ""~ ': . - m" " . . . ' .' c,: 
7tL11 
APPLICATION FOR AMENDED CERTIFICATE OF AUTHORITY 
Ja m 3 00 PM "91 
prJ ~TAT~ 
T <) the Secretaly of State of the State of Idahc: S t. ::::. . T _. - •. ", 
Pursuam 1:0 Section 30-1-118, Idaho Code. the undersigned Corporation hereby ~d~tik~ fo~ an'~~nded 
certificate o·f authority to tmosact business in the State of Idaho and for thm: purpose submits the following 
statement. 
1 • A Certificate of Authority was iSS1!.ledi to the corporation by your office 00 j I.) "...,;L L 1: 19, j t.J 
authorizing it to tmnsact business in the State of Idaho under the name of ----------------------
2. Its corporate name has been changed to _____________________________ _ 
N £)(TJ;L W~5T 
3. The Ilame which it shall use hereafter in the State of fdaho is ---------------------------
W£'ST 
4. It desit'"e5 to pursue in the tralilsaction of bl.llSiiness in the State of Idaho purposes. other than or in addition to 
those set forth in iits. prior application for certificate of authority, as foJlKlws: 
Submiit appliicaltiofl and filing fee to: 
Office of the Secret:a.-y of St.ilIte 
Division of Corpora:tions 
Rle two COJIlies. 
If a nama chal'lge, a:ttach csrtiificata to of Ad from sate of ancorporatiicm. 
Fee:: $30.00 
7~'5AFFIDAVIT OF CHARLES E. KOVIS IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION TO DETERMINE COMPETENCY 
----------------------
5ecre:titl:y of Stiltll use only 
DATE 061'101'19'97 
0256 100937 1. 4-
CK I: 1005 miT, 19577 







Office Of the Secretary of State 
I, EDWARD J. FREEL, SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE STATE OF 
DELAWARE. DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE SAID 'ONECOMM CORPORATION. 
N.A . ' , FILED A CERTIFICATE OF MERGER, CHANGING ITS NAME TO 
"NEXTEL WEST CORP.", THE TWENTY-SECOND DAY OF MAY, A.D. 1997, AT 
J. 
2196427 8320 
97i187377 AUTI-IENTICATION: 06-09 --97 
DATE: 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHARLES E. KOVIS IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION TO DETERMINE COMPETENCY 
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FILED " 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 











CASE NO. CR06-07149 
OPINION AND ORDER 
ON DEFENDANT'S MOnON 
TO DISMISS AND MOTION 
IN LIMINE 
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Motion in Limine. 
The Court heard oral arguments on the motions on November 25,2008. Defendant Leotis B. 
Branigh III was represented by attorney Charles E. Kovis. The State was represented by 
Prosecuting Attorney Daniel L. Spickler. The Court, having considered the motions, affidavits 
and briefs filed by the parties, having heard oral arguments of counsel, and being fully advised in 
the matter, hereby renders its decision. 
State v. Branigh 
Opinion & Order on Motion to Dismiss I Motion in Limine 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Defendant Branigh contends that by charging him with murder the State has violated his 
right against double jeopardy under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution as he 
has already once been placed in jeopardy for the same offense. Defendant contends police 
endangered his life and/or limb the first time when they pursued him at high speed in marked 
patrol units with emergency lights flashing, shot at his vehicle in order to disable it, and then 
arrested him. It is Defendant's contention that by charging him and causing him to stand trial for 
murder, his life and/or limb is endangered a second time for the same offense. Defendant argues 
that the plain language of the Fifth Amendment supports his position. The Fifth Amendment 
reads: 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, 
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in 
the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or 
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put 
in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation. 
United States Constitution, Amendment 5. 
The Defendant contends the plain language of the Fifth Amendment supports his 
position, emphasizing the words "nor shall any person ... for the same offense ... be twice put 
in jeopardy oflife or limb." While the Court finds the Defendants argument creative, it does not 
find support for the Defendant's position in the language of the Fifth Amendment. When the 
language relied on by the Defendant is read in context of the full text of the Amendment, it 
provides that no person shall be held to answer twice for the same offense, as answering for an 
offense places a person's life or limb in jeopardy. Adopting the interpretation argued by the 
Defendant would work an absurdity, as all that would be necessary to avoid prosecution for 
State v. Branigh 2 
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criminal activity is to flee or resist arrest to such a degree that police officers are forced to take 
serious measures to execute an arrest. Neither the Constitution nor any court would support an 
individual creating their own "jeopardy" and thereby acquiring 5th Amendment immunity from 
further prosecution. 
In the instant matter, Defendant Branigh is being held to answer only now for the alleged 
offense of murdering Michael Johnston. Since jeopardy will not attach until such time as a jury 
is sworn to try the issue, Defendant Branigh is not being held a second time to answer for the 
same offense. 
MOTION IN LIMINE - CELL PHONE RECORDS 
Defendant's Motion in Limine seeks to prevent the State from submitting as evidence at 
trial the electronically stored cell phone records of the Defendant obtained by means of a search 
warrant. Defendant asserts the records were obtained by means of a lawful search warrant that 
was unlawfully executed and, because the records were unlawfully obtained, they cannot be used 
as evidence at trial. In the instant case, a Lewiston City police officer contacted the local Nextel-
Sprint office to inquire about obtaining the cell phone records of Defendant Branigh. The local 
office told the officer he would have to contact the company's Overland Park, Kansas office 
where the records are stored. 
!LlWe 
On Octobe~, 2008, the Officer obtained a search warrant from Nez Perce County 
Magistrate Kalbfleisch for the electronically stored cell phone records of the Defendant. I The 
search warrant listed the premises to be searched as Sprint Nextel Corporate Security, Subpoena 
Compliance, located at 6480 Sprint Parkway in Overland Park, Texas (Fax #913-315-0736). 
Upon the suggestion of the Kansas office ofNextel-Sprint, which the officer had contacted by 
1 Attached as Appendix 1. 
State v. Branigh 3 
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telephone, the officer faxed the search warrant to the fax number supplied and listed in the 
warrant? Subsequently, the cell phone records were provided by mail to the Lewiston City 
Police Department. However, the records failed to include a letter of certification/authenticity 
so, on November 29,2007, the Officer obtained a second search warrant from Nez Perce County 
Magistrate Gaskill for the records and a letter of certification/authenticity.3 The second search 
warrant described the premises to be searched identically to the first warrant. The second 
warrant was then faxed to the fax number on the warrant as supplied by Nextel-Sprint. 
Idaho Code § 19-4408 reads: 
A search warrant may in all cases be served by any of the officers mentioned in 
its directions, but by no other person, except in aid of the officer on his requiring 
it. Service of a warrant may be made by the officers mentioned in its directions 
in person, by mail or facsimile transmission, or by electronic mail. Unless an 
investigation necessitates otherwise, the officer should attempt notification on 
the person whom it is served prior to electronic mail service. 
Idaho Criminal Rule 41(a) reads: 
(a) Authority to Issue Warrant. A search warrant authorized by this rule may be 
issued by a district judge or magistrate within the judicial district wherein the 
property or person sought is located upon request of a law enforcement officer 
or any attorney for the state ofIdaho. [emphasis added]. 
The Defendant contends the Idaho search warrant, while lawfully obtained, was 
unlawfully executed as it was not executed upon a Nextel-Sprint business located within the 
judicial district where the search warrant was obtained, as required by I.C.R. 41(a). Instead, the 
search warrant was sent by fax to another state well outside the judicial district where the search 
warrant was issued. 
2 The Court takes judicial notice that area code 913 includes Overland Park, Kansas. 
3 Attached as Appendix 2. 
State v. Branigh 4 
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The State first argues that the procedure followed was that suggested by Nextel-Sprint, 
implying it must be proper since it was recognized by the Kansas office of Nextel-Sprint. The 
State further argues that the question is not one of geography but one of personal jurisdiction. 
The State reasons that, because Nextel-Sprint is registered in Idaho as a foreign corporation 
doing business in Idaho, it is subject to the Court's personal jurisdiction and therefore, a search 
warrant issued by an Idaho judge carries the same force and authority when executed upon the 
Overland Park, Kansas Nextel-Sprint office as it would if the search warrant had been issued by 
a court in the judicial district where the Kansas office is located. The Court is not persuaded. 
The fact that a court has personal jurisdiction over a business entity has no bearing on the 
geographical limitations placed on search warrants by either statute and by rule. Neither can a 
business entity determine the proper procedure for execution of a state issued search warrant. 
The State has provided the Court with no authority that would allow a search warrant to 
be served on a location outside of the judicial district where the warrant is obtained. The 
language of 1. C.R. 41 (a) is clear and unambiguous. Barring authority that supersedes or trumps 
the Rule, of which the State has presented none, the Court finds the search warrant, while 
lawfully obtained, was unlawfully executed and, as a result, the cell phone records obtained by 
means of the search warrant were unlawfully obtained. Nevertheless, the Court's ruling does not 
foreclose admission of the Defendant's cell phone records if the State can present records that 
are shown to be lawfully obtained and a proper foundation for the admission of the records is 
established. 
State v. Branigh 5 
Opinion & Order on Motion to Dismiss I Motion in Limine 
75/P 
ORDER 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is hereby DENIED. 
Defendant's Motion in Limine re Cell Phone Records is hereby GRANTED. 
Dated this Z~ day of November 2008. 
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(Day and Night) 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, TO ANY SHERIFF, CONSTABLE, MARSHALl OR POLICEMAN IN THE 
COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE: 
PROOF by Affidavit having been this day made before me by one: Ofc. Brandon Hopple of 
the Lewiston Police Department, showing that there is reasonable cause to believe that 
certain property hereinafter described is located in or upon the following described 
premise: Sprint Nextel Corporate Security, Subpoena Compliance, locited at 6480 Sprint 
Parkway in Overland Park, Texas (Fax #913-315-0736). 
That the property referred to and sought consists of printouts of all incoming and 
outgoing text messages for cell phone number 20&305-8257; and the call detail records 
to include all incoming and outgoing calls for cell phone number 20&305-8257 for the 
period of 09-01-2007 until 10-02-07. 
YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED, at any time of the day or night to make 
immediate search of the above-described premisesl persons and/or vehice, for the 
property described above; and if you find the same or any part thereof to bring it forthwith 
before me at the Nez Perce County Courthouse in the City of Lewistonl Nez Perce County, 
Idaho. 
RETURN to this Warrant is to be made to the above-entitled Court within FOURTEEN 
~NVk~iWER ON MOTION TO 1 
DISMISS/MOTION IN LIMINE 
75% 
(14) days from the date hereof. 
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND and DATED this L/1'1day of _D:::::..J£.~~---,,.,,,t -''''---__ 
~tlNVAF"9\('JRDER ON MOTION TO 2 
DISMISS/MOTION IN LIMINE 
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SEARCH WARRANT. 
STATE OF I D A H 0 ) 
: 55. 




(Day and Night) 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, TO ANY SHERIFF, CONSTABLE, MARSHAL, OR POLICEMAN IN THE 
COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE: 
PROOF by Affidavit having been this day made before me by one: Ofc. Brandon Hopple of 
the Lewiston Police Department, showing that there is reasonable cause to believe that 
certain property hereinafter described is located in or upon thefollowing described 
premise: Sprint Nextel Corporate Security, Subpoena Compliance, located at 6480 Sprint 
Parkway in Overland Park, Texas (Fax #913-315-0736). 
That the property referred to and sought consists of subscriber information, to 
include name, address, date of birth, social security information, or any other identifying 
information regarding the account holder or holders for cell phone number 208-305-8257 
during the period of 09-01-2007 through 10-02-2007; and a certification/authentication 
letter on records requested and already provided to the Lewiston Police Department for 
Sprint/Nextel case number 2007-193092. 
YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED, at any time of the day or night to make 
immediate search of the above-described premises, persons and/or vehicle, for the 
property described above; and if you find the same or any part thereof to bring it forthwith 
before me at the Nez Perce County Courthouse in the City of LeWiston, Nez Perce County, 
~.FUNji(i)Nt AINIA~ER ON MOTION TO 1 
DISMISS/MOTION IN LIMINE 
Idaho. 
RETURN to this Warrant is to be made to the above-entitled Court within FOURTEEN 
(14) days from the date hereof. 
-\--
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND and DATED thisB day of Nov 
JUDGE 
s@R~WW~!<DrRDERONMOTIONTO 2 
DISMISS/MOTION IN LIMINE 
f 7007 
7{a1 
If1)j JItIM '})l flit 1 ~'?i 
the fore~~~~~b~~~~~~/~:t:~~h~e-re-:--c-,~Y ~,ffi, eb,ru, "ar:,~od1r true :OPies of 
Hand delivered . ,_" ~ 
__ Delivered via Valley Messenger Service LJ:', 'I I 
Mailed 
-LFacsimile 
Daniel L Spickler 
Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney 
And 
Charles E. Kovis 
Attorney for Defendant 
OPINION AND ORDER ON MOTION TO 
DISMISS/MOTION IN LIMINE 
76)' 
DANIEL L. SPICKLER 
Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney 
Post Office Box 1267 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone: (208) 799-3073 
Idaho State Bar No. 2923 
FILED 
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LEOTIS B. BRANIGH III, ) 
Defendant. ) 
CASE NO. CR2007-0008107 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
COMES NOW, DANIEL L. SPICKLER, Prosecuting Attorney for Nez Perce County, 
Idaho, in the above-entitled matter and moves the above-entitled Court to reconsider it's 
Opinion and Order on Defendant's Motion in Limine filed on December I, 2008. 
This Motion is made and based upon the Brief in Support of Motion for 
Reconsideration, and on the records on file herein. 
DATED this ~ day of December 20~~ '~ 
DANIEL L. SPICK~ 
Prosecuting Attorney 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 1 
7{,3 
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
I declare under penalty of perjury that a full, true, complete and correct copy of the 
foregoing MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION was 
(1) hand delivered, or 
(2) hand delivered via court basket, or 
(3) / sent via facsimile, or 
(4) mailed, postage prepaid, by depositing the same in the United 
States Mail. 
ADDRESSED TO THE FOLLOWING: 
Charles E. Kovis 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 9292 
Moscow, ID 83843 
J~ 
DATED this ~ day of December 2008. 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 2 
r. Legal Assistant 
DANIEL l. SPICKLER 
FILED 
Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney 
Post Office Box 1267 
818 om Z ffJ 1 06 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone: (208) 799-3073 
Idaho State Bar No. 2923 
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LEOTIS B. BRANIGH III, ) 
Defendant. ) 
CASE NO. CR2007-0008107 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF STATE'S 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
COMES NOW, DANIEL L. SPICKLER, Prosecuting Attorney for Nez Perce County, 
Idaho, in the above-entitled matter and hereby respectfully submits the following Brief in 
Support of State's Motion for Reconsideration regarding Text Messages obtained from 
Defendant's Electronic Communications Service Provider 
The State apologizes to the Court for failing to timely provide specific references to 
the State's authority to issue a Search Warrant for stored wire and electronic 
communications and transactional records and to have said· Warrant served extra-
territorially. 
1. AUTHORITY FOR EXTRA-TERRITORIAL SERVICE OF WARRANT 
Authority for both Federal and State Courts to issue extra-territorial search 
warrants is provided by 18 U.S.c. 2701 et. seq. (the Electronic Communication Privacy 
Act). The USA Patriot Act (Public Law 107-56) broadened the provisions of 18 U.S.c. 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF STATE'S 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 1 
7bS 
2703 to include stored wire and electronic communications. Definitions applicable to the 
ECPA are adopted from 18 U.S.c. 2510. 
Section 220 of the USA Patriot Act is entitled "Nationwide Service of Warrants for 
Electronic Evidence", and modified the provisions of the ECPA. 
As stated in Commentary, Chapter 121, Stored Wire and Electronic 
Communications and Transactional Records Access, National Institute for Trial Advocacy, 
James A. Adams (2008): 
Authorization for obtaining the contents of stored 
communications depends on two variables - the type of facility 
controlling the storage and the duration of the storage. To gain 
access to the content of materials stored in an "Electronic 
Communications System" (defined in 18 U.S.c. 2510 (14)) that 
have been stored for 180 days or less, the government can 
require disclosure only by resorting to a Fourth Amendment 
search warrant. The search warrant issuance process was 
amended to permit issuance by any judge having jurisdiction 
over the offense (emphasis added) regardless of the locus of 
the electronic storage system. Thus, such warrants are valid 
nationwide regardless of where they are issued. 
The relevant statute, Title 18 U.S.C. 2703 (a), provides in pertinent part that: 
A governmental entity may reqUire the disclosure by a provider 
of electronic communications service of the contents of a wire 
or electronic communication that is in electronic storage in an 
electronic communications system for one hundred and eighty 
days or less, only pursuant to a warrant issued using the 
procedures described in the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedures by a court with jurisdiction over the offense under 
investigation or equivalent state warrant. 
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not apply to state judges or state law 
enforcement. The State must only comply with Fourth Amendment requirements of 
probable cause. United States v. Katoa, (2004, CA10 Utah) 379 F.3d 1203, cert denied 
(2005 US) 2005 US Lexis 1888; U.S. v. McKeever, (1990, CAS Tex) 905 F.2d 829; U.S. v. 
Piver, (1990, CA9 OR) 899 F.2d 881. 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF STATE'S 
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A rather complete discussion of the reasoning behind the Federal Legislation is 
given In the Matter of the Search of, Yahoo, Incorporated, 701 First Avenue, Sunnyvale, 
California 94089, (2007 US Dist , Ariz): 
Common sense dictates the result reached herein. Judicial and 
prosecutorial efficiency is better served by permitting the 
federal district court for the district where the crime allegedly 
occurred to preside over both the investigation and prosecution 
of that crime. Commentators have suggested that one reason 
for the amendments effected by Section 220 of the Patriot Act 
was to alleviate the burden placed on federal district courts in 
the Eastern District of Virginia and the Northern District of 
California where major internet service providers (IIISPs") AOL 
and Yahoo, respectively, are located. See, Paul K. Ohm, Parallel 
Effect Statutes [*12] and E-mail "Warrants": Reframing the 
Internet Surveillance Debate, 72 Geo.Wash.L.Rev. 1599, 1613-
15 (Aug. 2004); Patricia L. Bellia, Surveillance Law Through 
Cyber/aw's Lens, 72 Geo.Wash.L.Rev. 1375, 1454 (Aug. 2004) 
(stating that the "effect of the change was to shift the 
responsibility for issuance of the order from the court where the 
service provider is located to the court with jurisdiction over the 
offense being investigated; prior to passage of the USA Patriot 
Act, a disproportionate number of such orders were issued in 
the Eastern District of Virginia, where AOL is located."); 
Franklin E. Fink, The Name Behind the Screenname: Handling 
Information Requests Relating to Electronic Communications, 
19 No. 11 Computer & Internet Law 1, 6-7 (Nov. 2002) (stating 
that "[t]his provision was intended to relieve the burden on 
district courts in which major communications providers are 
located, such as the Northern District of California and Eastern 
District of Virginia."). Indeed, the House Judiciary Committee's 
Report accompanying the USA Patriot Act explains that § 
2703(a) "attempts to address the investigative delays caused 
by the cross-jurisdictional nature of the Internet." Paul K. Ohm, 
Parallel Effect Statutes and E-mail "Warrants": Reframing the 
Internet Surveillance Debate, 72 Geo.Wash.L.Rev. at 1614-15, 
n. 80 (Aug. 2004) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 107-236, pt. 1 at 57 
(2001)). The Committee's Report further explains that requiring 
an investigator to coordinate with agents, prosecutors, and 
judges in the district where the ISP is located would cause time 
delays that "could be devastating to an investigation, especially 
where additional criminal or terrorists acts are planned." Id. 
(emphasis added). Additionally, requiring an Arizona federal 
agent investigating a crime committed in Arizona to travel to 
California or Virginia to obtain an out-of-district search warrant 
from a California or Virginia magistrate judge for electronically-
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF STATE'S 
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stored communications would, in my view, unnecessarily 
increase the cost of federal investigations. 
2. 18 U.S.C. 2703(a) is applicable to the States. 
Lest there be any confusion about the referenced statute's applicability to the 
states, the Court's opinion in Ameritech v. McCann, 403 F.3d 908; 2005 U.s. App. LEXIS 
5941 discusses the issue regarding applicability of the ECPA to the states (in the context 
of 18 USC 2706, which deals with the requirement that governmental entities are 
responsible for reasonable costs incurred by the service provider): 
"A governmental entity" is considerably broader than "the 
federal government." The point of § 2706 is not to distinguish 
the federal government from other governments, but to 
distinguish the public from the private sector. Any private actor 
who wants information from a phone company will have to 
negotiate and pay for the service, when §2702 allows disclosure 
at all. Governments have a power of compulsion, and §2706 
attaches a price tag to the use of that power, just as the 
Constitution's takings clause requires compensation for other 
uses of governmental power to obtain private property. 
Although the Electronic Communications Privacy Act does not 
define the term "governmental entity/, it uses that phrase in 
several sections in ways that make application to state and local 
governments unmistakable. For example, §2703 specifies how a 
"governmental entity" can go about obliging a phone company to 
hand over records. The statute gives examples, such as "an 
administrative subpoena authorized by a Federal or State statute 
or a Federal or State grand jury or trial subpoena", 
§2703(b)(1)(B)(i). Other options include a "State warrant" 
(referred to in three subsections) and a "Federal or State grand 
jury or trial subpoena" (in § 2703(c)(2)). Then there is § 
2703(d), which distinguishes what "a State governmental 
authority" must do from how a federal governmental body 
proceeds, an odd reference indeed if the category "governmental 
entity" does not include states. 
The language of § 2703 and § 2706 taken together is enough to 
satisfy any plain-statement requirement for application of federal 
law to the states. Cf. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460-61, 
115 L. Ed. 2d 410, 111 S. Ct. 2395 (1991). Although the 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF STATE'S 
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Congressional Budget Office expressed an opinion that the 1986 
law would not impose new costs on states, this view--on which 
Congress did not vote, and the President did not sign--cannot 
alter the meaning of enacted statutes. It suggests instead that 
the CBO erred (or perhaps thought that compensable demands 
would be so rare that the expenses under § 2706 would not 
make a dent in a governmental budget). 
Next in line is the District Attorney's argument that § 2706 does 
not preempt state law. It does not contain an express 
declaration of preemption, the District Attorney observes, and 
therefore (he says) does not supersede state law. Since when 
has such a declaration been required? The Constitution's 
supremacy clause does all the heavy lifting. Federal statutes 
prevail over state and local statutes to the extent of any 
inconsistency, whether or not Congress so declares one statute 
at a time. See International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 
481, 489, 93 L. Ed. 2d 883, 107 S. Ct. 805 (1987). 
3. Defendant lacks standing to raise constitutional violation issues. 
In addition to the grounds asserted above, the State contends the Defendant is 
without standing to contest the State's obtaining records belonging to Sprint/Nextel. The 
records may be about the Defendant, but they do not belong to him. 
The Court, in Albert Terrill Jones v. United States of America, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
31892, observed: 
"A person has an expectation of privacy protected by the Fourth 
Amendment if he has a subjective expectation of privacy, and if 
society is prepared to recognize that expectation as objectively 
reasonable." United States v. Mira valles, 280 F.3d 1328, 1331 
(11th Cir. 2002) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 
361, 88 S. Ct. 507, 516, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967) (Harlan, J., 
concurring). An individual's right to privacy is limited however. 
"[T]he Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of 
information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to 
Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on 
the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and 
the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed." 
United States v. Miller, 425 U.s. 435, 443, 96 S.Ct. 1619, 1624, 
48 L. Ed. 2d 71 (1976) (limited by statute). 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF STATE'S 
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We have not addressed previously the existence of a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in text messages or e-mails. Those 
circuits that have addressed the question have compared e-mails 
with letters sent by postal mail. Although letters are protected 
by the Fourth Amendment, "if a letter is sent to another, the 
sender's expectation of privacy ordinarily terminates upon 
delivery." United States v. King, 55 F.3d 1193, 1195-96 (6th Cir. 
1996)(citations omitted). Similarly, an individual sending an e-
mail loses "a legitimate expectation of privacy in an e-mail that 
had already reached its recipient." Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 
333 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173, 190 
(2d Cir. 2004). See also United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 
418 (C.A.A.F. 1996) ("Drawing from these parallels, we can say 
that the transmitter of an e-mail message enjoys a reasonable 
expectation that police officials will not intercept the 
transmission without probable cause and a search warrant. 
However, once the transmissions are received by another 
person, the transmitter no longer controls its destiny."), cited in 
Guest, 255 F.3d at 333. 
CONCLUSION 
Since this Court has already determined the search warrant was properly issued 
upon probable cause, and that this Court has jurisdiction over the offense of First Degree 
Murder committed in Nez Perce County, Idaho, for the reasons and on the grounds 
disclosed above, the State respectfully requests this Court to Reconsider its decision 
regarding the admissibility of Defendant's text messages and deny Defendant's Motion in 
Limine. i tJ 
DATED this ex - day of December 2008. 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF STATE'S 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 6 
Prosecuting Attorney 
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
I declare under penalty of perjury that a full, true, complete and correct copy of the 
foregoing BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF STATE'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION was 
(1) hand delivered, or 
(2) hand delivered via court basket, or 
(3) _/_ sent via facsimile, or 
(4) mailed, postage prepaid, by depositing the same in the United 
States Mail. 
ADDRESSED TO TH E FOLLOWING: 
Charles E. Kovis 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 9292 
Moscow f ID 83843 
~J 
DATED this --11L- day of December 2008. 
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2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37601, * 
In the Matter of the Search of, Yahoo, Incorporated, 701 First Avenue, Sunnyvale, California 94089 
NO.07-3194-MB 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 
CASE SUMMARY 
2007 u.s. Dist. LEXIS 37601 
May 21, 2007, Decided 
May 22, 2007, Filed 
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The United States (Government) moved for an order authorizing an out-of-district search 
warrant for the contents of electronically-stored communications, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.s. § 2703(a). The subject of 
the search warrant, a California-based Internet service provider (ISP), challenged the scope of the warrant that 
could be issued by the United States District Court for the District of Arizona. 
OVERVIEW: A computer user outside the United States criminally hacked into a Government computer located in 
Yuma, Arizona. The Government subpoenaed the ISP's records, which indicated that the hacker was accessing an 
unauthorized E-mail account from computers assigned internet protocol addresses in a European country. The 
Government filed a motion seeking an out-of-district search warrant pursuant to 18 U.s.C.s. § 2703(a) to search and 
seize electronic information, including electronically-stored communications, associated with the unauthorized E-mail 
account stored on the ISP's computer servers located in California. The court concluded that Fed. R. Crim. P. 41 could 
not reasonably be interpreted to limit the extra-territorial scope of § 2703(a). Congress clearly intended that a district 
court had the authority under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.s.C.S. §§ 2701-2712. to obtain such 
records from other jurisdiction. 
OUTCOME: The Government's motion to authorize an out-of-district search warrant for the contents of electronically-
stored communications held by the ISP provider was granted. 
CORE TERMS: search warrant, out-of-district, electronic, Federal Rules, issuance, electronic communication, 
electronically-stored, authorize, provider, e-mail, yahoo, USA Patriot Act, internet, issuing, unauthorized, federal 
district, interpreting, ambiguous, seizure, territorial jurisdiction, seize, Patriot Act, federal law, governmental entity, 
legislative history, committee reports, procedural aspects, SUbject-matter, meaningless, disclosure 
LEXISNEXIS® HEADNOTESttiShow 
JUDGES: [*1] Lawrence O. Anderson y, United States magistrate Judge. 
OPINION BY: Lawrence O. Anderson ... 
OPINION 
ORDER 
This matter is before the Court on the motion of the United States for an order authorizing an out-of-district search 
warrant for the contents of electronically-stored communications pursuant to Title 18 U.s.c. § 2703(a). 
1. Background 
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The United States asserts that on February 23, 2006, an unidentified individual obtained unauthorized access to a United 
States government computer (the "victim computer"), located in Yuma, Arizona, which is the property of a governmental 
agency. A forensic examination revealed that the unauthorized individual exfiltrated a text file from the victim computer to 
an e-mail address, xxxx_xxx@yahoo.com 1 (the "unauthorized e-mail account"). 
FOOTNOTES 
1 Obviously, this is not the actual email address and is used to protect the pending criminal investigation . 
. --.-.------.-.-.--.------------.-------.~ 
The Government has subpoenaed Yahoo, Inc, ... ·s ("Yahoo") records which indicate that the user is accessing [*2] the 
unauthorized e-mail account from computers assigned internet protocol ("IP") addresses in a southeastern EUropean 
country. 2 On December 15, 2006 and March 9,2007, the Government issued requests to Yahoo pursuant to lItle 18 
U.S.c. § 2703ff) 3 to preserve existing records associated with the unauthorized e-mail account pending issuance of more 
formal legal process. The Government contends that the Yahoo computer servers located in Sunnyvale, California contain 
data, induding stored electronic mail communications, for a particular subscriber assodated with the unauthorized e-mail 
account. 
FOOTNOTES 
2 The Electronic Communications Privacy Act ("ECPA"), TItle 18 U.s.c. §§ 2701-2712, permits the Government to 
compel production of certain types of information, including basic user information, using a subpoena. TItle 18 U.s.c. § 
2703(c)(2). 
3 To minimize the risk that electronic information will be lost, TItle 18 U.s.c. § 2703ff) permits the Government to 
direct network service providers to preserve records pending the issuance of compulsory legal process. TItle 18 U.s.C. 
§ 2703ff). 
[*3] On May 8, 2007, the Government filed a motion seeking an out-of-district search warrant pursuant to lItle 18 
U.s.c. § 2703(a) to search and seize electronic information, including electronically-stored communications, assodated 
with the unauthorized e-mail account stored on computer servers located in Sunnyvale, California. The Court granted that 
motion, issued the search warrant and now explains its rUling. 
The question presented is whether the District Court of Arizona may properly issue a search warrant ordering the search 
and production of electronic evidence pursuant to § 2703(a) where the warrant is directed to an out-of-district internet 
service provider located in California. 
II. Analysis 
The relevant statute, TItle 18 U.s.C. § 2703(a), provides, in pertinent part, that: 
A governmental entity may require the disclosure by a provider of electronic communication service of the 
contents of a wire or electronic communication, that is in electronic storage in an electronic communications 
system for one hundred and eighty days or less, only pursuant to a warrant issued using the procedures 
described in the [*4] Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by a court with jurisdiction over the offense under 
investigation or equivalent State warrant. 
Id. (emphasis added). The Government argues that this proviSion authorizes this Court to issue a warrant to search and 
seize contents of electronically-stored communications which are contained on Yahoo's computer servers in Sunnyvale, 
California. As discussed below, the Court agrees that § 2703(a) grants this Court such authority. 
A. Statutory Interpretation 
In interpreting a statute, federal courts "'look first to the plain language of the statute, construing the proviSions of the 
entire law, including its object and policy, to ascertain the intent of Congress.'" United States v. Hockings, 129 F.3d 1069, 
1071 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Northwest Forest Resource Council v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 825,830 (9th Cir. 1996). If the 
provision is ambiguous, the court looks to legislative history. Id. Statutory language is ambiguous if it is capable of being 
understood by reasonably well-informed people in two or more different ways. United States v. Quarrel/, 310 F.3d 664, 
669 (10th Cir. 2002). [*5] 
It is "a fundamental canon that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the 
overall statutory scheme." FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.s. 120, 133, 120 S. Ct. 1291. 146 l. Ed. 2d 
121 (2000) (quoting Davis v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 489 U.s. 803, 809, 109 S. Ct. 1500. 103 l. Ed. 2d 891 (1989). 
If necessary to discern Congress' intent, the court may read statutory terms in view of the purpose of the statute. The 
structure and purpose of a statute may also provide guidance in determining the plain meaning of its provisions. K Mart 
Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.s. 281, 291. 108 S. Ct. 1811, 100 L. Ed. 2d 313 (1988) ("In ascertaining the plain meaning of 
[aJ statute, the court must look to the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the language and design of the 
statute as a whole."); United States v. Lewis, 67 F.3d 225. 228-29 (9th Cir. 1995) ("Particular phrases must be construed 
in Iight.pf.,J;It~ltEK<¥lcPJUfB<t§fl\'t94Sf!\~Ff! Rf,!;l!a ~hole statutory scheme."). To determine Congress' intent in enacting a 
statute,Q~ fnWa'R>b'EoIlsnit"-c/-v'aHet'V 6fSduttE!S including rules of statutory construction and interpretation, and 
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extrinsic information such [*6] as the statute's expressed purpose, discussions in committee reports, accepted and 
rejected amendments, and statements made in congressional floor debates. U.S. v. McNab, 331 F.3d 1228, 1238 (11th Cir. 
2003). 
Federal courts are advised to avoid interpreting a statute in such a way that renders a word or phrase redundant or 
meaningless. Gustafson v. Af/oyd Co., Inc., 513 u.s. 561, 562. 115 S, Ct. 1061, 131 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1995); Kunqys v. United 
States, 485 U.s. 759, 778, 108 S. Ct. 1537,99 L. Ed. 2d 839 (1988). Such courts should also presume that when 
Congress alters the words of a statute, it does so with an intent to change the statute's meaning. United States v. Wilson, 
503 U.s, 329, 336, 112 S. Ct. 1351, 117 L. Ed. 2d 593 (1992). Mindful of these rules of statutory interpretation, the Court 
will consider the meaning, scope and limitations of § 2703(a). 
B. Title 18 U.s.C. § 27Q3(a) 
The issue before the Court requires analysis of § 2703(a), as amended by Section 220 of the Uniting and Strengthening 
America by Providing Appropriate Tools to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, PL 107-56 (HR 3162) (the "USA 
Patriot Act"). Before amendment by the USA Patriot Act in 2001, § 2703(a) provided [*7] that: 
A governmental entity may require the disdosure by a provider of electronic communications service of the 
contents of a wire or electronic communication, that is in electronic storage in an electronic communication 
system for one hundred and eighty days or less, only pursuant to a warrant issued under the Rules of 
Criminal Procedure or equivalent State warrant. 
18 U.s.c. § 2703 (1998) (emphasis added), amended by PL 107-56 (HR 3162), 2001, 
Section 220 of the USA Patriot Act, entitled "Nationwide Service of Search Warrants for Electronic Evidence," amended §. 
2703(a) so it now provides that: 
A governmental entity may require the disdosure by a provider of electronic communication Service of the 
contents of a wire or electronic communication, that is in electronic storage in an electronic communications 
system for one hundred and eighty days or less, only pursuant to a warrant issued using the procedures 
described in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by a court with jurisdiction over the offense under 
investigation or equivalent State warrant. 
Title 18 U.S.c. § 2703(a) (emphasis added), [*8] as amended by PL 107-56 (HR 3162), 2001. 
Section 220 of the Patriot Act made two changes to § 2703(a). First, search warrants may now be issued "using the 
procedures described in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure," rather than "under" those Rules. Second, search 
warrants may now be issued "by a court with jurisdiction over the offense." Title 18 U.s.c. § 2703(a}. The Court will now 
analyze the meaning of these two statutory phrases. 
1. "Jurisdiction over the Offense" 
The Court first considers the meaning of the phrase "jurisdiction over the offense" as used in § 2703(a). The Supreme 
Court has recently noted that "[j]urisdiction is a 'word of many, too many, meanings.'" Rockwell Int'l COrD. v. United 
States, U.s., 127 S.Ct. 1397, 1405, 167 L. Ed. 2d 190 (2007) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment 
523 U.s. 83, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 140 L. Ed. 2d 210 (1998)). Section 2703(a) does not specify whether Congress intended the 
word "jurisdiction" to mean subject-matter, personal, or territorial jurisdiction. 
The issue sub judice appears to be an issue of first impression in the Ninth Circuit. In view of the lack of [*9] any 
controlling or persuasive case law in the Ninth Circuit discussing § 2703(a), the Court looks outside the Ninth Circuit to a 
District of Florida decision which held that § 2703 (a) authorizes a federal district court where the crime allegedly occurred 
to issue out-of-district warrants for the seizure of stored electronic communications. In Re Search Warrant, 19 
Fla.L.Weekly Fed. D. 309 at 13, No. 6:05-MC-168-0rl-31JGG, 2005 U.s. Dist. LEXIS 44507 (M.D. Fla, Dec. 23, 2005). 
Although this not a published order, it reversed a magistrate judge's published order that declined to authorize an out-of-
district search warrant that sought to seize electronic data maintained by a "dot-com" web site located in the Northern 
District of California. See, In Re; Search Warrant 362 F.supp.2d 1298 (M.D. Fla. 2003). 
The Court agrees with the district judge's conclusion in In Re Search Warrant, 19 Fla.L. Weekly Fed. D. 309 at 13, No. 
6:05-MC-168-0rl-31JGG, 2005 U.s. Dist. LEXIS 44507 (M.D. Fla, Dec. 23, 2005), that Congress intended "jurisdiction" to 
mean territorial jurisdiction. Title 18 U.s.c. § 3231 gives federal district courts original subject matter jurisdiction over 
all [*10] violations of federal law. Title 18 U.S.c. § 3231 (stating that "district courts of the United States shall have 
original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of all offenses against the laws of the United States. "). Because 
all federal courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over violations of federal law, interpreting jurisdiction to mean "subject-
matter jurisdiction" would render these words meaningless and contrary to the rule of statutory construction that a statute 
should "be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, VOid, or 
insignificant." TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.s. 19, 31. 122 S. Ct. 441, 151 L. Ed. 2d 339 (2001). 
Federal district courts have territorial jurisdiction over those crimes that occur in their district. U.S. v. Schiefen, 139 F.3d 
638, 639 (8th Cir. 1998). Concluding that "jurisdiction" means territorial jurisdiction is conSistent with the legislative 
history of the USA Patriot Act. Legislative history of the USA Patriot Act indicates that Congress intended that amendments 
ma~.,Q)f~ ~triRt~'AAP~I'i to "all tyR!2s of criminal and foreign intelligence investigations. [*11] "147 Cong.Rec. 
Sl~a!l~:h~Mrr~~isS,liAsl:E?;&sion, October 25,2001,2001 WL 1297566. The legislative history 
indiM@;1l'~@Nep@R2RI3(!;(1)NSIi.:1E~1ID~ationwide Service of Warrants for Electronic Evidence' permits a 
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single court having jurisdiction over the offense to issue a search warrant for e-mail that would be valid anywhere in the 
United States." 147 Cong.Rec. H7159-03 at H7197-98, 107<th> Congress, l<st> Session, October 23,2001,2001 WL 
1266413; USA Patriot Act § 220, 115 Stat. at 291. 
Common sense dictates the result reached herein. Judicial and prosecutorial efficiency is better served by permitting the 
federal district court for the district where the crime allegedly occurred to preside over both the investigation and 
prosecution of that crime. Commentators have suggested that one reason for the amendments effected by Section 220 of 
the Patriot Act was to alleviate the burden placed on federal district courts in the Eastern District of Virginia and the 
Northern District of California where major internet service providers ("ISPs") AOL and Yahoo, respectively, are located. 
See, Paul K. Ohm, Parallel Effect Statutes [*12] and E-mail "Warrants": Reframing the Internet Surveillance Debate, 72 
Geo.Wash.L.Rev. 1599, 1613-15 (Aug. 2004); Patricia L. Bellia, Surveillance Law Through Cyberlaw's Lens, 72 
Geo.Wash.L.Rev. 1375, 1454 (Aug. 2004) (stating that the "effect of the change was to shift the responsibility for issuance 
of the order from the court where the service provider is located to the court with jurisdiction over the offense being 
investigated; prior to passage of the USA Patriot Act, a disproportionate number of such orders were issued in the Eastern 
District of Virginia, where AOL is located."); Franklin E. Fink, The Name Behind the Screenname: Handling Information 
Requests Relating to Electronic Communications, 19 No. 11 Computer & Internet Law 1, 6-7 (Nov. 2002) (stating that 
"[t]his provision was intended to relieve the burden on district courts in which major communications providers are 
located, such as the Northern District of California and Eastern District of Virginia."). Indeed, the House Judiciary 
Committee's Report accompanying the USA Patriot Act explains that § 2703(a) "attempts to address the investigative 
delays caused by the cross-jurisdictional [*13] nature of the Internet." Paul K. Ohm, Parallel Effect Statutes and E-mail 
"Warrants": Reframing the Internet Surveillance Debate, 72 Geo.Wash.L.Rev. at 1614-15, n. 80 (Aug. 2004) (citing H.R. 
Rep. No. 107-236, pt. 1 at 57 (2001)). The Committee's Report further explains that requiring an investigator to 
coordinate with agents, prosecutors, and judges in the district where the lSP is located would cause time delays that "could 
be devastating to an investigation, especially where additional criminal or terrorists acts are planned." Id. (emphasis 
added). Additionally, requiring an Arizona federal agent investigating a crime committed in Arizona to travel to California 
or Virginia to obtain an out-of-district search warrant from a California or Virginia magistrate judge for electronically-
stored communications would, in my view, unnecessarily increase the cost of federal investigations. 4 
FOOTNOTES 
4 Occasionally, an entity subject to a valid search warrant and an investigating agent located in a different district 
may mutually agree, similar to production of documents via a subpoena duces tecum, to production of the sought-after 
records by fax or mail without the necessity of the agent traveling to the outside district; provided, of course, the 
search warrant was properly authorized. 
[*14] In light of the foregoing discussion, the Court concludes that when Congress amended Section 2703(a) via Section 
220 of the USA Patriot Act to add the phrase "a court with jurisdiction over the offense," Congress intended to authorize 
the federal district court located in the district where the alleged crime occurred to issue out-of-district warrants for the 
seizure of electronically-stored communications. This Court has jurisdiction over alleged crimes that occurred in Yuma, 
Arizona which, of course, is within the District of Arizona. Thus, § 2703 (a) authorizes this Magistrate Judge to issue an 
out-of-district warrant for the search and seizure of electronically-stored communications located in California. 
2. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 
Section 2703(a), however, should not be viewed in isolation. Section 2703(a) provides that when "a court with jurisdiction 
over the offense" issues an out-of-district warrant for the seizure of electronic communications, it must do so "using the 
procedures described in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure." Title 18 U.s.c. § 2703(a) (emphasis added). 
Although [*15] § 2703 (a) references the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure generally, in view of the purpose of that 
section, it is clear that Congress intended that the specific provisions of the Federal Rules which govern search warrants 
would apply to § 2703 (a). Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 addresses the issuance of search warrants. Thus, the 
Court must consider the interplay between Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41, which discusses the issuance of search 
warrants, and § 2703(a). 
Having concluded that § 2703(a)'s reference to the "Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure" means Rule 41, the phrase 
"using the procedures described in" the Federal Rules remains ambiguous. A reasonable person could conclude that this 
phrase requires compliance with all of the provisions contained in Rule 41 as the Florida Magistrate Judge did in In Re: 
Search Warrant 362 F.SUDD.2d 1298 (M.D. Fla. 2003). Alternatively, a reasonable person could also conclude that the 
"procedures described in" refers only to the provisions of Rule 41 which are procedural in nature. Because both 
interpretations are [*16] reasonable, the phrase "using the procedures described in the Federal Rules" is ambiguous. 
Quarrell, 310 F.3d at 669 (stating that statutory language is ambiguous if reasonable minds could interpret the same 
language in two or more ways.) 
In view of this ambiguity, the Court must determine which interpretation aligns with Congress' intent in amending §. 
2703(a). Id. For the reasons discussed below, the Court concludes that the phrase "using the procedures described in" only 
refers to the specific provisions of Rule 41 which detail the procedures for obtaining and issuing search warrants. A 
fundamental canon of statutory construction proVides that "unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking 
their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning." United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051. 1057 (9th Cir.1998) (quoting 
Perrin v. United States, 444 U.s. 37,42,100 S. Ct. 311, 62 L. Ed. 2d 199 (1979)). The word "procedure" is defined as "a 
seriEJgM~rnkg~.r~I~~~TP~erican Heritage Dictionary, 4<th> Ed. (2000),5 or "a specific method or 
courM5f~":f(5ItRllc<5N'S1:D~~fI&N(1999). The common definition of "procedure" supports [*17] the 
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conclusion that § 2703(a) incorporates only those provisions of Rule 41 which discuss "steps to be taken" or the "specific 
method" of issuing a warrant. 
FOOTNOTES 
5 This definition found in the American Heritage Dictionary can be accessed electronically at 
education.yahoo.comjreference. 
Interpreting "using the procedures" to refer only to the provisions in Rule 41 that describe "steps" or a "spedfic method" 
related to issuing a warrant gives meaning to Congress' amendment of § 2703Ca) by the USA Patriot Act. Prior to the USA 
Patriot Act, § 2703(a) authorized the issuance of a warrant "under" the Rules of Criminal Procedure. See, PL 107-56, § 
. 220(a)(1)(amending § 2703(a) by "striking 'under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure' every place it appears and 
inserting using the procedures described in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure .... "). The use of the word "under", a 
broad term, 6 in the prior version of § 2703(a), required that the issuance of a warrant comply with all of the provisions 
of Rule 41. [*18] Rules of statutory construction require the Court to assume that by changing "under" to "using the 
procedures described in" the Federal Rules, Congress intended to change the scope of Rule 2703(a). Wilson, 503 U.s. at 
336. The phrase "using the procedures described in" narrowly focuses on the procedural aspects of obtaining and issuing a 
search warrant. The word "procedures" is modified by "described in," which expresses Congress' intent that only some 
aspects -- the procedural aspects -- of Rule 41 apply to § 2703(a). See, Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co .. 367 U.s. 303, 307, 
81 S. Ct. 1579.6 L. Ed. 2d 859,1961-2 C.B. 254 (1961) (stating that under the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, the meaning 
of a word in a statute may be ascertained in reference to the meaning of the accompanying words. This rule avoids 
assigning a word a meaning that is so broad that it is inconsistent with accompanying words and, thus gives "unintended 
breadth to the Acts of Congress."). If all parts of Rule 41 were procedural, the phrase "described in" would be surplusage 
and contrary to the rule of construction that provides that a court should avoid interpreting a statute in a manner that 
renders a word or phrase meaningless [*19] or redundant. Gustafson, 513 U.s. at 562; Kungys, 485 U.s. at 778. 
FOOTNOTES 
6 "Under" is defined as "in view of," such as "under these conditions," American Heritage Dictionary, 4<th> Ed. (2000), 
and as "inferior" or "subordinate." Black's Law Dictionary, 7<th> Ed. (1999). 
Applying this interpretation of § 2703(a), the Court finds that several portions of Rule 41 do not concern the procedures 
related to the issuance of a search warrant and, therefore, do not apply to the issuance of a warrant under § 2703(a). 
First, Rule 41(a), "Scope and Definitions," does not describe any procedure. Rule 41(q) and ib.l discuss "Motion[s] to 
Return Property" and "Motion(s] to Suppress." These subsections do not contain any procedures relevant to issuing a 
search warrant. Similarly, Rule 41(b), entitled "Authority to Issue a Warrant," does not discuss the procedure by which 
a search warrant is to be issued. Rather, Rule 41(b) discusses the authority of a magistrate judge to issue a warrant in 
three drcumstances. Specifically, Rule 41(b), provides in part that: 
[*20] (b) Authority to Issue a Warrant. At the request of a federal law enforcement officer or an attorney 
for the government; 
(1) a magistrate judge with authority in the district - or if none is reasonably available, a judge of a 
state court of record in the district - has the authority to issue a warrant to search for and seize a 
person or property located within the district; 
(2) a magistrate judge with authority in the district has authority to issue a warrant for a person 
or property outside the district if the person or property is located within the district when the 
warrant is issued but might move or be moved outside the district before the warrant is 
executed; 
(3) in an investigation of domestic or international terrorism (as defined in section 2331 of title 18, 
United States Code), by a Federal magistrate judge in any district in which activities related to the 
terrorism may have occurred, for a search of property or for a person within or outside the district. 
Fed.R.Crim.P. 41(b), as amended December 1, 2007. This subsection only discusses whether a warrant may issue in 
certain cirCUmstances, [*21] and does not discuss procedures for issuing a warrant. Rule 41(b) is not procedural in 
nature and, therefore, does not apply to § 2703(a). This conclusion is supported by Rule 41(a)(1) which provides that 
"[t]his rule does not modify any statute regulating search or seizure, or the issuance and execution of a search warrant 
in special circumstances." Fed.R.Crim.P. 41(a). Section 2703(a) which authorizes out-of-district search warrants on 
internet service providers is a statute which regulates the issuance of warrants in "special circumstances." Accordingly, 
Rule 41 Ca) expresses Congress' intent that Rule 41(b) does not limit a district court's authority granted in § 2703(a). 
In contrast to the foregoing subsections, several other provisions in Rule 41 speCifically discuss procedures related to 
issuing a warrant. For example, Rule 41(e) enumerates procedures for issuing a warrant. Rule 41(e) describes the 
contents of the warrant and the manner in which a warrant should be executed. Fed.R.Crim.P. 41(e). Similarly, 
Fed.R.Crim.P. 41(d) describes procedures [*22] for requesting a warrant in the presence of a magistrate judge. Id. Thus, 
thesdlRddelitJ l* aSi'diR.P0 ~aS!Tit(fE~~o 3 (a). 
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III. Conclusion 
In conclusion, the Court finds that TItle 18 U.S.CO § 2703(a) authorizes a federal district court, located in the district where 
the alleged crime occurredt to issue search warrants for the production of electronically-stored evidence located in 
another district. The warrant must be issued in compliance with the procedures described in Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 41. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(b)t however, does not limit the authority of a district court to issue 
out-of-district warrants under § 2703(a) because Rule 41(b) is not procedural in nature andt therefore, does not apply to 
§ 2703(a). Thus, this Court concludes that § 2703(a) authorizes an Arizona magistrate judge to issue an out-of-district 
search warrant for the contents of communications electronically-stored in California when the alleged crime occurred in 
the District of Arizona. 
Accordingly, 
IT IS ORDERED that the Government's [*23] motion to authorize an out-of-district search warrant for the contents of 
electronically-stored communications held by Yahoo in Sunnyvale, California is GRANTED. The subject search warrant is 
issued. 
Dated this 21<st> day of May, 2007 
Lawrence O. Anderson 
United States magistrate Judge 
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TITLE 18. CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
PART 1. CRIMES 
CHAPTER 119. WIRE AND ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS INTERCEPTION AND 
INTERCEPTION OF ORAL COMMUNICATIONS 
Go to the United States Code Service Archive Directory 
18 USCS § 2510 
'+ NITA Commentary: 
Review expert commentary from The National Institute for Trial Advocacv preceding 18 
uses § 2510 (relating to video surveillance).Review expert commentary from The 
National Institute for Trial Advocacv following 18 USCS § 2516 (relating to wire and 
electronic communicationsl.Review expert commentary from The National Institute for 
Trial Advocacy preceding 18 USCS § 2701 (relating to computer records).Review expert 
commentary from The National Institute for Trial Advocacy following 18 USCS § 3117 
(relating to electronic tracking and thermal imaging devices). 
§ 2510. Definitions 
As used in this chapter [18 USCS §§ 2510 et seq.]--
(1) "wire communication" means any aural transfer made in whole or in part through 
the use of facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable, or 
other like connection between the point of origin and the point of reception (including 
the use of such connection in a switching station) furnished or operated by any person 
engaged in providing or operating such facilities for the transmission of interstate or 
foreign communications or communications affecting interstate or foreign commerce; 
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> 19 Moore's Federal Practice 
(Matthew Bender 3d eeLl, ch 201, 
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> 19 Moore's Federal Practice 
(Matthew Bender 3d ed.), ch 203, 
Interocutory Orders § 203.15. 
Forms: 
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Bender), ch 6C. The Intemet § 
6C.02. 
> 4 Milgrim on Trade Secrets 
(Matthew Bender) ch 17, 
InteHectual Property and the Intemet 
§ 17.03. 
(2) "oral communication" means any oral communication uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such 
communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such expectation, but such term does not 
include any electronic communication; 
(3) "State" means any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any 
territory or possession of the United States; 
(4) "intercept" means the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication 
through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device.[;] 
(5) "electronic, mechanical, or other device" means any device or apparatus which can be used to intercept a wire, oral, 
or electronic communication other than--
(a) any telephone or telegraph instrument, equipment or facility, or any component thereof, (i) furnished to the 
subscriber or user by a provider of wire or electronic communication service in the ordinary course of its business and 
being used by the subscriber or user in the ordinary course of its business or furnished by such subscriber or user for 
connection to the facilities of such service and used in the ordinary course of its business; or (ii) being used by a provider 
of wire or electronic communication service in the ordinary course of its business, or by an investigative or law 
enforcement officer in the ordinary course of his duties; 
(b) a hearing aid or similar device being used to correct subnormal hearing to not better than normal; 
(6) "person" means any employee, or agent of the United States or any State or political subdivision thereof, and any 
individ'BRJlEfhtfNh~~(fnOFnS;]t0\lftfOh'iPany 1 trust, or corporation; 
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(7) "Investigative or law enforcement officer" means any officer of the United States Of of a 5tdte or politicai subdivision 
thereof, who is empowered by law to conduct investigations of or to make arrests for offenses enumerated in this chapter 
[18 USCS §§ 2510 et seq.], and any attorney authorized by law to prosecute or participate in the prosecution of such 
offenses; 
(8) "contents", when used with respect to any wire, oral, or electronic communication, includes any information 
concerning the substance, purport, or meaning of that communication; 
(9) "Judge of competent jurisdiction" means--
(a) a judge of a United States district court or a United States court of appeals; and 
(b) a judge of any court of general criminal jurisdiction of a State who is authorized by a statute of that State to enter 
orders authorizing interceptions of wire, oral, or electronic communications; 
(10) "communication common carrier" has the meaning given that term in section 3 of the Communications Act of 1934 
[47 USCS § 153J; 
(11) "aggrieved person" means a person who was a party to any intercepted wire, oral, or electronic communication or a 
person against whom the interception was directed; 
(12) "electronic communfcation" means any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of 
any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system that 
affects interstate or foreign commerce, but does not include--
(A) any wire or oral communication; 
(B) any communication made through a tone-only paging device; 
(C) any communication from a tracking device (as defined in section 3117 of this title [18 USCS § 3117]); or 
(D) electronic funds transfer information stored by a financial institution in a communications system used for the 
electronic storage and transfer of funds; 
(13) "user" means any person or entity who--
(A) uses an electronic communication service; and 
(B) is duly authorized by the provider of such service to engage in such use; 
(14) "electronic communications system" means any wire, radio, electromagnetic, photooptical or photoelectronic 
facilities for the transmission of wire or electronic communications, and any computer facilities or related electronic 
equipment for the electronic storage of such communications; 
(15) "electronic communication service" means any service which provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive 
wire or electronic communications; 
(16) "readily accessible to the general public" means, with respect to a radio communication, that such communication is 
not--
(A) scrambled or encrypted; 
(B) transmitted using modulation techniques whose essential parameters have been withheld from the public with the 
intention of preserving the privacy of such communication; 
(C) carried on a subcarrier or other signal subsidiary to a radio transmission; 
(D) transmitted over a communication system provided by a common carrier, unless the communication is a tone only 
paging system communication; or 
(E) transmitted on frequencies allocated under part 25, subpart D, E, or F of part 74, or part 94 of the Rules of the 
Federal Communications Commission, unless, in the case of a communication transmitted on a frequency allocated under 
part 74 that is not exclusively allocated to broadcast auxiliary services, the communication is a two-way voice 
communication by radio; 
(17) "electronic storage" means--
(A) any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic communication incidental to the electronic 
transmission thereof; and 
(B) any storage of such communication by an electronic communication service for purposes of backup protection of 
such communication; 
(18) "aural transfer" means a transfer containing the human voice at any point between and including the point of origin 
and the point of reception; 
(19) "foreign intelligence information", for purposes of section 2517(6) of this title [18 USCS § 2517(6)], means--
(A) information, whether or not concerning a United States person, that relates to the ability of the United States to 
protect against--
(i) actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power; 
(ii) sabotage or international terrorism by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power; or 
(iii) clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network of a foreign power or by. an agent of a 
foreign power; or 
(8) information, whether or not concerning a United States person, with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory 
that relates to--
(i) the national defense or the security of the United States; or 
(ii) the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States; 
(20) "protected computer" has the meaning set forth in section 1030 [18 USCS § 1030]; and 
(21) "computer,trespasser"--
(A) means a person who accesses a protected computer without authorization and thus has no reasonable expectation 
of privacy in any communication transmitted to, through, or from the protected computer; and 
(B) does not include a person known by the owner or operator of the protected computer to have an existing 
contractual relationship with the owner or operator of the protected computer for access to all or part of the protected 
computer. 
'+ History: 
(Add~Jttt¥m1~PP'or¥PVFTglf.NlfEtf92, 82 Stat. 212; Oct. 21, 1986, P.l. 99-508, Title I, § 101(a), 
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(c)(l)(A), (4) 100 Stat. 1848,1851; Oct. 25, 1994, P.1,"~~Q3-414! Title II, §§ 202(a), 203; 108 Stat. 4290, 4291; April 24, 
1996, P.L. 104-132, Title VII, Subtitle B, § 731, 110 Stat. 1303; Oct. 26, 2001, P.L. 107-56, Title II, §§ 203(b)(2), 
209(1), and 217(1), 115 Stat. 280, 283, 291; Dec. 28, 2001, P.L. 107-108, Title III, § 314(b), 115 Stat. 1402; Nov. 2, 
2002, P.L. 107-273, Div B, Title W, § 4002(e)(10), 116 Stat. 1810.) 
-:;. History; Ancillary Laws and Directives: 
± 1. Explanatory notes 
.± 2. Amendments 
.± 3. Short titles 
.± 4. Other provisions 
-;;: 1. Explanatory notes: 
The bracketed semicolon has been inserted in para. (4) as the punctuation probably intended by Congress. 
-;;: 2. Amendments: 
1986. Act Oct. 21, 1986 (effective and applicable as provided by § 111 of such Act, which appears as a note to this 
section), in para. (1), substituted "any aural transfer" for "any communication", and inserted "(including the use of such 
connection in a switching station)", deleted "as a common carrier" following "person engaged", and inserted "or 
communications affecting interstate or foreign commerce and such term includes any electronic storage of such 
communication, but such term does not include the radio portion of a cordless telephone communication that is transmitted 
between the cordless telephone handset and the base unit"; in para. (2), inserted", but such term does not include any 
electronic communication"; in para. (4), inserted "or other" following "aural", and inserted ", electronic,"; in para. (5), in 
the introductory matter, substituted "wire, oral, or electronic" for "wire or oral", in subpara. (a), in cI. 0), substituted 
"provider of wire or electronic communication service" for "communications common carrier", and inserted "or furnished by 
such subscriber or user for connection to the facilities of such service and used in the ordinary course of its business", and 
in cI. Oi), substituted "provider of wire or electronic communication service" for "communications common carrier"; in para. 
(8), substituted "wire, oral, or electronic" for "wire or oral" and deleted "identity of the parties to such communication or 
the existence," following "concerning the"; in para. (9)(b), substituted "wire, oral, or electronic" for "wire or oral"; in para. 
(10), deleted "and" following the semicolon; in para. (11), substituted "wire, oral, or electronic" for "wire or oral", and 
substituted a semicolon for the concluding period; and added paras. (12)-(18). 
1994. Act Oct. 25, 1994, in para. (1), deleted ", but such term does not include the radio portion of a cordless telephone 
communication that is transmitted between the cordless telephone handset and the base unit" following "storage of such 
communication", in para. (12), deleted subpara. (A), which read: "the radiO portion of a cordless telephone communication 
that is transmitted between the cordless telephone handset and the base unit;", and redesignated subparas. (B), (C), and 
(D), as subparas. (A), (B), and (C), respectively, and, in para. (16), in subpara. (D), deleted "or" after the concluding 
semicolon, in subpara. (E), inserted "or" after the concluding semicolon, and added subpara. (F). 
1996. Act April 24, 1996, in para. (12), in subpara. (B), deleted "or" after the concluding semicolon, in subpara. (C), added 
"or" after the concluding semicolon, and added subpara. (D) and, in para. (16), in subpara. (D), added "or" after the 
concluding semicolon, in subpara. (E), deleted "or" after the concluding semicolon, and deleted subpara. (F), which read: 
"an electronic communication;". 
2001. Act Oct. 26, 2001, in para. (1), deleted "and such term includes any electronic storage of such communication" 
following "commerce", in para. (14), inserted "wire or", in para. (17)(B), deleted "and" following the concluding semicolon, 
in para. (18), substituted "; and" for a concluding period, and added para. (19). 
Such Act further, in para. (18), deleted "and" following the concluding semicolon, in para. (19)(B)(ii), substituted the 
concluding semicolon for a period, and added paras. (20) and (21). 
Act Dec. 28,2001, in para. (19), in the introductory matter, inserted", for purposes of section 2517(6) of this title,". 
2002. Act Nov. 2, 2002, in para. (10), substituted "has the meaning given that term in section 3 of the Communications 
Act of 1934" for "shall have the same meaning which is given the term 'common carrier' by section 153(h) of title 47 of 
the United States Code". 
-:;. 3. Short titles: 
Act Oct. 21, 1986, P.L. 99-508, § 1, 100 Stat. 1848, provides: "This Act may be cited as the 'Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act of 1986' .... 
Act Nov. 21, 1997, P.L. 105-112, § 1, 111 Stat. 2273, provides: "This Act [amending 18 USCS § 2512J may be cited as 
the 'Law Enforcement Technology Advertisement Clarification Act of 1997'.". 
-:;. 4. Other provisions: 
Congressional findings. Act June 19, 1968, P.L. 90-351, Title III, § 801, 82 Stat. 211, provides: 
"Ons~I~il1\f ~Nj~i~PO~A~f:Sblished studies, the Congress makes the following findings: 
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"(a) Wire communications are normally conducted through the use of facilities which form part of an interstate network. 
Ihe same facilities are used for interstate and intrastate communications. There has been extensive wiretapping carried on 
without legal sanctions and without the consent of any of the parties to the conversation. Electronic/ mechanical/ and other 
intercepting devices are being used to overhear oral conversations made in private/ without the consent of any of the 
parties to such communications. The contents of these communications and evidence derived therefrom are being used by 
public and private parties as evidence in court and administrative proceedings/ and by persons whose activities affect 
interstate commerce. The possession/ manufacture/ distribution/ advertising, and use of these devices are facilitated by 
interstate commerce. 
nCb) In order to protect effectively the privacy of wire and oral communications/ to protect the integrity of court and 
administrative proceedings, and to prevent the obstruction of interstate commerce/ it is necessary for Congress to define 
on a uniform basis the circumstances and conditions under which the interception of wire and oral communications may be 
authorized, to prohibit any unauthorized interception of such communications, and the use of the contents thereof in 
evidence in courts and administrative proceedings. 
"(c) Organized criminals make extensive use of wire and oral communications in their criminal activities. The 
interception of such communications to obtain evidence of the commission of crimes or to prevent their commission is an 
indispensable aid to law enforcement and the administration of justice. 
"Cd) To safeguard the privacy of innocent persons, the interception of wire or oral communications where none of the 
parties to the communication has consented to the interception should be allowed only when authorized by a court of 
competent jurisdiction and should remain under the control and supervision of the authorizing court. Interception of wire 
and oral communications should further be limited to certain major types of offenses and specific categories of crime with 
assurances that the interception is justified and that the information obtained thereby will not be misused.". 
National Commission for the Review of Federal and State laws Relating to Wiretapping and Electronic 
Surveillance. Act June 19/1968, P.L. 90-351, Title VIII/ § 804/ 82 Stat. 223; Oct. 15/1970/ P.L. 91-452, Title XII, § 
1212, 84 Stat. 961; Jan. 2/ 1971, P.L. 91-644, Title VI, § 20, 84 Stat. 1893; Act Jan. 2, 1975, P.L. 93-609, §§ 1-3, 88 
Stat 1972; Oec. 23, 1975, P.L. 94-176, 89 Stat. 1031/ which formerly appeared as a note to this section, provided for the 
establishment, composition, powers and duties, and compensation of a National Commission for the review of Federal and 
State Laws Relating to Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance and further provided for the termination of the Commission 
sixty days after the submission of its final report to the President and Congress, which was to be submitted on or before 
April 20/ 1976.". 
Intelligence activities. Act Oct. 21/ 1986, P.L. 99-508/ Title 1/ § 107/ 100 Stat. 1858, provides: 
"Ca) In general. Nothing in this Act or the amendments made by this Act [for full classification consult USCS Tables 
volumes) constitutes authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity. 
nCb) Certain activities under procedures approved by the Attorney General. Nothing in chapter 119 or chapter 121 of 
title 18, United States Code, shall affect the conduct, by officers or employees of the United States Government in 
accordance with other applicable Federal law/ under procedures approved by the Attorney General of activities intended 
to--
"(1) intercept encrypted or other official communications of United States executive branch entities or United States 
Government contractors for communications security purposes; 
"(2) intercept radio communications transmitted between or among foreign powers or agents of a foreign power as 
defined by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978; or 
"(3) access an electronic communication system used exclusively by a foreign power or agent of a foreign power as 
defined by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 .... 
Effective dates and application of Oct. 21, 1986 amendments. Act Oct. 21,1986, P.L. 99-508, Title I, § 111, 100 
Stat. 1859, provides: 
"Ca) In general. Except as provided in subsection Cb) or Cc), this title and the amendments made by this title [generally 
amending 18 USCS §§ 2510 et seq.; for full claSSification, consult USCS Tables volumes] shall take effect 90 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act and shall/ in the case of conduct pursuant to a court order or extenSion, apply only with 
respect to court orders or extensions made after this title takes effect. 
"Cb) Special rule for State authorizations of interceptions. Any interception pursuant to section 2516(2) of title 18 of the 
United States Code which would be valid and lawful without regard to the amendments made by this title [generally 
amending 18 USCS §§ 2510 et seq.; for full classification, consult USCS Tables volumes] shall be valid and lawful 
notwithstanding such amendments if such interception occurs during the period beginning on the date such amendments 
take effect and ending on the earlier of--
"(1) the day before the date of the taking effect of State law conforming the applicable State statute with chapter 119 
of title 18, United States Code [18 USCS §§ 2510 et seq.], as so amended; or 
"(2) the date two years after the date of the enactment of this Act. 
"Cc) Effective date for certain approvals by Justice Department officials. Section 104 of this Act [amending 18 USCS § 
2516(1)] shall take effect on the date of enactment of this Act.". 
Repeal of sunset provision for Title II of Act Oct. 26, 2001. Act Oct. 26, 2001, P.L. 107-56, Title II, § 224, 115 
Stat. 295; Dec. 30, 2005, P.L. 109-160, § 1/ 119 Stat. 2957; Feb. 3, 2006/ P.l. 109-170/ § 1, 120 Stat. 3/ which formerly 
appeared as a note to this section, was repealed by Act March 9, 2006/ P.L. 109-177/ Title I, § 102CaL 120 Stat. 194. Such 
note provided that certain provisions of Title II of Act Oct. 26, 2001, the USA PATRIOT Act, would cease to have effect on 
March 10,2006/ except that such provisions would continue in effect with respect to any particular foreign intelligence 
investigation that began before the termination date, or with respect to any particular offense or potential offense that 
began or occurred before the termination date. 
Notes: 
:; Code of Federal Regulations: 
sur'131D'EJ'Ptff-smii5jl{iY cWrsT3\erFf§ommerce--General information, 15 CFR Part 730. 
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Bureau of Industry and Security, Department of Commerce--Commerce Control 
CFR Part 738. 
overview and the Country Chart; 15 
Bureau of Industry and Security, Department of Commerce--Control policy--CCL based controls, 15 CFR Part 742. 
Bureau of Industry and Security, Department of Commerce--The Commerce Control List, 15 CFR Part 774. 
:; Related statutes & Rules: 
This section is referred to in 18 USCS §§ 2517, 2709, 2711. 3103a, 3127, 3504. 
:; Research Guide: 
Federal Procedure: 
7 Moore's Federal Practice (Matthew Bender 3d ed.), ch 37A, Discovery of Computer-Based Information § 37A.04. 
19 Moore's Federal Practice (Matthew Bender 3d ed.), ch 201. Appellate Jurisdiction in the Federal System § 201.52. 
19 Moore's Federal Practice (Matthew Bender 3d ed.t ch 203, Interlocutory Orders § 203.15. 
24 Moore's Federal Practice (Matthew Bender 3d ed.), ch 606, The Grand Jury § 606.04. 
27 Moore's Federal Practice (Matthew Bender 3d ed.), ch 641, Search and Seizure §§ 641.21,641.121. 
5 Weinstein's Federal Evidence (Matthew Bender 2nd ed.l. ch 900, Discovering and Admitting Computer-Based 
Evidence § 900.07. 
1 Federal Rules of Evidence Manual (Matthew Bender) § 402.02. 
1 Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure (Matthew Bender). ch 9, Subject-Matter Jurisdiction: Cognizable 
Claims §§ 9,1, 9.2. 
1 Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure (Matthew Bender), ch 11, The Petition § 11.3. 
5 Civil Rights Actions (Matthew Bender), ch 24, Wiretapping and Electronic Eavesdropping (Omnibus Crime Control 
and Safe Streets Act of 1968, TItle III, 18 U.s.C. § 2520) PP 24.01, 24.03. 
8A Fed Proc L Ed, Criminal Procedure §§ 22:94,249,252,253,255,256, 272,280,284, 290, 294-298,300,301, 
307,311,312. 
12A Fed Proc L Ed, Evidence §§ 33:706,709,712, 715, 750, 757. 
15 Fed Proc L Ed, Freedom of Information §§ 38:103, 217. 
16A Fed Proc L Ed, Habeas Corpus §§ 41:185, 225. 
31 Fed Proc L Ed, Telecommunications §§ 72:993, 1046. 
Am Jur: 
3C Am Jur 2d, Aliens and Citizens § 2131. 
29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence § 619. 
37A Am Jur 2d, Freedom of Information Acts §§ 108, 316. 
68 Am Jur 2d, Searches and Seizures §§ 328, 332-334, 336-340, 365, 375, 390, 410, 436, 461. 
70 Am Jur 2d, Sedition, Subversive Activities, and Treason §§ 30, 70. 
Am Jur Trials: 
1 Am Jur Trials, Investigating the Criminal Case, p. 481. 
5 Am Jur Trials, Excluding Illegally Obtained Evidence, p. 331. 
70 Am Jur Trials, The Defense of a Computer Crime Case, p. 435. 
77 Am Jur Trials, Representing Law Enforcement Officers in Personnel Disputes and Employment Litigation, p. 1. 
86 Am Jur Trials, Arbitration Highways to the Courthouse--A Litigator's Roadmap, p. 111. 
Am Jur Proof of Facts: 
67 Am Jur Proof of Facts 3d, Proof of Liability for Violation of Privacy of Internet User, by Cookies or Other Means, p. 
249. 
29 Am Jur Proof of Facts, Wiretapping, p. 59l. 
30 Am Jur Proof of facts, Electronic Eavesdropping by Concealed Microphone or Microphone-Transmitter, p. 113. 
Forms: 
4 Bender's Federal Practice Forms, Form 14:46, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
10 Am Jur Legal Forms 2d (Rev ed), Internet Transactions § 150B:47. 
20A Am Jur PI & Pr Forms (2008), Privacy, § 60. 
23A Am Jur PI &Pr Forms (Rev ed), Telecommunications § 71.30. 
BRlEF IN SUPPORT OF STATE'S 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 7f~ 
1211/2008 12:22 PM 
Get a DOClh'Ilent - by Citation - 18 USCS § 2510 htlps:IIW\'iW .lexis.corolresearchlretrieve? _ m=685e5d29bea913eall .. 
60f35 
Intellectual Property: 
2 Milgrim on Licensing (Matthew Bender), ch 6C, The Internet § 6C.02. 
4 Milgrim on Trade Secrets (Matthew Bender), ch 17, Intellectual Property and the Internet § 17.03. 
Criminal Law and Practice: 
1 Criminal Constitutional Law (Matthew Bender), ch 2, Search and Seizure § 2.03. 
2 Criminal Constitutional Law (Matthew Bender). ch 6, Grand Jury Procedures § 6.0l. 
1 Criminal Defense Techniques (Matthew Bender). ch 4B, Suppression of Illegally Obtained Evidence: Visual 
Surveillance § 4B.03. 
1 Criminal Defense Techniques (Matthew Bender)' ch 5, Electronic Surveillance Under Federal Law §§ 5.10, 5.11, 
5.13. 
lA Criminal Defense Techniques (Matthew Bender), ch 23, Brady: Strategy and Tactics § 23.07. 
2 Criminal Defense Techniques (Matthew Bender), ch 52, Defense of a Gambling Case § 52.02. 
3 Criminal Defense Techniques (Matthew Bender), ch 57, Oefense of a Drug Abuse Case § 57,03. 
4 Criminal Defense Techniques (Matthew Bender), ch 80, Private Searches § 80.06. 
4 Criminal Defense Techniques (Matthew Bender), ch 84, Computer Crime §§ 84.06, 84.11. 
1 Business Crime (Matthew Bender), ch 4B, Motions Directed at Discovery P 4B.06. 
6 Business Crime (Matthew Bender), ch 28, Commercial Espionage P 28.04. 
Immigration: 
6 Immigration Law and Procedure (rev. ed.L ch 72, Procedure in Deportation Cases § 72.04. 
Corporate and Business Law: 
5 Antitrust Laws and Trade Regulation. 2nd Edition (Matthew Bender), ch 92, Full-Scale Investigations by the 
Department of Justice § 92.04. 
2 Liability of Corporate Officers and Directors (Matthew Bender). ch 17, Defenses, Protective Measures and Compliance 
Programs § 17.11. 
Labor and Employment: 
10 Labor and Employment Law (Matthew Bender), ch 272, Privacy in the Workplace §§ 272.01, 272.02. 
Annotations: 
Obtaining evidence by use of sound recording or of mechanical or electronic eavesdropping device ("bugging") as 
violation of Fourth Amendment-federal cases. 59 LEd 2d 959. 
Supreme Court's views as to what constitutes probable cause sufficient, under Federal Constitution's Fourth 
Amendment, for issuance of search warrant. 164 LEd 2d 867. 
Texts: 
Homeland Security Deskbook (Matthew Bender). ch 6, Communications and Cyber Security §§ 6.01, 6.02. 
Homeland Security Deskbook (Matthew Bender), ch 12, Cooperation With Law Enforcement Agencies §§ 12.05, 12.09. 
Homeland Security Deskbook (Matthew Bender). ch 13, Disclosure, Confidentiality, and Privacy Issues § 13.05. 
3 The Law of Advertising (Matthew Bender), ch 56, Internet AdvertiSing § 56.06. 
Law Review Articles: 
Nevin; Scott. The USA Patriot Act: lime To Speak Up [Discussion of T. Derden, One Year Under the Patriot Act]. 46 
Advoc (Boise) 19, December 2003. 
Brandt; Van Valkenburgh. The USA Patriot Act: The Devil is in the Details [Discussion of T. Derden, One Year Under 
the Patriot Act]. 46 Advoc (Boise) 24, December 2003. 
Freiwald. Online Surveillance: Remembering the Lessons of the Wiretap Act. 56 Ala L Rev 9, Fall 2004. 
Adelman. Video Surveillance in Nursing Homes. 12 Alb U Sci & Tech 821, 2002. 
Case; Feibleman; Gruber. Electronic eavesdropping and wiretapping in divorce cases. 16 Am J Fam L 37, Spring 2002. 
Coacher. Permitting Systems Protection Monitoring: When the Government Can Look and What It Can See. 46 AF L 
Rev 155, 1999. 
Pippin. Consumer Privacy on the Internet: It's "Surfer Beware". 47 AF L Rev 125, 1999. 
Pikowsky. Privilege and Confidentiality of Attorney-Client Communication Via E-mail. 51 Baylor L Rev 483, Summer 
1999. 
uBRll:IfilfnENsSlYlEPORfHeOOsSa'a4\CilEE8:ctronic Evidence Compliance--A Guide for Internet Service Providers. 18 
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Berkeley Tech U 945, Fall 2003. 
Bellia. Spyware and the Limits of Surveillance Law. 20 Berkeley Tech U 1283, Summer 2005. 
Bignami. European Versus American Liberty: A Comparative Privacy Analysis of Antiterrorism Data Mining. 48 BC L 
Rev 609, May 2007. 
Chemerinsky. Litigation alerts in the USA Patriot Act. 23 Cal Law 29, April 2003. 
Lee. Can Police Track your Wireless Calls? Call Location Information and Privacy Law. 21 Cardozo Arts & Ent U 381. 
2003. . 
Dobbins. Protecting the Unpopular from the Unreasonable: Warrantless Monitoring of Attorney Client Communications 
in Federal Prisons. 53 Cath UL Rev 295, Winter 2004. 
Bast. What's Bugging You? Inconsistencies and Irrationalities of the Law of Eavesdropping. 47 DePaul L Rev 837, 
Summer 1998. 
Circumventing Title III: The use of Pen Register Surveillance in Law Enforcement. 1977 Duke U 751. 
Rosenszweig. Civil Liberty and the Response to Terrorism. 42 Dug L Rev 663, Summer 2004. 
Gorelick; Harwood; Zachary. Navigating Communications Regulation in the Wake of 9/11. 57 Fed Comm U 351. May 
2005. 
Game; Blakely; Armstrong. The Legal Status of Spyware. 59 Fed Comm U 157, December 2006. 
King. Direct Marketing, Mobile Phones, and Consumer Privacy: Ensuring Adequate Disclosure and Consent Mechanisms 
for Emerging Mobile Advertising Practices. 60 Fed Comm U 229, March 2008. 
Electronic intelligence gathering and the omnibus crime control and safe streets act of 1968. 44 Fordham L Rev 331, 
November 1975. 
Solove. The Coexistence of Privacy and Security: Fourth Amendment Codification and Professor Kerr's Misguided Call 
for Judicial Deference. 74 Fordham L Rev 747, November 2005. 
Privacy of Conversations Over Cordless and Cellular Telephones: Federal Protection Under the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act of 1986.9 Geo Mason U L Rev335/ Summer 1987. 
Howell. Surveillance Law: Reshaping the Framework: Seven Weeks: The Making of the USA PATRIOT Act. 72 Geo 
Wash L Rev 1145, August 2004. 
Solove. Reshaping the Framework; Electronic Surveillance Law. 72 Geo Wash L Rev 1264, August 2004. 
Bellia. Surveillance, Records & Computers: Surveillance Law Through Cyberlaw's Lens. 72 Geo Wash L Rev 1375, 
August 2004. 
Fishman. Surveillance/ Records & Computers: Technology and the Internet: The Impending Destruction of Privacy by 
Betrayers/ Grudgers, Snoops, Spammers, Corporations, and the Media. 72 Geo Wash L Rev 1503, August 2004. 
Mulligan. Surveillance, Records & Computers: Reasonable Expectations in Electronic Communications: A Critical 
Perspective on the Electronic Communications Privacy Act. 72 Geo Wash L Rev 1557, August 2004. 
Ohm. Surveillance, Records & Computers: Parallel-Effect Statutes and E-Mail "Warrants": Reframing the Internet 
Surveillance Debate. 72 Geo Wash L Rev 1599, August 2004. 
Hedrick; Gruber. Privacy Cybersex and Divorce: Interception of and Access to E-mail and Other Electronic 
Communications in the Marital Home. 17 J Am Acad Matrimonial Law 1. 2001. 
Morgan. Marital Cybertorts: The Limits of Privacy in the Family Computer. 20 J Am Acad Matrimonial Law 231. 2007. 
Goldsmith, The Supreme Court and Title III: Rewriting the Law of Electronic Surveillance. 74 J Crim L 1, Spring, 1983. 
Donohue. Criminal Law: Anglo-American Privacy and Surveillance. 96 J Crim L & Criminology 1059, Spring 2006. 
Ebert. Mailer Daemon: Unable to Deliver Message Judicial Confusion in the Domain of E-Mail Monitoring in the Private 
Workplace. 1 J High Tech L 63,2002. 
Rahavy. The Federal Wiretap Act: The Permissible Scope of Eavesdropping in the Family Home. 2 J High Tech L 87, 
2003. 
Sidbury. You've got mail ... and your boss knows it: rethinking the scope of the Electronic Communications Privacy 
Act. 5 J Internet L 16, July 2001. 
Perez-Albuerne; Friedman. Privacy Protection for Electronic Communications and the "Interception-Unauthorized 
Access" Dilemma. 19 J Marshall J Computer & Info L 435, Spring 2001. 
Cooper. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act: Does the Answer to the Internet Information Privacy Problem lie 
in a Fifteen-year-old Federal Statute? A Detailed Analysis. 20 J Marshall J Computer & Info L 1. Fall 2001. 
Thompson. The Digital Explosion Comes With a Cost: The Loss of Privacy. 4 J Tech L & Pol'y 3, Spring 1999. 
Taylor. The Scope of Government Access to Copies of Electronic Communications Stored with Internet Service 
Providers: A Review of Legal Standards. 6 J Tech L & Pol'y 1. Fall 2001. 
Pikowsky. An Overview of the Law of Electronic Surveillance Post September 11, 2001. 94 Law Ubr J 601, Fall 2002. 
Rosenstein. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 and satellite descramblers: toward preventing 
statutory obsolescence. 76 Minn L Rev 1451. June 1992. 
Turkington. Protection for Invasions of Conversational and Communication Privacy by Electronic Surveillance in 
Family, Marriage, and Domestic Disputes Under Federal and State Wiretap and Store Communications Acts and the 
Common Law Privacy Intrusion Tort. 82 Neb L Rev 693, 2004. 
Kerr. Internet Surveillance Law after the USA Patriot Act: The Big Brother that isn't. 97 Nw UL Rev 607, Winter 2003. 
The USA Patriot Act: Privacy Versus Security in a Post-9/ll World. Symposium. 29 NC J Int'I & Com Reg 595, Summer 
2004. 
Harrison. The USA Patriot Act: A New Way of Thinking, an Old Way of Reacting, Higher Education Responds. 5 NC JL & 
Tech 177 , Spring 2004. 
Sproule. The Effect of the USA Patriot Act on Workplace Privacy. 49 Prac Law 35, February 2003. 
Walden; Flanagan. Honeypots: A Sticky Legal Landscape? 29 Rutgers Computer & Tech U 317,2003. 
Hooper. "You've Got Mail:" Privacy Rights In the Workplace. 25 S III U L J 609, Spring 2001. 
Garrie; Armstrong; Harris. Voice over Internet Protocol and the Wiretap Act: Is Your Conversation Protected? 29 
Seattle Univ L R 97. Fall 2005. 
Fishman. The Interception of Communications Without A Court Order: Title III, Consent and Expectation of Privacy. 51 
st. John's Laws Rev 41, Fall 1976. 
MrgmffitrlJNt~~rrPffits~r:F~eSSniffersf and Privacy at the Margin. 2005 Stan Tech L Rev 1, 2005. 
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Breinholt. HOV-J About A Uttle Perspective: The USA Patriot Act and the Uses and Abuses of History". 9 TeX Rev Law & 
Pol 17, Fall 2004. 
Schwartz. Reviving Telecommunications Surveillance Law. 75 U Chi L Rev 287, Winter 2008. 
Subsequent use of electronic surveillance interceptions and the plain view doctrine; fourth amendment limitations on 
the omnibus crime control act. 9 U Mich J L Ref 529, Spring 1976. 
Karafin. "Don't Ask, Don't Tell;" A Discussion of Employee Privacy in Cyberspace in Ught of McVeigh v. Cohen, et al. J 
Va JL & Tech 7, Fall 1998. 
Taylor. Issues Raised by the Application of the Pen Register Statutes to Authorize Government Collection of 
Information on Packet-Switched Networks. 6 Va JL & Tech 4, Spring 2001. 
Jennings. Carnivore: US Government Surveillance of Internet Transmissions. 6 Va JL & Tech 10, Summer 2001. 
Clark. Symposium on Electronic Privacy in the Information Age: Cell Phones as Tracking Devices. 41 Val UL Rev 1413, 
Summer 2007. 
Joyce; Bigart. Symposium on Electronic Privacy in the Information Age: Uability for All, Privacy for None: The 
Conundrum of Protecting Privacy Rights in a Pervasively Electronic World. 41 Val UL Rev 1481. Summer 2007. 
DeCoste. Sender Beware: The Discoverability and Admissibility of E-Mail. 2 Vand J Ent L & Prac 79, Winter 2000. 
The Suppression Sanction Under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act for Violations of the Private One-Party 
Consent Exception. 34 ViII L Rev 111, 1989. 
Kerr. Are We Overprotecting Code? Thoughts on First-Generation Internet Law. 57 Wash & Lee L Rev 1287, Fall 2000. 
Bell. Prosecuting White-Collar Crime: Theatrical Investigation: White-Collar Crime, Undercover Operations, and 
Privacy. 11 Wm & Mary Bill of Rts J 151, December 2002. 
Emerging Issues Analysis 
Posner on The Obtain/Use Surveillance Dichotomy 
The government's surveillance power has increased significantly. For instance, the Protect America Act of 2007 has 
expanded the government's power to conduct warrantless surveillance under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. But 
how can this information be used, and how can the use be opposed? In this expert commentary, Steve c. Posner discusses 
the dichotomy between surveillance and use of surveilled information in criminal prosecutions. 
-:;:: Interpretive Notes and Decisions: 
LIN GENERAL 
± 1. Constitutionality, generally 
± 2.--Fourth Amendrnent 
± 3.--Tenth Amendment 
± 4. Purpose 
± 5. Construction, generally 
± 6.--Definitions 
± 7. Extra-territorial application 
± 8. Relationship with state law, generally 
± 9.--Pre-emption 
± 10.--State statutes more stringent than federal requirements 
± l1.--Miscellaneous 
ILCONSTRUCTION AND APPLICATION OF PARTICULAR DEFINITIONS 
± 12. Wire communication 
± 13. Oral communication 
± 14.--Expectation of privacy, generally 
± 15.----Miscellaneous 
± 16. Intercept, generally 
± 17.--Telephone conversations 
± 18.--Use of pen register or other tracing device 
± 19.--Miscellaneous 
± 20. Electronic, mechanical, or other device, generally 
± 21.--Extension telephone exemption 
± 22. Person 
± 23. Investigative officers 
± 24. Law enforcement officers 
± 25. Aggrieved person 
± 26. Judge of competent jurisdiction 
LIN GENERAL 
:; 1. Constitutionality, generally 
Title III of Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (18 USCS §§ 2510-2520) is constitutional. United States v 
Iannelli (1973, CA3 Pal 477 F2d 999, affd (1975) 420 US 770, 43 LEd 2d 616,95 S Ct 1284; United States v Kohne 
(1973, WD Pal 358 F SUPD 1053, affd without op (1973, CA3 Pa) 485 F2d 679 and affd without op (1973, CA3 Pa) 485 
F2d 61B1RlE-Fclf.ll'i !sUPPORqs0)E3s!(!:AI'E2~224, 94 S Ct 2624 and affd without op (1973, CA3 Pa) 485 F2d 682 and 
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affd V'Jithout op (1973, CA3 Pa) 487 F2d 1394 and affd 'vvithout op (1973, CA3 Pa) 487 F2d 1395 and affd without op 
(1973, CA3 Pa) 487 F2d 1396; Washburn v State (1973) 19 Md APR 187, 310 A2d 176. 
Title III of Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (18 USCS §§ 2510 et seq.) is not unconstitutional on its 
face. United States v Tortorello (1973, CA2 NY) 480 F2d 764. cert den (1973) 414 US 866, 38 LEd 2d 86, 94 S Ct 63; 
United States v Leta (1971. MD Pal 332 F SURR 1357. 
Title III of Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (18 USCS §§ 2510-2520) absolutely prohibits electronic 
surveillance by federal government except under carefully defined circumstances and only after securing judicial authority; 
18 USCS §§ 2510 et seq. was written to create limited authority for electronic surveillance and investigation of specified 
crimes thought to lie within province of organized criminal activity and it was designed to conform to prevailing 
constitutional standards. United States v Kalustian (1975, CA9 Cal) 529 F2d 585. 
Title III of Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (18 USCS §§ 2510 et seq.) does not violate USCS 
Constitution, Amendments 1, 1.,.2.. United States v Best (1973, SD Ga) 363 F SURD 11. 
18 USCS §§ 2510-2520 are constitutional. United States v Webster (1979, DC Md) 473 F SURR 586, affd (1981, CA4 Md) 
639 F2d 174, 7 Fed Rules Evid Serv 998, 68 AlR Fed 928, cert den (1981) 454 US 857, 70 LEd 2d 152, 102 S Ct 307 
and mod, in part (1982, CA4 Md) 669 F2d 185, cert den (1982) 456 US 935, 72 L Ed 2d 455, 102 S Ct 1991. 
Since telephone is instrumentality of interstate commerce, Congress has plenary power under Constitution to regulate its 
abuse; Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act does not violate due process as it applies to interspousal wiretapping. 
Kratz v Kratz (1979, ED Pal 477 F SURR 463 (criticized in Kirkland v Franco (2000, ED La) 92 F SURD 2d 578). 
18 USCS §§ 2510-2520, is facially constitutional. Whitaker v Garcetti (2003, CD Cal) 291 F SUDP 2d 1132. affd in part and 
revd in part on other grounds, remanded, vacated on other grounds, in part, claim dismissed, request den (2007, CA9 Cal) 
486 F3d 572, 67 FR Serv 3d 1167 and (Abrogated on other grounds as stated in Walden v City of Providence (2007, DC 
RI) 495 F SURD 2d 245, 26 BNA IER Cas 580). 
'+ 2.--Fourth Amendment 
Fourth Amendment does not require that electronic surveillance order issued by court under Title III of Omnibus Crime 
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (18 USCS §§ 2510-2520) include specific authorization to enter covertly premises 
described in order; in interpreting statute, United States Supreme Court will respect policy of Congress so as not to impute 
to statute self-defeating, if not disingenuous purpose; effect of detailed restrictions of 18 USCS § 2518 on court with 
respect to authorization of "wiretapping" and "bugging" is to guarantee that wiretapping or bugging occur only when there 
is genuine need for it and only to extent that it is needed, and once such need has been demonstrated in accord with 
requirements of § 2518, courts have broad authority to approve interception of wire and oral communications, subject to 
constitutional limitations. Dalia v United States (1979) 441 US 238, 60 LEd 2d 177, 99 S Ct 1682. 
Statutory procedures of Title III, Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (18 USCS §§ 2510-2520) comport 
with Fourth Amendment and with rigid requirement for constitutionally permissible court-supervised interceptions as 
formulated by Supreme Court, and are therefore constitutional. United States v Cafero (1973, CA3 Pal 473 F2d 489, cert 
den (1974) 417 US 918. 41 LEd 2d 223. 94 S Ct 2622. 
Suppression of evidence obtained as result of court-authorized electronic interception on ground that 18 USCS §§ 
2510-2520 is unconstitutional on its face in that it fails to meet requirements for lawful electronic surveillance imposed by 
Fourth Amendment was error, since warrant and notice requirements of 18 USCS § 2518 are justifiably directed to 
protection of primary target of search, it being literally impossible to determine from typical telephone or face-to-face 
conversation who might be entitled to notice. United States v Whitaker (1973. CA3 Pal 474 F2d 1246. cert den (1973) 
412 US 950, 37 LEd 2d 1003, 93 S Ct 3014 and cert den (1973) 412 US 953, 37 LEd 2d 1006,93 S Ct 3003, 
Because of precise and discriminate requirements and provision for close judicial supervision contained in 18 USCS~ 
2515-2520, Title III of Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1968 (18 USCS §§ 2510-2520) does not violate Fourth Amendment, 
and is constitutional. United States v Boba (1973. CA4 SC) 477 F2d 974, cert den (1975) 421 US 909,43 LEd 2d 774, 95 
S Ct 1557. 
Title III of Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 USCS §§ 2510-2520, does not unconstitutionally 
authorize such broad intrusions as to violate Fourth Amendment, allowing obtaining of testimonial evidence of crimes in 
violation of Fourth and Fifth Amendments, violate First Amendment rights of free speech, allow search for which no notice 
prior to entry is required, or allow interceptions without establishment of probable cause. United States v Sklaroff (1975, 
CA5 Fla) 506 F2d 837, cert den (1975) 423 US 874, 96 S Ct 142,46 LEd 2d 105 and (Overruled as stated in United 
States v McWilliams (2008. SD W Va) 530 F SUDD 2d 813). 
18 USCS §§ 2510-2520, which permit wire tapping and electronic surveillance, do not contravene USCS Constitution, 
Amendments 1,1,.2.,~. United States v Diadone (1977, CA5 Tex) 558 F2d 775, reh den (1977, CA5 Tex) 562 F2d 1257 
and reh den (1977, CA5 Tex) 562 F2d 1258 and cert den (1978) 434 US 1064,98 S Ct 1239,55 LEd 2d 765 and cert den 
(1978) 434 US 1064,98 S Ct 1239, 55 LEd 2d 765 and cert den (1978) 434 US 1064, 98 S Ct 1239,55 LEd 2d 765 and 
(Overruled as stated in United States v McWilliams (2008, SD W Va) 530 F SUDR 2d 813). 
18 uftRlEI2ili-SUI1B.oJ&frvQE:EH='E&ffiJi}&ndment. United States v Bailey 0979, CA9 Wash) 607 F2d 237, cert 
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den (1980) 445 US 9"\4. 63 LEd 2d 769. 100 S Ct 1327. 
Interception of 2 narcotics-related phone calls made by inmate on telephone accessible to many other inmates did not 
violate Fourth Amendment, where Wiretap order authorized interception of only narcotics-related conversations of certain 
individuals, some of them unnamed, and government's interceptions were carefully circumscribed. United States v 
Figueroa (1985, CA2 NY) 757 F2d 466, cert den (1985) 474 US 840, 88 LEd 2d 100, 106 S Ct 122. 
Neither Fourth Amendment nor federal Wiretap Statute, Title III of federal Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 
1968, 18 USCS §§ 2510-2520, proscribes interception and use of audio or visual data of persons who are not specifically 
named in application seeking judicial authorization of such interception; therefore, plumbing inspector who was convicted 
of improperly accepting monetary payments could not argue that there was not probable cause supporting order 
authorizing installation of video cameras in vehicles that were used during inspections on ground that only information 
supporting order was not particularized as to him. United States v Urban (2005, CA3 Pal 404 F3d 754, cert den (2005) 
546 US 1030, 126 S Ct 732, 163 L Ed 2d 568 and cert den (2005) 546 US 1030, 126 S Ct 732, 163 LEd 2d 568 and 
subsequent app (2007, CA3 Pa) 240 Fed AROX 528. 
Provisions of Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, §§ 2510-2520 of Title 18, do not permit unconstitutional 
invasion of privacy. United States v Sklaroff (1971. SD Fla) 323 F SURR 296. 
Omnibus Criminal Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (18 USCS §§ 2510-2520) is sufficiently circumscribed to comply 
with guaranties of USCS Constitution Amendment 4 and, therefore, is constitutional. United States v Cantor (1971. ED Pal 
328 F SURR 561. affd (1972, CA3 Pa) 470 F2d 890; United States v Focarile (1972, DC Md) 340 F SUPP 1033, affd (1972, 
CA4 Md) 469 F2d 522, affd (1974) 416 US 505,40 L Ed 2d 341. 94 S Ct 1820 and affd without op (1973, CA4 Md) 473 
F2d 906. cert den (1973) 411 US 952,36 LEd 2d 414,93 S Ct 1931; United States v Curreri (1973, DC Md) 363 F SUPP 
430. 
Failure of 18 USCS §§ 2510 et seq. to proscribe unconsented and unannounced entries does not render it unconstitutional 
under Fourth Amendment. United States v Giacalone (1977, ED Mich) 455 F Suop 26. 
Military judge did not abuse its discretion when it denied servicemember's motion to suppress evidence given by Internet 
service provider without warrant that showed that servicemember had signed up for Internet service because 
servicemember did not have reasonable expectation of privacy in information showing that he had subscribed. United 
States v Ohnesorge (2005, NMCCA) 60 MJ 946, 2005 CCA LEXIS 51. 
-:; 3.--Tenth Amendment 
Omnibus Crime Control Act and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (18 USCS §§ 2510-2520) does not violate Tenth Amendment 
"affirmative limits on federal action affecting states under Commerce Clause," where § 2515 prohibits state's use of 
anonymously received surreptitious recording of telephone conversations in its investigation/prosecution of public 
corruption since communication was intercepted in violation of § 2511, because current Supreme Court view is that 
Congress may intrude into area of state criminal law and that Tenth Amendment is more truism than it is active limitation 
on Congress. Michigan v Meese (1987, ED Mich) 666 F SUpp 974, affd without op (1988, CA6 Mich) 850 F2d 692, 
withdrawn by publisher, reported in full (1988, CA6 Mich) 853 F2d 395, cert den (1988) 488 US 980, 102 LEd 2d 560, 
109 S Ct 528. 
-:; 4. Purpose 
Title III of Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act (18 USCS §§ 2510-2520), which authorizes use of electronic 
surveillance for specified classes of crimes, represents comprehensive attempt by Congress to promote more effective 
control of crime while protecting privacy of individual thought and expression. United States v United States Dist. Court 
(1972) 407 US 297,32 L Ed 2d 752,92 S Ct 2125. 
Purpose of Title III of Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (18 USCS §§ 2510-2520) is to prohibit, on pain 
of criminal and civil penalties, all interceptions of oral and wire communications except those specifically provided for in 
Act, most notably those interceptions permitted to law enforcement officers when authorized by court order in connection 
with investigation of serious crimes listed in 18 USCS § 2516. United States v Giordano (1974) 416 US 505,40 L Ed 2d 
341. 94 S Ct 1820. 
Restrictions of Title III of Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (18 USCS §§ 2510 et seq.)--generally 
prohibiting interception of wire, electronic, and oral communications--are intended to protect important government 
interest in privacy of communication, thereby encouraging uninhibited exchange of ideas and information among private 
parties. Bartnicki v VODDer (2001) 532 US 514, 121 S Ct 1753,149 LEd 2d 787, 2001 CDOS 4037, 2001 Daily Journal 
DAR 4961. 167 BNA LRRM 2199, 29 Media L R 1737,143 CCH LC P 59221, 2001 Colo J CAR 2488,14 FLW Fed S 254. 
18 USCS §§ 2510 et seq. has dual purpose of protecting privacy of wire and oral communications and of delineating on 
uniform basis circumstances and conditions under which interception of wire and oral communications may be authorized. 
United States v Cafero (1973, CA3 Pal 473 F2d 489, cert den (1974) 417 US 918, 41 LEd 2d 223, 94 S Ct 2622. 
Title III of Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (18 USCS §§ 2510-2520), which sets forth comprehensive 
legislffRtEFEJ:Tilr5t9Iipt(l)Rhftwr:sqJi~"'Sand wire communications, attempts to strike delicate balance between 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 7f7 
12/1/2008 12:22 PIv 
Get a Docrnnent - by Citation - 18 USCS § 2510 https:llwww.lexis.comlresearchlretrieve? _m=685e5d29bea913eall .. 
II of 35 
need to protect persons from uflwarranted eiectronic surveiiiance and preservation of iaw enforcement toois needed to 
fight organized crime. United States v Phillips (1976, CA8 t"'lo) 540 F2d 319, cert den (1976) 429 US 1000,50 LEd 2d 
611. 97 S Ct 530. 
Title III of Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (18 USCS §§ 2510 et seq.) is comprehensive statute 
designed to regulate strictly interception and disclosure of wire and oral commUnication; it has as its dual purpose (1) 
protecting privacy of wire and oral communications, and (2) delineating on uniform basis circumstances and conditions 
under which interception of such communications may be authorized; legislative history of Title III makes it clear, as do 
elaborate authorization and disclosure provisions of statute itself, that protection of privacy was overriding congressional 
concern of Act. United States v Cianfrani [1978, CA3 Pal 573 F2d 835,3 Media L R 1961 (criticized in United States v 
McVeigh (1997, CAlO Colo) 119 F3d 806, 25 Media L R 1937,1997 Colo J CAR 1124). 
18 USCS §§ 2510 et seq. has 2 purposes: protecting privacy of wire and oral communications and delineating on uniform 
basis circumstances and conditions under which interception of wire and oral communications may be authorized. 
Providence Journal Co. v FBI (1979, CAl RI) 602 F2d 1010, 5 Media L R 1390, 52 ALR Fed 173, cert den (1980) 444 US 
107L 62 LEd 2d 752, 100 S Ct 1015. 
18 USCS §§ 2510 et seq. was directed against use of sophisticated electronic equipment and not against long-accepted use 
of rudimentary material. United States v Miller (1983, CAl Mass) 720 F2d 227, cert den (1984) 464 US 1073, 79 LEd 2d 
220, 104 S Ct 984. 
Purpose of 18 USCS §§ 2510-2520 is to provide law enforcement officials with tools necessary to combat crime without 
unnecessarily infringing upon right of individual privacy. United States v Carneiro (1988, CA9 Wash) 861 F2d 1171. 
Procedures and remedies of 18 USCS §§ 2510-2520 have 2 dominant purposes: to prevent improper invasions of privacy 
and to provide compensation when such invasions occur. Zweibon v Mitchell (1979, APD DC) 196 US App DC 265, 606 F2d 
1172, cert den (1981) 453 US 912, 69 LEd 2d 997,101 S Ct 3147, reh den (1981) 453 US 928, 69 L Ed 2d 1024, 102 S 
Ct 892 and reh den (1981) 453 US 928,69 LEd 2d 1025,102 S Ct 892. 
Major purpose of 18 USCS §§ 2510-2520 was to prohibit electronic surveillance by law enforcement officers acting without 
court authorization. Kratz v Kratz (1979, ED Pal 477 F Supp 463 (criticized in Kirkland v Franco (2000, ED La) 92 F Supp 
2d 578). 
Protection of privacy was overriding congressional concern in enacting 18 USCS §§ 2510-2520; Act represents attempt by 
Congress to establish system of safeguards to electronic surveillance. United States v Clemente (1979, SD NY) 482 F Supp 
102, affd without op (1980, CA2 NY) 633 F2d 207 and affd without op (1980, CA2 NY) 633 F2d 207. 
Purpose of 18 USCS §§ 2510-2520 is to protect privacy of wire and oral communications and to delineate on uniform basis 
circumstances and conditions under which interception of wire and oral communications may be authorized. Sikes v Segers 
(1979) 266 Ark 654, 587 SW2d 554. 
"+ 5. Construction, gen-erally 
Although Title III of Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (18 USCS §§ 2510-2520) does not refer 
explicitly to covert entry, language, structure, and history of statute indicate that Congress has conferred upon courts--
ancillary to their responsibility for reviewing and approving electronic surveillance applications under statute--power to 
authorize law enforcement officer's covert entry into private premises (that is, officer's physical entry into premises 
without owner's permission or knowledge) for installation of "bugging" equipment. Dalia v United States (1979) 441 US 
238,60 LEd 2d 177, 99 S Ct 1682. 
If 18 USCS §§ 2510-2520 are to survive constitutional challenge under Fourth Amendment, they must be given as limited 
construction as is warranted by language used. Application of United States (1970, CA9 Nev) 427 F2d 639 (superseded by 
statute as stated in United States v Illinois Bell Tel. Co. (1976, CA7 III) 531 F2d 809) and (superseded by statute on other 
grounds as stated in Company v United States (In re United States) (2003, CA9 Nev) 349 F3d 1132,2003 CDOS 9891). 
Since 18 USCS §§ 2510 et seq. prohibits warrantless eavesdropping except under national security powers of President 
and emergency situations and since it serves as national standard by which validity of state legislation is determined, it is 
to be strictly construed. United States v Capra (1974, CA2 NY) 501 F2d 267, cert den (1975) 420 US 990, 43 LEd 2d 670, 
95 S Ct 1424. 
18 USCS §§ 2510-2520 does not authorize federal courts to permit visual electronic surveillance of private promises, since 
statute only sanctions interception of wire or oral communications. United States v Biasucci (1986, CA2 NY) 786 F2d 504, 
cert den (1986) 479 US 827,93 L Ed 2d 54,107 S Ct 104 and cert den (1986) 479 US 827, 93 LEd 2d 56,107 S Ct 107. 
Summary judgment in favor of defendants on prisoner's claim of violation of Federal Wiretap Act, 18 USCS §§ 2510 et 
seq., was affirmed because defendants provided considerable evidence that prisoner had reasonable opportunity to 
discover wiretap violation before indictment; further, since recordings were of prisoner, and prisoner presumably requested 
disclosure of recordings during discovery in his criminal prosecution, prisoner and his attorney were not considered third 
parties, and any disclosure made pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 16 did not constitute illegal disclosure under 18 USCS § 
2511; therefore, prisoner's claims were barred by two-year statute of limitations set forth under 18 USCS § 2520. Lanier v 
Bryan~<IN> $ddFjPOmcOF9S:IMjI)IEtSAPD 203P. 
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Denial of satellite television provider's claims against accused pirates was reversed because (1) provider's satellite 
broadcasts were "electronic communications" as defined by Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 USCS §§ 
2510-2521, (2) private right of action was available under 18 USCS §§ 2511(1)(a) and 2520 for unauthorized interception 
of encrypted satellite television broadcasts, and (3) Communications Act did not provide sole remedy. DirecTV Inc. v Pepe 
(2005, CA3 NJ) 431 F3d 162, 78 USP02d 1612. 
Where Government intended to introduce defendant's telephone conversations recorded while defendant was in prison, it 
was not erroneous to deny defendant's motion to suppress recorded conversations, because consent alone sufficed to admit 
recorded conversations under Federal Wiretap Act, 18 USCS §§ 2510-2522. United States v Moore (2006, CAS La) 452 
F3d 382, cert den (2006, US) 127 S Ct 423, 166 LEd 2d 299 and subsequent app (2007, CAS La) 238 Fed APRX 13, cert 
den (2007, US) 128 S Ct 710,169 LEd 2d 558. 
Since Congress conceived of electronic surveillance as means of combating infiltration of American SOCiety by organized 
crime, where organized crime is involved, scope of permissible surveillance expands. United States v Clemente (1979, SD 
NY) 482 F SURR 102, affd without op (1980, CA2 NY) 633 F2d 207 and affd without op (1980, CA2 NY) 633 F2d 207. 
Only "aggrieved person" may challenge particular wiretap. United States v Lavin (1985, ED Pal 604 F SURR 350. 
Wiretap evidence obtained in Puerto Rico is subject to law of First Circuit, rather than Second Circuit where case is being 
tried, regardless of whether Second Circuit has more stringent exclusionary device, because there is no logical basis for 
conclusion that forum should reward or punish government with either more lenient or more severe penalty than that 
applied by courts of jurisdiction where conduct occurred. United States v Gerena (1987, DC Conn) 667 F SURR 911 
(criticized in Northern Tankers (CYRrus) v Backstrom (1996, DC Conn) 934 F SURR 33). 
Computer book/magazine/game publisher is awarded judgment for more than $ 50,000 against U.s. Secret Service, where 
agents obtained warrant and seized computers, drsks, and other materials of publisher under false notion that employee 
had sensitive, proprietary computer document that had been wrongfully made available to public via computer bulletin 
boards, because seizure of work product materials violated 42 USCS § 2000aa-6 and 18 USCS § 2703, even though 
seizure could not constitute interception of "electronic communication" so as to bring 'lnto play statutory scheme at 18 
USCS §§ 2510 et seq. Steve Jackson Games v United States Secret Servo (1993, WD Tex) 816 F SURR 432, affd (1994, 
CAS Tex) 36 F3d 457 (criticized in Goodspeed v Harman (1999, ND Tex) 39 F SURR 2d 787) and (superseded by statute on 
other grounds as stated in KonoR v Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. (2001, CA9 Cal) 236 F3d 1035,2001 CD OS 199, 2001 Daily 
Journal DAR 311, 166 BNA LRRM 2195, 142 CCH LC P 10872) and (criticized in Guest v Leis (2001, CA6 Ohio) 255 F3d 
325, 2001 FED APR 206P). 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 USCS §§ 2510-2711 did not provide exclusion of evidence as remedy for 
violation. United States v Ohnesorge (2005, NMCCA) 60 MJ 946, 2005 CCA LEXIS 51. 
-:; 6.--Definitions 
Assertion that since private individual would be liable for alleged interception of plaintiff's communications, plaintiff could 
maintain direct suit against United States is without merit since "person," as used in 18 uses § 2520 and defined by § 
2510(6), excluded United States; reading of 2 statutes so as to permit plaintiff to sue United States would frustrate intent 
of Congress in enacting § 2510 by rendering statutory definition of "person" in that section meaningless. SRock v United 
States (1978, SD NY) 464 F SURP 510 (criticized in Lukas v Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Auth. (1993, ED NY) 1993 US Dist 
LEXIS 21065) and (critidzed in Terkel v AT&T Corp. (2006, ND III) 441 F SURP 2d 899). 
No court order is required under 18 USCS § 3122 and 28 USCS § 1651 to use cellular telephone digital analyzer, where 
digital analyzer is to be used to detect electronic serial number, cellular telephone's own number, and numbers called by 
cellular telephone but not contents of any communication, because use of such device to detect these numbers does not 
violate proscriptions of 18 USCS §§ 2510 et seq., which define "contents" of communication as including any information 
covering substance, purport, or meaning of that communication. In re United States (1995, CD Cal) 885 F SUPP 197. 
Computer salesman's challenge to employer's use of video surveillance system is denied summarily, where salesman 
acknowledged in his deposition that videotape had no sound, because, in absence of any record of "human voice at any 
point between and including point of origin and point of reception," as is required for "aural transfer" as used in 18 USCS § 
2510, federal wiretapping prohibitions are inapplicable. Audenreid v Circuit City Stores, Inc. (2000, ED Pal 97 F SUPR 2d 
660, 16 BNA IER Cas 651 (criticized in Kline v Sec. Guards, Inc. (2003, ED Pal 2003 US Dist LEXIS 15476). 
In action by husband, partner, and their closely held corporation against wife for recording corporation's telephone 
communications on telephone line located in couple's home under Title III of Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act 
of 1968, 18 USCS §§ 2510 et seq., exception for inter-spousal eavesdropping in context of domestic dispute did not apply 
as calls were mostly non-domestic communications, and there were fact issues as to whether telephone extension 
requirement for inter-spousal exception was met. Britton v Britton (2002, DC Me) 223 F SURR 2d 276. 
Definition of "electronic storage" in 18 USCS § 2510(17)(B) includes storage after transmission of copy of electronic 
communication made for purpose of backup protection. Ouon v Arch Wireless Operating Co. (2004, CD Cal) 309 F SURP 2d 
1204. 
DefinlliRlI'i'JPtW'Slr:TW(!)RJ]?@]!ii $5If~'i~unambiguous and controlling; court must apply ordinary definition of 
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"use," which is to put into action or service, avail oneself of, employ. QUOD v Arch Wireless Operating Co. (2004, CD Cal) 
309 F SUPD 2d 1204. 
Cell phone service providers indisputably fit within definition of provider of electronic communication service. In re United 
States Orders pursuant to 18 U.s.c. 2703(d) (2007, DC Mass) 509 F SUDD 2d 76 (criticized in In re United States for an 
Order Directing Provider of Elec. Commun. Servo to Disclose Records to the Gov't (2008, WD Pal 534 F SURD 2d 585). 
Because location of cell tower in relation to point of origin (or termination) of call discloses nothing about substance of call 
itself, it is "noncontent" information within meaning of Stored Communications Act, 18 USCS §§ 2701 et seq. In re United 
States Orders pursuant to 18 U.s.c. 2703(d) (2007, DC Mass) 509 F SUPD 2d 76 (criticized in In re United States for an 
Order Directing Provider of Elec. Commun. Servo to Disclose Records to the Gov't (2008. WD Pal 534 F SUPD 2d 585). 
'+ 7. Extra-territorial application 
Where defendant, citizen of Italy allegedly illegally abducted from Uruguay, alleged that he was victim of unlawful 
wiretapping conducted at direction of United States employees in violation of 18 USCS §§ 2510, 2518, and Fourth 
Amendment and that employee of public telephone company who was bribed by American agents to conduct illegal 
surveillance had subsequently been arrested, indicted and imprisoned in Uruguay, defendant was entitled to invoke 18 
USCS § 3504, and absent written, sworn denial of wiretap allegation by prosecution, defendant was entitled to evidentiary 
hearing on his wiretap allegations as to violation of his constitutional rights, but 18 USCS §§ 2510 et seq. has no 
application outside United States. United States v Toscanino (1974, CA2 NY) 500 F2d 267, reh den (1974, CA2) 504 F2d 
1380 and (criticized in United States v Noriega (1997, CAll Fla) 117 F3d 1206,47 Fed Rules Evid Serv 786,11 FLW Fed 
~ and (criticized in State v Nysus (2001, ADD) 2001 NMCA 23, 130 NM 431, 25 P3d 270) and (criticized in Weilburg v 
Sims (2005, CA7 III) 132 Fed Appx 665) and (criticized in United States v Padilla (2007, SD Fla) 2007 US Dist LEXIS 
26077). 
District Court ruling that introduction of telephone conversations intercepted by Canadian wiretaps placed by that country's 
police without judicial authorization was not prohibited by 18 USCS §§ 2510-2520 even though conversations traveled in 
part over United States communications system would be affirmed. United States v Cotroni (1975, CA2 NY) 527 F2d 708, 
cert den (1976) 426 US 906, 48 LEd 2d 830, 96 S Ct 2226. 
18 USCS §§ 2510 et seq. has no application outside United States; therefore, interceptions of telephone conversations 
made in Canada by Canadian officials, lawful under Canadian law, are admissible in extradition hearing, even though 
interceptions would have violated 18 USCS §§ 2510 et seq. Stowe v Devoy (1978, CA2 NY) 588 F2d 336, cert den (1979) 
442 US 931, 61 LEd 2d 299,99 S Ct 2862. 
Evidence derived from Canadian wiretaps is admissible in criminal prosecution in United States where institution of 
interception is for investigation of Canadian offense, interception is not product of cooperative effort between Canadian 
and American authorities, and interception is conducted within limits of Canadian law even though if interception were to 
occur in United States under same circumstances, evidence derived therefrom would be inadmissible. United States v 
DelaDlane (1985, CAW Colo) 778 F2d 570,19 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1347, cert den (1986) 479 US 827, 93 LEd 2d 54,107 
S Ct 104. 
Title III of Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (18 USCS §§ 2510-2520) is inapplicable to electronic 
surveillance abroad; to extent that plaintiffs cause of action against various government officials alleged that plaintiff was 
subject to illegal electronic surveillance by such officials in foreign country! action could not be brought under 18 USCS §§ 
2510-2520 as they have no extra territorial effect. Berlin Democratic Club v Rumsfeld (1976, DC Dist Col) 410 F Supp 
144. 
Evidence derived from wiretap was not admissible in federal prosecution where evidence established that interception was 
unlawful under Canadian Law on content of interceptive conversation could not be used in evidence against defendants in 
Canada. United States v Phillips (1979, MD Fla) 479 F Supp 423, 79-2 USTC P 9732, 45 AFTR 2d 526. 
18 USCS § 2510 is inapplicable extra-territorially; although no United States court could authorize extra-territorial 
wiretap! it does not follow that interception of such is therefore illegal. United States v Bennett (1982. DC Puerto Rico) 
538 F Supp 1045. 
Wiretap evidence of narcotics conspiracy need not be suppressed, even though New York judge issued order for electronic 
surveillance which included "slave" device connecting Maryland telephone to New York monitoring station! because 
jurisdiction to order "interception" under 18 USCS § 2510(4) vests either in location where conversations are actually 
heard or where mechanical device is inserted. United States v Burford (1991. SD NY) 755 F SUPD 607, affd without op 
(1992, CA2 NY) 986 F2d 501. 
Federal wiretap statute (18 USCS § 2510) does not apply to wiretap in Canada initiated by Canadian authorities. State v 
Nieuwenhuis (1985, ApD) 146 Ariz 477, 706 P2d 1244. 
'+ 8. Relationship with state law, generally 
Wiretap evidence obtained in violation of neither Constitution nor federal law is admissible in federal court! even though 
obtaiiffItiEFo1N~1:J1.Pp~~e:FJISFAqr~'lgw. United States v Keen (1974, CA9 Wash) 508 F2d 986 ..... cert den 
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(1975) 421 US 929, 44 I Ed)d "'6, 95 set 1655. 
18 USCS § 2516(2) provides for state court authorizations of interceptions of wire or oral communications in conformity 
with applicable state statute, and thus, conclusion that state law governs validity of warrants issued by state courts is in no 
way inconsistent with general rule that federal law governs admissibility of wiretap evidence in federal criminal cases, 
because federal statute includes relevant state law in context of state court authorizations. United States v Nelligan (1978, 
CA5 Fla) 573 F2d 251. 
Execution of federal wiretap order by District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department members of federal DEA joint 
task force does not constitute violation of 18 USCS § 2510. United States v Lyons 0982, CA4 Md) 695 F2d 802, 12 Fed 
Rules Evid Serv 203. 
State law governing electronic surveillance cannot be less protective of privacy than federal electronic surveillance 
statutes. United States v McKinnon (1983, CAl Mass) 721 F2d 19. 
In enacting wiretap provisions of Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (18 USCS §§ 2510-2520), Congress 
did not intend to occupy entire field of electronic surveillance to exclusion of state regulation; state wiretap provisions 
based on type of surveillance, that is, whether it is wiretapping or eavesdropping does not conflict with scheme of federal 
act based on type of communication, that is whether it is wire or oral. People v Conklin (1974) 11 Cal 3d 648, reported at 
(1974) 12 Cal 3d 259,114 Cal Rptr 241. 522 P2d 1049, app dismd (1974) 419 US 1064,42 L Ed 2d 661. 95 S Ct 652. 
18 USCS §§ 2510-2520 was not intended to occupy entire field of wiretapping, and where state statute does not impair 
attainment of federal objectives, but rather aids in fulfilling purposes of federal law, state statute is enforceable. Tavernetti 
v Superior Court of San Diego County (1978) 22 Cal 3d 187, 148 Cal Rptr 883, 583 P2d 737. 
-; 9.--Pre-emption 
In prosecution for violation of provisions of Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, allowing into 
evidence tape recordings taken by undercover government agent of his conversations with defendants was not error on 
ground that California law prohibited interception of telephone conversations even when one of parties has given prior 
consent to interception, since such state law is inconsistent with 18 uscs § 2511(2)(c). United States v Johnson (1973, 
CA9 Cal) 484 F2d 165, cert den (1973) 414 US 1112,38 LEd 2d 739,94 S Ct 842 and cert den (1974) 415 US 922, 39 L 
Ed 2d 477,94 S Ct 1424. 
On appeal of conviction of defendants, corporation officers and state governor, of violation of 18 USCS §§ 1951, 1952, on 
ground that it was error for trial court to receive in evidence conversations of state officer informant with Governor and 
other principals in conspiracy which were recorded since state statute made unlawful recording of telephone conversation 
with another without such person's permission and prohibited introduction into evidence of such recorded conversations, 
statute was in conflict with 18 USCS § 2511 and federal statute as to validity of interception and admissibility of evidence 
governed. United States v Hall (1976, CAW Okla) 536 F2d 313, cert den (1976) 429 US 919, 50 L Ed 2d 285, 97 S Ct 
313. 
18 USCS § 2518 pre-empts inconsistent state provision purporting to govern disposition of recordings, logs, transcripts and 
other items pertaining to intercepted communications authorized by court order. State v Siegel (1971) 13 Md App 444, 
285 A2d 671. affd (1972) 266 Md 256, 292 A2d 86. 
18 USCS §§ 2510 et seq. pre-empt state law authorizing broader orders. People v Shapiro (1980) 50 NY2d 747,431 
NYS2d 422, 409 NE2d 897. 
Although Congress attempted to pre-empt field of wiretapping and eavesdropping in enacting 18 USCS §§ 1510 et seq., 
state legislation is permitted as long as it is not less restrictive than federal statute. Commonwealth v Look (1980) 379 
Mass 893, 402 NE2d 470, cert den (1980) 449 US 827, 66 LEd 2d 31. 101 S Ct 91. 
By enacting 18 USCS §§ 2510 et seq. Congress did not intend to pre-empt state legislation in field of electronic 
surveillance; states are free to devise their own statutory schemes, although before state officials can lawfully monitor oral 
and wire communications, state legislature is required to speCifically authorize such activities; if state chooses to enact 
legislation, scheme must be at least as restrictive as regulations in 18 USCS §§ 2510 et seq. State v Hanley (1979) 185 
Mont 459, 605 P2d 1087. 
Title III of Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, 18 USCS §§ 2510 et seq. has pre-empted field of wiretap and 
established minimum standards for admissibility of evidence procured through electronic or mechanical eavesdropping, and 
scope of l1tle III's authority extends to both federal and state courts. Pulawski v Blais (1986, RI) 506 A2d 76. 
When it enacted 18 USCS §§ 2510-2520, Congress intended that states be permitted to supplement federal law and that 
state laws on subject of wiretapping would be pre-empted only if they were more permissive than federal law. People v 
Conklin (1973, Apo) 107 Cal Rptr 771. superseded on other grounds (1974) 12 Cal 3d 259, 114 Cal Rotr 241. 522 P2d 
1049, app dismd (1974) 419 US 1064,42 LEd 2d 661, 95 S Ct 652. 
In passing l1tle III of Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act (18 uses §§ 2510-2520), Congress pre-empted field of 
interception of wire communications; however, states are also permitted to regulate wiretaps, provided their standards are 
at le~EFiiJ1N~~qrtlryF fgctePfm.tj?tate v McGillicuddy (1977, Fla Apo D2) 342 So 2d 567. 
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18 USCS § 2516(2) authorizes interception of oral or wire communication and use of such interceptions as evidence if 
state statute so permits and authorizing state statute meets minimum requirements of 18 USCS § 2516 and since federal 
law governs, more strict provision, whether federal or state, must be followed. State v Kolosseus (1977) 198 Neb 404,253 
NW2d 157. 
-:;: 10.--State statutes more stringent than federal requirements 
Interpretation of state Wiretap statute, whether proceedings be federal or state, can never be controlling where state 
statute might impose requirements less stringent than controlling standard of 18 USCS §§ 2510-2520; if state should set 
forth procedures more exacting than those of federal statute, however, validity of interceptions and orders of authorization 
by which they were made would have to comply with that test as well. United States v Marion (1976, CA2 NY) 535 F2d 
697 (criticized in United States v Amanuel (2005, WD NY) 418 F SURP 2d 244). 
State may establish more strict standards than 18 USCS §§ 2510 et seq. mandates, but may not utilize less restrictive 
standards; fact that state statute does not track provisions of 18 USCS §§ 2510 et seq. does not invalidate evidentiary use 
of state-court authorized Wiretaps otherwise obtained in compliance with substantive procedures of 18 USCS §§ 2510 et 
seq. United States v Curreri (1974, DC Md) 388 F Supp 607. 
Plaintiff's claim that federal prosecutors and law enforcement agents violated 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5704(2)(iil, part of 
Pennsylvania Wiretap Act, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 5701 et seq., was preempted by Federal Wiretap Act, 18 USCS §§ 2510 et 
seq., as federal statute did not require state approval for warrantless wiretaps where one party had consented to be 
recorded. Bansal v Russ (2007, ED Pal 513 F Supp 2d 264. 
18 USCS §§ 2510-2520 does not preclude application of state standards which apply more restrictive rules to wiretapping 
situations. Warden v Kahn (1979, 1st Dist) 99 Cal APR 3d 805, 160 Cal Rptr 471 (criticized in Nagy v Whittlesey 
Automotive Group (1995, 4th Dist) 40 Cal App 4th 1238.47 Cal Rptr 2d 395, 95 CDOS 9350, 95 Daily Journal DAR 
16235, 11 BNA IER Cas 389). 
State standards for authorizing wiretaps must provide at least minimum requirements of 18 USCS §§ 2510 et seq.; state 
standards, however, may be more stringent; state statutes are not required to be carbon copies of federal law. Cox v State 
(1979) 152 Ga App 453, 263 SE2d 238, 
State may enact wiretap laws that give its citizens greater protection than does federal wiretap law, and courts may 
construe their own state's wiretap law so as to afford their citizens additional protection. State v Catania (1981) 85 NJ 
418,427 A2d 537 (criticized in State v Purnell (1999) 161 NJ 44, 735 A2d 513). 
Interpretation of state wire tap statute is not controlling where it imposes requirements less stringent than controlling 
standard of 18 USCS §§ 2510 et seq.; if state sets forth procedures more exacting than those of federal statute, validity of 
interceptions and orders of authorization must comply with that test as well. Evans v State (1984) 252 Ga 312,314 SE2d 
421, cert den (984) 469 US 826, 83 LEd 2d 50, 105 S Ct 106. 
Limitations set by 18 USCS § 2516 are to be observed by state authorities, but state is not prohibited from imposing even 
more restrictive requirements than are set out in federal statute. Application of Olander (1973) 213 Kan 282, 515 P2d 
1211. 
If state wiretap statute is more permissive than federal act (18 USCS §§ 2510-2520) any wiretap authorized thereunder is 
fatally defective and evidence thereby obtained is inadmissible under 18 USCS § 2515; only discretion left to state in 
eavesdropping area was whether to enact eavesdropping legislation more restrictive than provisions of federal act; 
however, since federal act was not self-executing, if state desired authorized eavesdropping, enactment of state legislation 
was necessary. State v Dowdy (1977) 222 Kan 118,563 P2d 425. 
-:;: l1.--Miscellaneous 
Federal occupation of field of wiretapping allows only state regulation which complies with federal procedure; however, it is 
not enough for defense to show that various provisions of state statute might countenance procedures in violation of 
federal standards, and defendants must show that such improper procedures were used in their case. United States v 
Smith (1984, CAl Mass) 726 F2d 852, cert den (1984) 469 US 841, 83 LEd 2d 82,105 S Ct 143. 
Evidence obtained by eavesdropping authorized by state statute was properly suppressed where state procedure for 
obtaining eavesdrop orders was more permissive than 18 USCS § 2516(2) and did not comply with Title III of Omnibus 
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act [18 USCS §§ 2510-2520] in key respects essential to federal regulatory scheme. State 
v Farha (1975) 218 Kan 394, 544 P2d 341, cert den (1976) 426 US 949,49 LEd 2d 1186, 96 S Ct 3170. 
On People's appeal of defendant's motion to suppress evidence in his prosecution for possession and use of heroin, on 
ground that telephone call monitored by motel employee violated federal and state eavesdropping statutes, People's 
contention that 18 USCS §§ 2510-2520 preempted field, thus causing state statute to be ineffective, was untenable; state 
statute was more stringent in that it contained no "aggrieved person" limitation, and state statute did not produce result 
inconsistent with objective of federal statute, so that both statutes were applicable. People v Warner (1975) 65 Mich App 
267, BlR.-l'EF<IN8SU:FPOR7l00 M!A:l]3E,'&58 NW2d 385. 
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Unpublished Opinions 
Unpublished: Plaintiffs' motion to remand was denied because complaint stated federal cause of action under Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act, 18 USCS §§ 2510 et seq., and defendant did not waive its right of removal in its proposed 
protective order, it merely stipulated to jurisdiction in state court for purposes of proposed protective order; furthermore, 
pursuant to 28 USCS § 1450, all injunctions, orders, and other proceedings had in state court action prior to removal 
would remain in full force and effect until dissolved or modified by court. MediterraneanCoins v Ebay Inc. (2005, ND Cal) 
2005 US Dist LEXIS 30876. 
II.CONSTRUCTION AND APPUCATION OF PARTICULAR DEFINITIONS 
-:; 12. Wire communication 
Reading 18 USCS §§ 2510 and 2511 together, it is clear that Congress did not mean that every conversation aided in any 
part by any wire would be wire communication; when part of communication is carried to or from land-line telephone, by 
way of radio telephone, entire conversation is wire communication and search warrant is required. United States v Hall 
(1973, CA9 Ariz) 488 F2d 193. 
To extent that computer "spy" system disclosed before they were sent out over telephone lines substance of replies 
generated by computer to defendant "intruder's" commands, information was not "wire communication" within meaning of 
18 USCS § 2510 at time of its retrieval. United States v Seidlitz (1978, CA4 Md) 589 F2d 152, cert den (1979) 441 US 
922,60 LEd 2d 396, 99 S Ct 2030. 
Telephone conversation between defendants which was intercepted by motel switchboard operator was "wire 
communication" within meaning of 18 USCS § 2510. United States v Axselle (1979, CAlO Kan) 604 F2d 1330. 
Conversations at private pretrial detention facility between defendant prisoner and defendant visitor were not wire 
communications protected under federal wiretap law because they communicated through internal communication device 
that resembles a handset, but is an entirely internal system that only connects two visiting rooms and is not connected to 
any facility capable of transmitting interstate or foreign communications pursuant to 18 USCS § 2510. United States v 
Peoples (2001. CA8 Mo) 250 F3d 630, 56 Fed Rules Evid Serv 331. subsequent app (2007, CA8 Mo) 483 F3d 876, cert den 
(2007, US) 128 S Ct 682, 169 LEd 2d 534. 
Despite apparent wireless nature of cellular phones, communications using cellular phones are considered wire 
communications under statute because cellular telephones use wire and cable connections when connecting calls. Company 
v United States (In re United States) (2003, CA9 Nev) 349 F3d 1132,2003 CDOS 9891. 
Good-faith exception to warrant requirement does not apply to warrants that are improperly issued under TItle III of 
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, 18 USCS §§ 2510 et seq.; statute is clear on its face and does not provide 
for any exception to rule that district courts must suppress illegally obtained wire communications; further, Senate Report 
discussing Title III indicates no desire to press scope of suppression role beyond present law, and good faith exception is 
product of judicial balancing of social costs and benefits of exclUSionary rule; judicial branch created exclusionary rule, and 
thus, modification falls to province of judiciary, while, in contrast, under TItle III, Congress has already balanced social 
costs and benefits and has provided that suppression is sole remedy for violations, meaning that rationale behind judicial 
modification of exclusionary rule is absent with respect to TItle III warrants. United States v Rice (2007, CA6 Ky) 478 F3d 
704,2007 FED App 88P, reh, en banc, den (2007, CA6) 2007 US App LEXIS 18746. 
Legality of court-ordered "pen register" depends on legality of court-ordered wiretap since, when used in conjunction with 
court-ordered wiretap, it does intercept wire communications within meaning of 18 USCS § 2510(1), (4). In re Alperen 
(1973, DC Mass) 355 F Supp 372, affd (1973, CAl Mass) 478 F2d 194. 
Purely mechanical act of dialing particular number as revealed by pen register is not "communication" within 
contemplation of TItle III of Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (18 USCS §§ 2510-2520). Von Lusch v 
State (1978) 39 Md ADD 517, 387 A2d 306, cert den (1978) 283 Md 740. 
Cable television systems are not common carriers pursuant to 47 USCS § 153(h) and as such, transmissions by cable 
operator are not "wire communications" under 18 USCS § 2510. Cox Cable Cleveland Area, Inc. v King (1983, ND Ohio) 
582 F Supp 376. 
Paid television supplier's microwave transmissions received by individual without authority from supplier and without 
payment of subscriber fee are not "wire communications" under 18 USCS § 2510(1), where transmissions were dispersed 
from top of bank building into and through air and at that point not carried along by means of, or subject to wire, cable, or 
other like connection to specific receiver. Hoosier Home Theater, Inc. v Adkins (1984, SD Ind) 595 F SUPP 389. 
Non-telephonic oral communications intercepted and recorded in good faith under wiretapping order must be suppressed, 
where non-call kitchen conversation picked up due to ineffective hang-up of phone receiver is without scope of 18 USCS § 
2510(1) "wire communication" authorized to be intercepted under order, because TItle III rule of exclusion contained in 18 
USCS §§ 2515 and 2518 (lO)(a)(iii) does not depend at all upon "good faith" of monitoring agent. United States v Barch 
(1988, ED Mich) 695 F Supp 898, revd on other grounds, remanded (1990, CA6 Mich) 903 F2d 1068. 
Wire communication is defined to mean communication containing human voice, pursuant to 18 USCS § 2510(1), (18); 
cell si~ru~~gtrrproRqnieFog~qrl!1'i8 definition because it does not involve transfer of human voice at any 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 793 
12/1/2008 12:22 PI'v 
vel Ci L/ULOllillClil- vy L1LiilWil- 10 U2>Li) S L-J 1V nupS:IIWWW.leXlS.COilliresearCDlrerrleVe! _ m=Do)e::)(l.L~bea;i 13eall.. 
17 of35 
point along path between cell phone and cell tower. In re Pen Register & Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site LoC"..ation Auth. 
(2005, SD Tex) 396 F SURP 2d 747 (critidzed in In re United States for Order for Disclosure of Telecommunications 
Records (2005, SD NY) 405 F Supp 2d 435) and (critidzed in In re United States for Order for Prospective Cell Site 
Location Info. (2006, SD NY) 460 F Supp 2d 448) and (critidzed in In re United States Orders pursuant to 18 U.s.c. 
2703(d) (2007, DC Mass) 509 F Supp 2d 64) and (criticized in In re United States for an Order: Authorizing the 
Installation & Use of a Pen Register & Trap & Trace Device (2007, SD Tex) 2007 US Dist LEXIS 77635) and (critidzed in In 
re United States for an Order Directing Provider of Elec. Commun. Servo to Disclose Records to the Gov't (2008, WD Pal 
534 F Supp 2d 585). 
In order for 18 USCS § 2703(c) to apply, information requested must pertain to "wire or electronic communications," and 
as defined in 18 USCS § 2510(15), that does not include location information. In re Application of United States (2007, DC 
Puerto Rico) 497 F SURP 2d 301. 
Cell site data is not wire communication under definitions in 18 USCS § 2510(1), (18) because it does not involve transfer 
of human voice at any point along path between cell phone and cell tower. In re Application of United States (2007, DC 
Puerto Rico) 497 F Supp 2d 301. 
Term "wire communication" is construed to apply only to that portion of radio-telephone communication which is actually 
transmitted by wire and not broadcast in manner available to public; portions of cordless telephone conversation 
intercepted by ordinary FM radio do not fall within category of "wire communications". State v Howard (1984) 235 Kan 
236,679 P2d 197 . 
. '+ 13. Oral communication 
Statements made by trader on floor of mercantile exchange, which were secretly recorded by undercover agent posing as 
trader, were not protected "oral communications" as defined by 18 USCS § 2510(2), since trader had no reasonable 
expectation that statements were private, even though exchange had membership requirement and rule prohibited tape 
recorders on trading floor. In re John Doe Trader Number One (1990, CA7 III) 894 F2d 240. 
Tape recordings, made by or with consent of former corporate vice-president of antitrust defendant, are discoverable, 
where some of conversations were face-to-face and others were telephonic. In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig. 
(2000, CA7 III) 216 F3d 621. 2000-1 CCH Trade Cases P 72945, cert den (2000) 531 US 993, 121 S Ct 483, 148 LEd 2d 
457. 
Interceptions of private cordless telephone communications prior to 1994 did not violate Wiretap Act, notwithstanding 
defendant's claim that cordless phone conversations are protected by Act as an "oral communication" under 18 USCS § 
2510; interception of cordless phone's radio transmission is not an interception of oral utterance itself, but of the radio 
signal produced by phone's handset and its base unit. Price v Turner (2001. CA9 Cal) 260 F3d 1144,2001 CDOS 7031, 
2001 Daily Journal DAR 8607. 
Both wiretappfng and bugging are regulated under TItle III of Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. 
No. 90-351(1968); bugging includes interception of all oral communication in given location, which typically is 
accomplished by installation of small microphone in room to be bugged and transmission to some nearby receiver, and no 
reason appears why transmission through wire technology rather than in some other fashion does not fall under ambit of 
TItle III. Company v United States (In re United States) (2003, CA9 Nev) 349 F3d 1132,2003 CDOS 9891. 
When telephone conversation is overheard and recorded at one end of line in absence of interception of communication 
passing through wires, it is not interception of "wire communication" but is interception of oral communication. United 
States v Carroll (1971, DC Dist Col) 332 F SUPD 1299. 
Definition of oral communication in 18 USCS § 2510(2) is devoid of any indication that oral communication must be 
interstate in character. United States v Burroughs (1974, DC SC) 379 F SUPD 736, app dismd (1975, CA4 SC) 510 F2d 
967, op withdrawn (1976, CA4 SC) 537 F2d 1156 and affd (1977, CA4 SC) 564 F2d 1111 (ovrld in part on other grounds 
by United States v Steed (1982, CA4 Va) 674 F2d 284, 10 Fed Rules Evid Serv 147). 
Telex interceptions which did not involve aural acquisition of defendants communications are not within purview of 18 
USCS §§ 2510 et seq., since term "aural" acquisition to § 2510 limits act to spedfically to those interceptions that are 
overheard, involving sense of actually hearing conversation. United States v Gregg (1986, WD Mo) 629 F SUDD 958, affd 
(1987, CA8 Mo) 829 F2d 1430,23 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1170, cert den (1988) 486 US 1022, 100 LEd 2d 226,108 S Ct 
1994. 
42 USCS § 1983 claim based on interception of neighbors' telephone calls via police scanner is partially dismissed, where 
cordless telephone conversations are not "oral communications" as defined by 18 USCS § 2510(2}, because cordless 
telephone communication was also expressly excluded from definitions of wire and electronic communications prior to 
October 25, 1994. Quigley v Rosenthal (1999, DC Colo) 43 F SUPD 2d 1163. affd in part and revd in part on other grounds 
(2003, CAlO Colo) 327 F3d 1044, cert den, motion gr (2004) 540 US 1229, 158 LEd 2d 172, 124 S Ct 1507. 
Defendant, who was not overnight visitor and who engaged solely in business discussions, did not have reasonable 
expectation of privacy at premises where he was overheard and tape-recorded while partidpating in "La Cosa Nostra" 
induction ceremony, and, thus, his conversation did not constitute "oral communication" within meaning of 18 USCS § 
25lO.EJ'RmFhI1:'f'mryptp'~n~f9lOA'JtEtfSstanding to suppress electronic surveillance. United States v Salemme 
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(1999LDC Mass) 91 F SURD 2d 141. revd on other grounds, remanded sub nom United States v Flemmi (2000. CAl Mass) 
225 F3d 78, cert den (2001) 531 US 1170, 148 LEd 2d 1002, 121 S Ct 1137. 
Portions of cordless telephone conversation intercepted by ordinary FM radio constitute oral communications, and rules 
pertaining to interception of oral communications are applicable. State v Howard (1984) 235 Kan 236, 679 P2d 197. 
Where uncle of arrestee went to police station, told officer that he wanted to talk to nephew "by himself," held 
conversation with nephew in interrogation room in police station which conversation was surreptitiously monitored and 
recorded by police, interception was not violative of 18 USCS § 2510(2) and recordings were admissible into evidence. In 
re Joseph A. (1973, 2nd Dist) 30 Cal APR 3d 880, 106 Cal RRtr 729. 
Unpublished Opinions 
Unpublished: Case was remanded where record contained insufficient evidence to demonstrate that government made 
requisite showing concerning 18 USCS §§ 2511(2)(d) and 2510(2) in camera hearing before district court or that its 
questions to witness in grand jury were not derived from allegedly illegal tape recording. Anderson v United States (In re 
Grand Jury Subpoena) (2006. CA9 Cal) 2006 US App LEXIS 25020. 
'+ 14.--Expectation of privacy, generally 
Legislative history behind 18 USCS § 2510(2) reflects Congress' intent that persons engaged in oral communications be 
protected where utterances occur under circumstances justifying expectation of privacy and court's inquiry is whether 
communications overheard were uttered by persons who have subjective expectation of privacy and whose expectations 
are objectively reasonable; evidence supported finding that police officer had reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
office; business office need not be sealed to offer occupant reasonable degree of privacy, and therefore conversation 
attempted to be overheard was "oral communication" within meaning of 18 USCS § 2510(2). United States v McIntyre 
(1978, CA9 Ariz) 582 F2d 1221. 
In prosecution for unauthorized electronic eavesdropping on oral communications, justifiable expectation of privacy must 
be established; mere fact that one might suspect conversations are being intercepted does not preclude finding of such 
expectation; consent of owner of premises to interception did not preclude finding that there was justifiable expectation of 
privacy nor did fact that conversations could be overheard through open door of bank's office preclude such expectation. 
United States v Duncan (1979, CA4 NC) 598 F2d 839,4 Fed Rules Evid Serv 848, cert den (1979) 444 US 871. 62 LEd 2d 
96, 100 S Ct 148. 
Interception of face-to-face conversation adventitiously picked up by telephone recording system because inmate was in 
process of trying to make phone call at time of conversation was not prohibited. United States v Willoughby (1988, CA2 
NY) 860 F2d 15,26 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1129, cert den (1989) 488 US 1033, 109 S Ct 846, 102 LEd 2d 978 and 
(criticized in United States v Lugo (2003, SD Tex) 289 F SURR 2d 790) and (criticized in PeoDle v Davis (2005) 36 Cal 4th 
510,31 Cal RRtr 3d 96,115 P3d 417, 2005 CDOS 6393, 2005 Daily Journal DAR 8733). 
Court did not commit plain error based on videotape surveillance of drug defendant which took place when number of 
persons were present and with consent of owner of premises. United States v Foster (1993, CA9 Cal) 985 F2d 466,93 
CDOS 820, 93 Daily Journal DAR 1586, amd on other grounds (1993, CA9 Cal) 1993 US ADD LEX IS 36776 and remanded 
on other grounds, on reh (1993, CA9 Cal) 995 F2d 882, 93 CDOS 4367,93 Daily Journal DAR 7483 and amd on other 
grounds (1994, CA9 Cal) 17 F3d 1256,94 CDOS 1679.94 Daily Journal DAR 2957. 
Government did not show that complaint which was filed more than two years after conversations between plaintiff, a 
former Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs, and former Assistant Secretary of State for Consular 
Affairs was time-barred under 18 USCS § 2520(e), where plaintiff submitted sworn affidavit that he discovered calls had 
been intercepted by officers at State Department communications center within limitations period, and government did not 
rebut affidavit but claimed that defendant must have realized that he had been monitored once one of his calls was 
broadcast throughout communications center. Berry v Funk (1998, ADD DC) 331 US ADP DC 62, 146 F3d 1003 (criticized 
in Blake v Wright (1999, CA6 Ohio) 179 F3d 1003, 15 BNA IER Cas 297, 1999 FED ADR 218P) and (criticized in TaRley v 
Collins (2000, CAll Ga) 211 F3d 1210, 16 BNA IER Cas 665). 
Employees misusing private telephone system are not entitled to any reasonable expectation that communication is not 
subject to interception as required by 18 USCS § 2510(2). United States v Christman (1974, ND Cal) 375 F SURD 1354. 
Congress did not intend 18 USCS § 2510 to apply to routine recording of emergency and investigative calls as integral 
component of police station telephone system. Jandak v Brookfield (1981. ND III) 520 F SURD 815. 
Persons reasonable expectation of privacy is matter to be considered on case-by-case basis, taking into consideration its 
unique facts and circumstances; test applied is 2 part: (1) that person involved have subjective expectation of privacy; and 
(2) was that expectation objectively reasonably; no reasonable person entering private home to sell insurance would 
anticipate his conversation would be electronically monitored. Benford v American Broadcasting Cos. (1982, DC Md) 554 F 
SURD 145. 
Defendants were entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs' Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, 18 USCS §§ 
2510 et seq., claims hecause prior state court judgment had found that plaintiffs' lacked reasonable expectation of privacy; 
prior:a:mEpufNl~t'Tipip6'.R1)ttelfPiSfJ1it{ffEtgJot have reasonable expectation of privacy precluded plaintiffs from 
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relitigating that issue. BQw~m!?v_p,ft~rmath Entm't (2005, ED Mich) 364 F SUPD 2d 641. 
Defendants were entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs' Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, 18 USCS §§ 
2510 et seq., claims because prior state court determination that plaintiffs did not have reasonable expectation of privacy 
precluded plaintiffs from relitigating that issue; all of parties before court were also parties to state court litigation, there 
was valid and final judgment issued by state court (even though that ruling was being appealed), issue of whether 
plaintiffs had objectively reasonable expectation of privacy was actually litigated in state proceeding, and plaintiffs' 
reasonable expectation of privacy was essential to addressing Michigan Eavesdropping statute, Mich. Compo Laws § 
750.539a et seq. Bowens v Aftermath Entm't (2005, ED Mich) 364 F SUDP 2d 641. 
Taped conversation in jail cell is not protected oral communication for which expectation of privacy would be justified. 
State v Williams (1985, Tenn) 690 SW2d 517, 63 ALR4th 447. 
Use of convenience store surveillance tape by police to identify defendant and then to elicit confession from defendant did 
not violate federal wiretap statute, 18 USCS §§ 2510 et seq., because any expectation of privacy defendant claimed in 
defendant's statements was objectively unreasonable in circumstances: defendant shouted threats and obscenities at clerk 
in convenience store open to public; defendant could not reasonably have expected such remarks--whether overheard by 
customer, passerby, store employee, or surveillance camera recording defendant's words--to be confidential. 
Commonwealth v Rivera (2005) 445 Mass 119, 833 NE2d 1113. 
:; 15.----Miscellaneous 
Intercepted conversation between defendants which occurred in house of complete strangers to which defendants had 
made several suspicious visits and into which they tried to gain entry by false representations, was not "oral 
communication" within meaning of 18 USCS § 2510(2), since conversation did not occur in factual setting which legally 
justified any subjective expectation of privacy defendants may have had. United States v Pui Kan Lam (1973, CA2 NY) 483 
F2d 1202, cert den (1974) 415 US 984, 39 LEd 2d 881. 94 S Ct 1577, 94 S Ct 1578. 
Defendants, charged with intercepting telephone communications in violation of 18 USCS § 2511(1)(a), (2), had no 
expectation of privacy with respect to use of tape recorder and tape by private investigation agency allegedly hired by 
defendant to perform electronic surveillance. United States v Hunt (1974, CAS Tex) 505 F2d 931. cert den (1975) 421 US 
975,44 L Ed 2d 466, 95 S Ct 1974. 
Recordings taped from microphone installed in hotel room to record conversations between Drug Enforcement 
Administration agent and defendant would not be treated as if agent were carrying recording device on him, were obtained 
in violation of defendant's expectation of privacy and inadmissible at trial. United States v Padilla (1975, CAl Puerto Rico) 
520 F2d 526 (criticized in United States v Lee (2004, CA3 NJ) 359 F3d 194, 63 Fed Rules Evid Serv 781, 93 AFTR 2d 
993). 
In order to allege cause of action under 18 USCS §§ 2510 et seq., there was must be reasonable expectation that 
communication be private; where person knew he was being interviewed, knew that newsmen had recording equipment, 
yelled and swore at top of voice, slammed jail bars, produced loud and attention-getting noises, and made no effort to 
communicate confidentially to his attorney, there was no reasonable expectation of privacy. Holman v Central Arkansas 
Broadcasting Co. (1979, CA8 Ark) 610 F2d 542, 5 Media L R 2217. 
Conversations between husband and wife during jail visit, which were taped by prisoner occupying cell next to husband, 
were not "oral communications" within meaning of 18 uses § 2510, since husband and wife had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in cell. United States v Harrelson (1985, CAS Tex) 754 F2d 1153, 17 Fed Rules Evid Serv 738, reh 
den, en banc (1985, CAS Tex) 766 F2d 186 and cert den (1985) 474 US 908, 88 LEd 2d 241. 106 S Ct 277 and cert den 
(1985) 474 US 1034, 88 LEd 2d 578, 106 S Ct 599. 
Police officers had no expectation that communications between police officers and prisoner in public jail would not be 
intercepted and thus communications were not "oral communications" within meaning of 18 uses § 2510. Angel v 
Williams (1993, CA8 Mo) 12 F3d 786, 27 FR Serv 3d 1402. 
Denial of motion to suppress tapes from secret recording of defendant's pre-arrest conversations while he sat in back seat 
of police car was proper since defendant did not have reasonable expectation of privacy. United States v McKinnon (1993, 
CAll Fla) 985 F2d 525, 7 FLW Fed C 90, cert den (1993) 510 US 843,126 LEd 2d 94, 114 S Ct 130. 
Surreptitious tape recording of defendant's call from jail was not interception within meaning of 18 USCS § 2510 because 
police only recorded what defendant said in mouthpiece, not what was transmitted over wire, and admiSSibility of recording 
was not prohibited because defendant had no expectation of privacy, where defendant placed call while officer was 
standing three feet away and television camera was suspended eight feet from telephone and pointed toward phone, 
notwithstanding fact that defendant conducted conversation in Thai. Siripongs v Calderon (1994, CA9 Cal) 35 F3d 1308, 
94 CD OS 5105, 94 Daily Journal DAR 9410, amd on other grounds, reh, en banc, den (1994, CA9 Cal) 35 F3d 1308,94 
CDOS 7830, 94 Daily Journal DAR 14461 and cert den (1995) 513 US 1183, 130 LEd 2d 1127, 115 S Ct 1175 and 
(criticized in United States v Martinez-Salazar (1998, CA9 Ariz) 146 F3d 653, 98 CDOS 4099, 98 Daily Journal DAR 5626). 
Although drug defendant spoke in Spanish, he had no reasonable expectation that conversations between himself and his 
codefendants at tire shop, where they allegedly unloaded drug shipments, would not be subject to interception pursuant to 
18 ~E.F5JlN, ~I(Sf:J:filp(')~qrtQ)Frs1]lYAdJsEli~ed motion to suppress audio and video taped conversations 
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surreptitiously recorded by informant under instructions from FBI. United States v Longoria (199~ CA1QK('jJJ1JZZ F3d 
1179, 1999 Colo J CAR 2608, subsequent app (1999, CAlO Kan) 182 F3d 1156, 1999 Colo J CAR 4373 (criticized in 
United States v Keifer (1999, CAlO Kan) 198 F3d 798, 1999 Colo J CAR 6718) and subsequent app (2002, CA6 Tenn) 38 
Fed APRX 237 and cert den (1999) 528 US 892, 145 LEd 2d 182, 120 S Ct 217. 
Employees at county rabies control center had reasonable expectation of privacy in their workplace under 18 USCS § 2510 
and thus director who placed tape recorder in their common office violated statute, where entire office consisted of single 
room that could not be accessed without employees' knowledge, employees took great care to see that their conversations 
remained private, and frank nature of employees' conversations in which they criticized their boss makes it obvious that 
they had subjective expectation of privacy. Dorris v Absher (1999, CA6 Tenn) 179 F3d 420, 15 BNA IER Cas 193, 138 CCH 
LC P 58643, 1999 FED APR 200P. 
Recording of conversation between defendant and his passenger in patrol car while officer was searching their car did not 
violate lItle III, since defendant did not have reasonable expectation of privacy pursuant to 18 USCS § 2510, 
notwithstanding fact that defendant was not in custody or being threatened with arrest, and defendant claimed that 
officer's statements that they should sit in police car for their safety created expectation of a safe haven. United States v 
Turner (2000, CAlO Wyo) 209 F3d 1198, 2000 Colo J CAR 2171. cert den (2000) 531 US 887, 148 LEd 2d 146, 121 S 
Ct 208. 
Conversations at private pretrial detention facility between defendant prisoner and defendant visitor were not protected 
because defendants had no reasonable expectation of privacy; under 18 USCS § 2510; facility's practice of monitoring and 
recording prisoner-visitor conversations was a reasonable me('jns of achieving legitimate institutional goal of maintaining 
prison security and those conversing in a prison setting are deemed to be aware of necessity for and existence of such 
security measures. United States v Peoples (2001. CA8 Mo) 250 F3d 630, 56 Fed Rules Evid Serv 331. subsequent app 
(2007, CA8 Mo) 483 F3d 876, cert den (2007, US) 128 S Ct 682, 169 LEd 2d 534. 
Insurance agent making standard sales pitch in private home has reasonable expectation of privacy within meaning of 18 
USCS § 2510(2). Benford v American Broadcasting Cos. (1980, DC Md) 502 F SURP 1159, 6 Media L R 2489, affd without 
op (1981, CA4 Md) 661 F2d 917. cert den (1981) 454 US 1060,70 LEd 2d 599,102 S Ct 612. 
Landowner's complaint about solicitor tape recording his statements at hearing held in connection with zoning citation 
must fail, where state rules of criminal procedure expressly provide for such recording, because federal wiretap statutes 
(18 USCS §§ 2510 et seq.) only prohibit recording of "such oral communications uttered by person exhibiting expectation 
that such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such expectation". Harman v Wetzel 
(1991. ED Pal 766 F SUPR 271. 
In action brought by attorneys who alleged that warden violated 18 USCS § 2511(1)(at part of lItle III of Omnibus Crime 
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 USCS §§ 2510-2522, by secretly recording attorneys' conversations with 
detainees at federal detention center, warden's motion to dismiss complaint on ground that attorneys' conversations with 
detainees did not constitute oral communications within meaning of 18 USCS § 2510(2) was denied because attorneys' 
expectations that their conversations were not subject to interception were justified in light of (1) federal regulations 
prohibiting recording of meetings between attorneys and prison inmates except under narrow circumstances that were not 
present, and (2) representations by prison officers that attorneys' conversations with detainees were not being recorded. 
Lonegan v Hasty (2006. ED NY) 436 F SURP 2d 419. 
Jury could have found that hospital's failure to aggressively respond to one incident of secret audio taping of its employees 
involving one of its managers made it liable under 18 USCS §§ 2510-2521 and 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5725, when second 
incident was uncovered next year; hospital's Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a) motion for new trial was denied. Care v Reading Hosp. & 
Med. Ctr. Inc. (2006, ED Pal 448 F SURP 2d 657, 66 FR Serv 3d 122. 
Recordings of defendant's conversations that took place in prison visiting room while defendant was incarcerated were not 
subject to sealing requirements of 18 USCS § 2518(8)(a), part of lItle III of Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act 
of 1968; lItle III does not apply to government's interception of prisoner's conversations while prisoner is incarcerated; 
pursuant to 18 USCS §§ 2510(2) and 2518(8)(a), statute only applies when participants in conversation had reasonable 
expectation of privacy, and prisoner has no reasonable expectation of privacy while incarcerated. United States v 
Calabrese (2007. ND III) 492 F Supp 2d 906. 
In determining what is justified expectation of privacy for purposes of 18 USCS § 2510(2t one must look to traditional 
Fourth Amendment law; police officer could testify as participant in conversation with defendant, even though unknown to 
such officer and defendant, officer at front desk overheard such conversation via intercom because officer had already 
advised defendant of Miranda rights. Commonwealth v Look (1980) 379 Mass 893, 402 NE2d 470, cert den (1980) 449 US 
827,66 LEd 2d 31, 101 S Ct 91. 
With regard to oral conversations (18 USCS § 2510(2»), persons within jailor police facility have no reasonable 
expectation of privacy unless they are lulled into believing that conversation would be confidential by conduct of police or 
by privileged relationship between parties to conversation. In re Joseph A. (1973, 2nd Dist) 30 Cal App 3d 880, 106 Cal 
Rptr 729. 
Tape recording of defendant's conversation following arrest and being placed in patrol car through activating of recording 
device for purpose of recording suspects' conversations during police officers' absence did not violate defendants 
constitutional right of privacy or 18 USCS § 2511 as defendant's expectation of privacy was not reasonable under 
circu~F'I'W:g't:TP:fi~ ~t'TI\i>F,t):S+2 Cal APR 3d 292,116 Cal RRtr 690, cert den (1975) 420 US 937,43 L 
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Ed 2d 414, 95 S Ct 1147. 
Unpublished Opinions 
Unpublished: Defendant impliedly consented to monitoring by using prison phones when he had been informed of prison 
phone policies, each phone contained sign stating that calls were monitored and recorded, and he clearly acknowledged his 
awareness of surveillance. United States v Habben (2007, CA9 Ariz) 2007 US ADD LEXIS 28835, cert den (2008, US) 128 
S Ct 1313, 170 LEd 2d 128. 
-:; 16. Intercept, generally 
Interception of point-to-point transmissions by FCC do not violate 18 USCS §§ 2510 et seq. because transmissions under 
such circumstances do not contain genuine subjective expectation of privacy. United States v Rose (1982, CAl Mass) 669 
F2d 23, cert den (1982) 459 US 828, 74 LEd 2d 65, 103 S Ct 63. 
Term "intercept" as it relates to "aural acquisitions" refers to place where communication is initially obtained regardless of 
where communication is ultimately heard, therefore installation of wire tap device on telephone lines in county within 
judicial circuit in which order was issued which permitted them to transmit signals back to offices of law enforcement 
authorities in county not located in such district was proper. United States v Nelson (1988, CAll Fla) 837 F2d 1519, reh 
den, en banc (1988, CAll Fla) 845 F2d 1032 and cert den (1988) 488 US 829,102 LEd 2d 58,109 S Ct 82. 
Interception includes both location of tapped telephone and of original listening post, and judges in either jurisdiction have 
authority under TItle III to issue wiretap orders. United States v Denman (1996, CA5 Tex) 100 F3d 399, cert den (1997) 
520 US 1121, 137 LEd 2d 336, 117 S Ct 1256. 
District court properly granted summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ, p, 56 in favor of insurance company in independent 
agent's action alleging violation of his privacy rights under Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), 18 uscs §§ 
2510 et seq., and under parallel state statute, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5702 et seq.; although company accessed agent's 
e-mail without authorization, there was no violation of privacy laws because there was no "intercept" of email within 
meaning of privacy laws and because 18 USCS § 2701(c) excepted searches by company, as service provider, from 
protection of ECPA, Fraser v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. (2003, CA3 Pal 352 F3d 107, 20 BNA IER Cas 1207, 149 CCH LC P 
59803. 
District court erred in dismissing indictment, charging defendant with conspiring to engage in conduct prohibited by various 
provisions of Wiretap Act, 18 USCS §§ 2510-2522, because interception of an e-mail message in temporary, transient 
electronic storage states an offense under 18 USCS §§ 2510-2522, and term "electronic communication" includes transient 
electronic storage that is intrinsic to communication process, and thus interception of an e-mail message in such storage is 
an offense under Wiretap Act. United States v Councilman (2005, CAl Mass) 418 F3d 67. 
Definition of "interception" set forth in 18 USCS § 2510(4) does not state where interception occurs or whether more than 
one interception point may exist for jurisdictional purposes under 18 USCS § 2518(3); most reasonable interpretation of 
statutory definition of interception is that interception occurs where tapped phone is located and where law enforcement 
officers first overhear call, and Ninth Circuit joins at least three of its sister circuits in so holding, United States v Luong 
(2006, CA9 Cal) 471 F3d 1107, subsequent app, remanded (2006, CA9 Cal) 215 Fed ADDX 639, cert den (2007, US) 128 S 
Ct 532, 169 LEd 2d 371 and cert den (2007, US) 128 S Ct 531. 169 LEd 2d 371 and cert den (2007, US) 128 S ct 531. 
169 LEd 2d 371. 
When FBI agent's affidavit explained that all intercepted calls from defendant's mobile phone, which had Eastern District of 
California area code t would first be heard within territorial jurisdiction of Northern District of California, calls were 
"intercepted" within jurisdiction of Northern District of California judge who authorized wiretap on phone, as required by 
18 USCS § 2518(3), because "interception" under 18 USCS § 2510(4) included where law enforcement officers first 
overheard calls. United States v Luong (2006, CA9 Cal) 471 F3d 1107, subsequent app, remanded (2006, CA9 Cal) 215 
Fed ADDX 639, cert den (2007, US) 128 S Ct 532, 169 LEd 2d 371 and cert den (2007, US) 128 S Ct 531. 169 LEd 2d 
371 and cert den (2007, US) 128 S Ct 531. 169 LEd 2d 371. 
Words "aural acquisition", literally translated, mean to come into possession through sense of hearing, as used in 18 USCS 
§ 2510(4), and recording of private conversation by party to it is not intercept within meaning of 18 USCS § 2510(4). 
Smith v Wunker (1972, SD Ohio) 356 F SUDD 44. 
Definition of term "intercept" under 18 USCS § 2510(4) clearly equates "interception" with listening to, monitoring, or 
hearing of described communications, either at time such communications occur or at subsequent time through use of 
electronic means, such as playback tape recorder; recording communication which has not been heard by government 
agents and storing that recording so that it will not be heard, unless demanded by parties involved in conversation, does 
not constitute interception under terms of 18 USCS § 2510(4). United States v Bynum (1973, SD NY) 360 F SUDD 400, 
affd (1973, CA2 NY) 485 F2d 490, vacated on other grounds (1974) 417 US 903,41 LEd 2d 209, 94 S Ct 2598. 
Language of 18 USCS §§ 2510, 1511 and 2515 does not proscribe interception and use by unaided ear of noises and 
talking loud enough to be overheard beyond confines of room. United States v Agapito (1979, SD NY) 477 F SUDD 706. 
Electronic eavesdropping evidence will not be suppressed due to participation of government confidential informant in 
insta~R9:E<pf )JNJ~~OFq;J~.AtpEIB (18 uscs §§ 2510 et seq.) limitations on authority to intercept 
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communications are concerned \-vith entire process of electronic sun/eillance, flinterception" as defined in § 2510(4) and 
employed in §§ 2516(1) and 2518(5) does not include installation of listening devices. United States v Gambino (1990, SD 
NY) 734 F SUPD 1084 (criticized in United States v Guzman (1998, SD NY) 1998 US Dist LEXIS 1538), 
Satellite television programming provider was not entitled to summary judgment on its claim that subscriber violated 18 
USCS § 2511(1)(a), part of Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 USCS §§ 2510-2522, when subscriber 
purchased and attempted to use pirate access device to decrypt, receive, and view provider's encrypted satellite 
transmissions; subscriber's admission that he purchased and attempted to use device was not sufficient to show that he 
actually "intercepted" signals within meaning of 18 USCS § 2510(4). DIRECfV, Inc. v Barnes (2004, WD Mich) 302 F SUPP 
2d 774. 
Unlawful interception requires use of electronic, mechanical, or other device; thus, if confidential informant merely 
eavesdropped on defendant, but did not use some form of device, then no unlawful interception occurred. United States v 
Jones (2005, DC Utah) 364 F SUDP 2d 1303. 
"Beepers", electronic tracking devices, do not "intercept" contents of communications within meaning of 18 USCS § 2510. 
State v Hendricks (1979) 43 NC ADP 245, 258 SE2d 872, cert den (1980) 299 NC 123. 262 SE2d 6. 
Where police officer's acquisition of contents of telephonic communications resulted from his answering telephone when it 
rang, no proscribed "interception" within meaning of 18 USCS § 2510(4) occurred even though conversations were 
simultaneously recorded. State v Vizzini (1971. APD Div) 115 NJ Super 97,278 A2d 235. 
Use of recording device attached to telephone receiver is interception within meaning of 18 USCS § 2510(4). PeoDle v 
Boscia (1975) 83 Misc 2d 501. 373 NYS2d 309. 
:; 17.--Telephone conversations 
"Intercept" under 18 USCS § 2510 does not pertain to acquisition of information through agent standing within 4 feet of 
defendant while she placed call; conversations carried on in tone of voice quite audible to persons standing outside are 
conversations knowingly exposed to public. United States v McLeod (1974, CA7 Ind) 493 F2d 1186. 
There is no domestic exception to l1tle II, and thus unless District Court erred in granting defendants' motions for 
summary judgment in suit brought by ex-husband for violations of wiretap statute based on ex-wife's taping, during 
divorce proceedings, of telephone conversations between ex-husband and couple's minor children who were living with 
ex-wife. Thompson v Dulaney (1992. CAlO Utah) 970 F2d 744. 
Surreptitious tape recording of defendant's call from jail was not interception within meaning of 18 USCS § 2510 because 
police only recorded what defendant said in mouthpiece, not what was transmitted over wire, and admissibility of recording 
was not prohibited because defendant had no expectation of privacy, where defendant placed call while officer was 
standing three feet away and television camera was suspended eight feet from telephone and pointed toward phone, 
notwithstanding fact that defendant conducted conversation in Thai. SiriDongs v Calderon (1994, CA9 Cal) 35 F3d 1308, 
94 CDOS 5105, 94 Daily Journal DAR 9410, amd on other grounds, reh, en banc, den (1994, CA9 Cal) 35 F3d 1308,94 
CDOS 7830, 94 Daily Journal DAR 14461 and cert den (1995) 513 US 1183, 130 LEd 2d 1127,115 S Ct 1175 and 
(criticized in United States v Martinez-Salazar (1998, CA9 Ariz) 146 F3d 653, 98 COOS 4099, 98 Daily Journal DAR 5626). 
Recording of telephone conversation alone constitutes "aural acquisition" of that conversation within meaning of 18 USCS 
§ 2510(4). Sanders v Robert Bosch Corp. (1994. CA4 SC) 38 F3d 736,10 BNA IER Cas 1. amd (1994, CA4) 10 BNA IER 
Cas 479 and reh, en banc, den (1995, CA4 SC) 10 BNA IER Cas 480 and (criticized in Dillon v Massachusetts Bay Transp. 
Auth. (2000) 49 Mass App 309, 729 NE2d 329, 16 BNA IER Cas 634 ). 
Wife, who owned liquor store with husband, was properly held not liable for interceptions of telephone conversations at 
store, since defendant's listening to telephone conversations that her husband unlawfully recorded were not interceptions 
under 18 USCS § 2510(4), and defendant's acquiescence in husband's plans to tap his own telephone and her passive 
knowledge of interceptions were insufficient to impute liability to her for those interceptions in addition to husband's 
liability, and would result in potential double recovery for single interception. Reynolds v Spears (1996, CA8 Ark) 93 F3d 
428. 
Interceptions of private cordless telephone communications prior to 1994 did not violate Wiretap Act, notwithstanding 
defendant's claim that cordless phone conversations are protected by Act as an "oral communication" under 18 USCS § 
2510; interception of cordless phone's radio transmission is not an interception of oral utterance itself, but of the radio 
signal produced by phone's handset and its base unit. Price v Turner (2001. CA9 Cal) 260 F3d 1144, 2001 COOS 7031. 
2001 Daily Journal DAR 8607. 
In defendant's motion to suppress tapes of his telephone calls obtained while he was prisoner, law enforcement and 
consent exceptions in Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 USCS § 2510(5)(a)(ii), excluded from 
definition of "interception" recordings made by any telephone or telegraph instrument, equipment or faCility, or any 
component thereof being used by investigative or law enforcement officer in the ordinary course of his duties. United 
States v Hammond (2002, CA4 Md) 286 F3d 189, cert den (2002) 537 US 900, 154 L Ed 2d 172, 123 S Ct 215. 
In defendant's motion to suppress tapes of his telephone calls obtained while he was prisoner, consent exceptions in 
Omn~tRI([!;lFnfNc@{rftPFr@NJf~Ii\:t§£fAcrEf'8J68, 18 USCS § 2510(5)(a)(iil, applied to prison inmates required to 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 79'1 
12/1/2008 12:22 PlY 
230f35 
JJLY:'~./ / WWW.lt:XlS.GOIWreSt:arCilirerrleVe ! -.m=oIDeJaL':>'bea:l Lleall., 
permit monitoring as condition of using prison telephones. UnitecLSJates v Hammond (2002, CA4 Md) 286 F3d 189. cert 
den (2002) 537 US 900, 154 LEd 2d 172, 123 S Ct 215. 
Offending statements made by non-media defendant (director of defendant religious discrimination advocacy group) 
concerning private plaintiffs, which were made at press conference and on television show went well beyond merely 
reporting plaintiffs' neighbor's allegations against plaintiffs; plaintiffs' interest in privacy was sufficient to allow federal 
wiretap act to be applied to situations involving "use" of plaintiffs' intercepted telephone conversations concerning purely 
private matters; thus, application of federal wiretap act to advocacy group's actions did not violate First Amendment. 
Ouigley v Rosenthal (2003, CAlO Colo) 327 F3d 1044, cert den, motion gr (2004) 540 US 1229, 158 LEd 2d 172, 124 S 
Ct 1507. 
Three-way telephone call, recorded by consent of one of parties to call, was found sufficiently trustworthy and did not 
violate Fourth Amendment or Federal Wiretap Statute, 18 USCS §§ 2510 et seq., where defendant knew that third party 
was online so was properly deemed to have consented to possibility that third person would record conversation; even 
though sound quality was poor, because defense expert was able to produce transcript of substantially all of conversation, 
to which government agreed to translation, tape was sufficiently trustworthy to withstand motion to suppress. United 
States v Moncivais (2005, CA6 Tenn) 401 F3d 751. 2005 FED ARD 145P. 
Accomplice's call to defendant was recorded in accordance with regulations set forth by Massachusetts Department of 
Corrections and correctional facility's internal policy; therefore, recording fit squarely within case law applying 18 USCS § 
251O(5)(a)(ii) law enforcement exception to recordings made by prison authorities who routinely monitored inmates' 
conversations and trial court properly found that correctional officer recorded calls in ordinary course of his duties, which 
was not violation of lit Ie III of Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 USCS §§ 2510-2522. United 
States v Lewis (2005, CAl Mass) 406 F3d 11. cert den (2006, US) 126 S Ct 2951. 165 LEd 2d 973. 
Recording made pursuant to routine prison practice of monitoring all outgoing inmate calls under documented policy, of 
which inmates are informed, does not constitute interception for purposes of lItle III of Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act of 1968, 18 USCS §§ 2510-2522. United States v Lewis (2005, CAl Mass) 406 F3d 11. cert den (2006, US) 
126 S Ct 2951. 165 L Ed 2d 973. 
Convicted defendants were entitled to new trial because government did not advance valid reason for admission of 
testimony relating to procedures used to obtain wiretap authorizations pursuant to lItle III of Omnibus Crime Control and 
Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 USCS §§ 2510 et seq.; nothing in 18 USCS § 2515 required admission of such testimony, 
which had effect of unfairly prejudicing defendants, and testimony was not admissible relevant evidence under either Fed. 
R. Evid. 401 or 402, absent challenge by defendants to wiretap's validity. United States v Cunningham (2006, CA7 Ind) 
462 F3d 708, reh den (2006, CA7 Ind) 2006 US ADD LEXIS 26930 and (criticized in United States v Thomas (2007, DC 
Dist Col) 525 F SURD 2d 17). 
Accused cocaine distributors may not have wiretap evidence suppressed due to authorizing judge's alleged lack of 
jurisdiction, even though New York judge granted application for electronic surveillance of New Jersey telephones and 18 
USCS § 2518(3) provides that judge may approve interception "within territorial jurisdiction" of his court, because § 
2510(4) "intercept" of telephone conversations occurred not in New Jersey, where electronic impulses were diverted, but 
in New York, where impulses were converted into sound and acquired by government. United States v Rodriguez (1990, 
SD NY) 734 F SUDD 116. 
County employees' conversations were entitled to protection under 18 USCS § 2510(2), where office director placed tape 
recorder in office bathroom to tape employees' private and personal conversations, and although members of public visited 
office and used bathroom where tape recorder had been placed, recorded conversations took place only when no member 
of public had been present, and conversations had stopped when telephone was being used or when any car turned into 
road that was only entrance to office. Dorris v Absher (1997, MD Tenn) 959 F SUDD 813 (criticized in Desilets v Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc. (1999, CAl NH) 171 F3d 711. 14 BNA IER Cas 1642. 137 CCH LC P 58598) and affd in part and revd in part 
on other grounds, summary judgment gr, remanded (1999, CA6 Tenn) 179 F3d 420,15 BNA IER Cas 193, 138 CCH LC P 
58643, 1999 FED ADD 200P. 
Even assuming that newspaper and its editor knew that conversation had been illegally recorded by some unknown person, 
18 USCS § 2510 could not be constitutionally applied to prohibit newspaper and its editor from publishing transcript of 
allegedly illegally wiretapped private conversation, where public school board trustee made numerous racial slurs and 
profane comments in conversation, written transcription of which was read into minutes of public school board meeting, 
and copy of minutes was obtained by newspaper through open records request. Peavy v New limes (1997, ND Tex) 976 F 
SUPP 532, 26 Media L R 1435, summary judgment gr, in part, summary judgment den, in part, claim dismissed, request 
den (1998, ND Tex) 1998 US Dist LEX IS 13448. 
18 USCS § 2510 did not apply to husband's interception of wife's telephone communication, but did not preclude claim 
against husband by other party to wife's communication. Kirkland v Franco (2000, ED La) 92 F SURR 2d 578. 
Invoice/billing information and names, addresses, and phone numbers of parties called by subscriber were not "contents" 
of communication within meaning of 18 USCS § 2510(8). Hill v MCI WorldCom Communs .. Inc. (2000, SD Iowa) 120 F 
SUPD 2d 1194. 
Because court could not conclude that minister's alleged counseling of caller rendered allegedly, homosexually explicit 
phone conversation business in nature, nor that it raised safety concerns for church personnel since conversation had been 
with agro£tl1'8fNi~peR:T ew~AepEgS'ning was question of fact, precluding summary judgment on minister's 
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daim that church and its employees violated Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 USCS §§ 2510-2521. Fischer v Mt. 
Olive Lutheran Church, Inc. (2002, WD Wis) 207 F Supp 2d 914. 
District court denied defendants' motions to suppress Title III interceptions of two telephones because interception of 
second telephone did not exceed 30-day maximum in 18 USCS § 2518(5); data gathered during first week after 
interception order was issued did not indude actual contents of communications, and, thus, "interception" as defined by 18 
USCS § 2510(4), did not begin until first recording was made. United States v Lazu-Rivera (2005, DC Puerto Rico) 363 F 
SUDP 2d 30. 
Defendants moved to dismiss plaintiffs Title III of Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Wiretap Act), 18 
USCS §§ 2510-2520, daims on grounds that recordings of telephone conversations between plaintiff and her boyfriend 
could not be subject to suit because they were made by investigative or law enforcement officer in ordinary course of his 
duties, pursuant to 18 USCS § 2510(5)(a)(ii); however defendants' motion on this basis was denied as record was 
inadequate to rule in defendants' favor absent discovery on issue. Additionally, there was inadequate factual record with 
regards to how much notice was provided to plaintiff or her boyfriend. Colandrea v Town of Orangetown (2007. SD NY) 
490 F SUPD 2d 342. 
Where city employees sued city and many offidals after defendants installed call recording system at public safety 
complex, asserting, inter alia, daim under Title III of Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Street Act of 1968, 18 USCS §§ 
2510 et seq., pursuant to 18 USCS § 2520, they asserted suffident cause of action under 18 USCS § 2511 to survive 
summary judgment and defendants failed to show that either of two exceptions to Act applied; first, because there. was 
genuine issue of material fact as to role that certain defendants played in procuring, installing, and using recording system, 
there existed genuine issue of material fact as to whether they intended to intercept plaintiffs' conversations pursuant to 
18 USCS § 2510(a)( 4 ). Further, argument that they did not intercept any calls through system because there was no 
evidence that they ever listened to calls, and thus they were never "actually acquired," was rejected. Walden v City of 
Providence (2007, DC RI) 495 F Supp 2d 245. 26 BNA IER Cas 580. 
Admissibility of evidence linking accused to drug transaction, gathered from telephone conversation overheard by battery 
First Sergeant on extension phone in orderly room, is not preduded by 18 USCS §§ 2510 et seq., since brief monitoring of 
telephone conversation by First Sergeant was in ordinary course of business, so conversation was never "intercepted" 
within meaning of § 2510. United States v Sturdivant (1982. CMA) 13 MJ 323. 
Recording by unindicted conspirator of telephone conversation with defendant by use of tape recorder and spedal adapter 
attached to telephone receiver did not meet statutory definition of "intercept" under New Jersey statute and 18 USCS §§ 
2510(4) and 2511(1)(a). State v Gora (1977. APD Div) 148 NJ Super 582. 372 A2d 1335. 
Use of telephone to surreptitiously eavesdrop on employees when there was no purpose of trying to detect illicit contacts 
with competitors could never fall within exception from criminal or dvil liability provided for use within ordinary course of 
business. Cady v IMC Mortg. Co. (2004. RI) 862 A2d 202, 22 BNA IER Cas 342. 
-:; 18.--Use of pen register or other tracing device 
For purposes of 18 USCS § 2510(4), pen register does not "intercept" because it does not acquire "contents" of 
communications or accomplish "aural acquisition" of anything. United States v New York Tel. Co. (1977) 434 US 159.54 L 
Ed 2d 376, 98 S ct 364. 
Pen register is not interception of communication under 18 USCS § 2510(4). Korman v United States (1973, CA7 III) 486 
F2d 926. 
Pen register does not hear sound and therefore does not accomplish "interception" for 18 USCS § 2510(4) purposes; pen 
register acquires its information by interpreting and printing out electric pulses and is thus not "aural acquisition", which is 
only acquisition authorized by 18 USCS §§ 2510 et seq. United States v Illinois Bell Tel. Co. (1976, CA7 III) 531 F2d 809. 
"Pen-register" is not interception of communication under 18 USCS § 2510(4). Application of United States for Order 
Authorizing Installation & Use of Pen Register (1976. CA8 Mo) 546 F2d 243. cert den (1978) 434 US 1008. 54 L Ed 2d 
750, 98 S Ct 716. 
Neither pen registers nor traces accomplished by "aural acquisition," are interception of wire communications as that term 
is defined by 18 USCS § 2510(4). Michigan Bell Tel. Co. v United States (1977, CA6 Mich) 565 F2d 385. 
Since pen registers do not intercept contents of communications, they are not within scope of 18 USCS §§ 2510-2520. 
United States v Kail (1979, CA9 Cal) 612 F2d 443. cert den (1980) 445 US 966. 64 LEd 2d 242.100 S Ct 1657 and cert 
den (1980) 445 US 969,64 L Ed 2d 247, 100 S Ct 1664 and cert den (1980) 446 US 912, 64 LEd 2d 266.100 S Ct 1842 
and cert den (1980) 446 US 953, 64 LEd 2d 810, 100 S Ct 2920. 
Use of "pen register", device used in connection with telephone by which telephone numbers of outgoing calls are recorded 
and number of times telephone rings in respect to incoming calls, but does not record conversations, does not involve 
interception, acquisition, or use of aural impulses, is not instrument by which aural interception takes place within 
meaning of 18 USCS § 2510(4). United States v Focarile (1972, DC Md) 340 F Supp 1033, affd (1972, CA4 Md) 469 F2d 
522L affd (1974) 416 US 505, 40 L Ed 2d 341, 94 S Ct 1820 and affd without op (1973, CA4 Md) 473 F2d 906, cert den 
(1973fBRlIE\POI'NL£~Rtf4W mAfWB· 
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"Pen register" is not "interception" under 18 USCS § 2510(4) and requirements of 18 USCS §§ 2510 et seq. do not apply. 
In re Korman (1972, ND III) 351 F Supp 325, affd (1973, CA7 III) 486 F2d 926. 
"Pen register", when used in conjunction with court-ordered wiretap, does "intercept" wire communications within scope of 
18 USCS § 2510(1), (4). In re Alperen (1973, DC Mass) 355 F Supp 372, affd (1973, CAl Mass) 478 F2d 194. 
Use of pen registers (devices which simply trace phone calls and do not record contents of such calls) does not constitute 
"interception" as that term is defined in 18 USCS § 2510(4) for purposes of 18 USCS §§ 2510 et seq. United States v Best 
(1973, SD Ga) 363 F Supp 11. 
Installation of pen register is clearly not subject to restrictions of 18 USCS § 2511. Von Lusch v C & P Tel. Co. (1978, DC 
Md) 457 F Supp 814. 
Since pen registers do not intercept "contents" of communications, fundamental part of definition of interception provided 
by 18 USCS § 2510(4), they are not controlled by TItle III of Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. 
Application of United States for An Order Authorizing Installation of Pen Register etc. (1978, WD Pal 458 F Supp 1174. 
Communications content information as defined under 18 USCS § 2510(8), obtained by post-cut-through dialed digits can 
not be intercepted by law enforcement under Pen/Trap Statute under 18 USCS §§ 3121(c}, 3127 and can only be 
intercepted by law enforcement under 18 USCS § 2518, part of TItle III of Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 
1968, and Stored Communications Act, 18 USCS §§ 2701 et seq.; thus, government was denied authorization for access to 
such information through pen trap order because call contents would be obtained, which was proscribed by PenlTrap 
Statute. In re the Application of United States (2006, SD Tex) 441 F Supp 2d 816 (criticized in In re United States for 
Order for Prospective Cell Site Location Info. (2006, SD NY> 460 F Supp 2d 448). 
Independent use of pen register is not subject to federal wiretapping statute since they are not intercepting devices as 
defined in statute, in that they do not intercept aural communications. People v Estrada (1978) 97 Misc 2d 127,410 
NYS2d 757. 
Because they do not accomplish "aural acquisition" or acquire contents of communications, pen registers fall outside 
purview of 18 USCS § 2510(4). Davis v United States (1978, Dist Col APR) 390 A2d 976. 
Evidence obtained from tracing device which did not disclose content of call, but only existence of communication, time of 
call, and number dialed did not constitute aural interception of communications within meaning of 18 USCS § 2510(4) and 
was admissible in prosecution of defendant for aggravated kidnapping and intimidation, 18 USCS § 2515 not being 
applicable and no court order being necessary. People v Turner (1976, 1st Dist) 35 III App 3d 550, 342 NE2d 158. 
Neither use of "pen register" alone, without accessory airphones, nor use of "trace" alone intercepts communication within 
meaning of 18 USCS § 2510(4)since such merely records numbers dialed from registered or traced telephone without 
showing that calls have been completed or answered. In re In-Progress Trace of Wire Communication etc. (1975, App Div) 
138 NJ Super 404.351 A2d 356. revd on other grounds (1978) 76 NJ 255, 386 A2d 1295. 
-:; 19.--Miscellaneous 
Printouts of Telex communications do not constitute "aural" acquisition of contents of communications; Telex 
communications, unlike telephonic communication, does not involve hearing sounds of voice but is more like pen register 
or television monitoring, sight rather than hearing being means of apprehending contents hence 18 USCS §§ 2510 et seq. 
do not apply to such printouts. United States v Gregg (1987, CA8 Mo) 829 F2d 1430. 23 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1170, cert 
den (1988) 486 US 1022, 100 LEd 2d 226, 108 S Ct 1994. 
Security officer employed by company that provided corporate defendant with security services could not recover damages 
for period of time after defendant turned off voice logger, even though due to design defect device continued to transmit 
ambient noise from guard's office to defendant's security control room, since conversations in guard's office were not 
intercepted in violation of Federal Wiretapping Act under 18 USCS § 2511; corporation never acquired "contents" Of any 
conversations taking place in guard's office under 18 USCS § 2510(4}, and there was no "intentional interception" under 
18 USCS § 2511. Sanders v Robert Bosch Corp. (1994. CA4 SC) 38 F3d 736, 10 BNA IER Cas L amd (1994, CA4) 10 BNA 
IER Cas 479 and reh, en banc, den (1995, CA4 SC) 10 BNA IER Cas 480 and (criticized in Dillon v Massachusetts Bay 
Transp. Auth. (2000) 49 Mass App 309, 729 NE2d 329, 16 BNA IER Cas 634). 
Subsequent listening to lawfully taped conversation by entity other than that which made original recording does not 
constitute interception which requires subsequent listening entity to obtain interception order. United States v Hammond 
(2002, CA4 Md) 286 F3d 189, cert den (2002) 537 US 900, 154 LEd 2d 172, 123 S Ct 215. 
In defendant's motion to suppress tapes of his telephone calls obtained while he was prisoner, under Omnibus Crime 
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 USCS § 2510(4), communication was only "intercepted" at time it was initially 
captured by non-party; "intercept" was defined as aural or other acquisition of wire communication through use of any 
electroniC, mechanical or other device. United States v Hammond (2002, CA4 Md) 286 F3d 189, cert den (2002) 537 US 
900, 154 LEd 2d 172, 123 S Ct 215. 
AirlirJ3Ri.(:l!JilrfW@l!Jptp@Rl1fJr@FJ ~'i{lp{iIl~f 3irline employee's secure website was not an "interception" in violation of 
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Wiretap Act,18 USCS §§ 2510-2520, since vice president acquired website's contents in their stored state, not during 
transmission. Konop v Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. (2002, CA9 Cal) 302 F3d 868,2002 COOS 7727, 2002 Daily Journal DAR 
9709,19 BNA IER Cas 166, 170 BNA LRRM 2906, 146 CCH LC P 10096, cert den (2003) 537 US 1193, 123 S Ct 1292, 
154 LEd 2d 1028, 19 BNA IER Cas 1088, 171 BNA LRRM 3152. 
Internet service company intercepted communication between drug companies and their website users, under 18 USCS § 
2510(4), because its acquisition was contemporaneous with transmission by users to drug companies; accordingly, district 
court erred by granting company summary judgment in Internet service company's favor. Blumofe v Pharmatrak, Inc. (In 
re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litig.) (2003, CAl Mass) 329 F3d 9 (criticized in In re ]etBlue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig. 
(2005, ED NY) 379 F Supp 2d 299). 
District court's dismissal of officers' claim, for violation of Stored Communications Act, 18 USCS §§ 2701 et seq., on ground 
that messages that were accessed were not in "electronic storage," was reversed because there was no dispute that 
messages that remained on internet service provider's server after delivery were stored by electronic communication 
service within meaning of 18 USCS § 2510 (17)(B) and that messages were stored for purposes of backup protection 
within meaning of 18 USCS § 2510(17)(B). Theofel v Farey-]ones (2004, CA9 Cal) 359 F3d 1066, cert den (2004, US) 
160 LEd 2d 17, 125 S Ct 48. 
Internet service provider's (ISP's) continued reception of former customer's e-mails did not constitute "interception" under 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 USCS §§ 2510 et seq., because it was conducted as part of ordinary course of 
ISP's business. Hall v EarthLink Network, Inc. (2005, CA2 NY) 396 F3d 500. 
Act of using device to decrypt encrypted satellite television transmissions unquestionably falls under definition of 
"interception" as defined in 18 USCS § 2510(4); thus, under plain language of 18 USCS § 2511 and 18 USCS § 2520, 
using pirate access device to intercept encrypted satellite transmissions of satellite television provider constitutes violation 
of 18 USCS § 2511(1)(a). DIRECfV Inc. v Nicholas (2005. CA4 NC) 403 F3d 223. 
In illegal interception of electronic communications case, e-mail messages obtained and copied from an online retailer by 
an Internet service provider (ISP) were "intercepted" within meaning of Wiretap Act. United States v Councilman (2005, 
CAl Mass) 418 F3d 67. 
Definition of "electronic storage" is extraordinarily and it covers any temporary, intermediate storage of wire or electronic 
communication incidental to electronic transmission thereof, as well as any storage of such communication by electronic 
communication service for purposes of backup protection of such communication. United States v Councilman (2005, CAl 
Mass) 418 F3d 67. 
If bugs were lawfully situated in living room, any conversation dealing with narcotics trafficking which they overheard, 
whether or not agents knew it was occurring in adjoining room, is lawfully intercepted and is therefore admissible. United 
States v Williams (1981, SO NY) 527 F Supp 859. 
Individual who received paid television supplier's microwave transmissions without authority or payment of fee did not 
"intercept" transmissions within meaning of 18 USCS § 2510(4), since he did not orally acquire contents of any wire or 
oral communication (as latter term is defined at 18 USCS § 2510(1», where signal had come as unconnected, 
omnidirectional frequency capable of receipt by anyone possessing required equipment, and supplier had no protectable 
privacy interest in signal prior to receipt. Hoosier Home Theater. Inc. v Adkins (1984, SO Ind) 595 F Supp 389. 
Grand jury subpoena for foreign currency trader's records is valid under 18 USCS § 2510(4), where undercover agent 
tape-recorded conversation that he also could plainly hear, because there was no "interception" or prohibition against 
preserving conversation agent could lawfully overhear. In re John Doe Trader Number One (1989, NO III) 722 F Supp 419, 
affd (1990, CA7 III) 894 F2d 240. 
Accused methamphetamine traffickers are not entitled to suppression of contents of 2 audio cassettes seized from 
answering machine during search of their residence, where deputies overheard incoming call over speaker while lawfully 
executing search warrant, then later replaced and transcribed contents of tapes, because deputies did not "intercept" any 
"wire, oral or electronic communication" within meaning of 18 USCS § 2510(4) when they overheard and replayed 
previously recorded conversations. United States v Upton (1991. SO Ohio) 763 F Supp 232. 
Computer programmer could not be liable under Electronic Communications Privacy Act (18 USCS §§ 2510 et seq.), to 
extent he inadvertently glimpsed e-mail on computer screen while helping someone, because § 2510(4) defines "intercept" 
as "acquisition of contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication through use of any electronic, mechanical, or 
other device." Wesley College v Pitts (1997. DC Del) 974 F Supp 375.13 BNA IER Cas 355. affd without op (1998, CA3 
Del) 172 F3d 861. 
Disgruntled insurance agent has no viable claim against insurer under Federal Wiretap Act (18 USCS §§ 2510 et seq.), 
where it is undisputed that insurer acquired e-mail agent sent to another agent from its electronic storage facility after 
other agent had received and read it, because insurer's retrieval of e-mail message from post-transmission storage, after 
transmission was complete, was no "interception." Fraser v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. (2001, ED Pal 135 F Supp 2d 623, 17 
BNA IER Cas 662 (criticized in Theotel v Farey-Jones (2003. CA9 Cal) 341 F3d 978. 2003 COOS 7848, 2003 Daily Journal 
DAR 9849) and affd in part and remanded in part (2003, CA3 Pa) 352 F3d 107. 20 BNA IER Cas 1207, 149 CCH LC P 
59803 and (criticized in Theofel v Farey-Jones (2004, CA9 Cal) 359 F3d 1066). 
SatelliBR!IIEFsiH'ti &~RlI?~RiEnQIi~fr~;Ea1'tS one unrelated individual alleging that they intercepted its television 
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programming by means of "Pirate Access Devices" in violation of 47 uses § 605 and 18 uses §§ 2510-2521 were 
dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 21 because daims involved distinct and unrelated acts by unrelated individuals, and 
there was neither "common transaction or occurrence" nor "common question of law" as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 20. 
DIREClV, Inc. v Armellino (2003, ED NY) 216 FRD 240 (critidzed in DIRECfV, Inc. v Barrett (2004, DC Kan) 220 FRD 
630). 
Individual's motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) was granted because amendments to 18 USCS § 2520 did not 
undermine previous rule issued by Court of Appeals for Fourth Circuit which found that no private cause of action was 
permitted under former version of § 2520 for violations of 18 USCS § 2512; furthermore, company had to allege unlawful 
possession and use of eavesdropping equipment in order to maintain cause of action under 18 USCS § 2511, but mere 
possession of that equipment, alone, afforded no dvil recovery under either § 2511 or § 2512. DIREClV, Inc. v Amato 
(2003. ED Va) 269 F SUDD 2d 688 (critidzed in Directv. Inc. v Perez (2003, ND III) 279 F SURD 2d 962) and (critidzed in 
DIREClV, Inc. v Gatsiolis (2003, ND III) 2003 US Dist LEXIS 15801) and (critidzed in Directv. Inc. v Pence (2003, ED Tex) 
2003 US Dist LEXIS 25895} and (criticized in DirecTV. Inc. v Dougherty (2003, DC NJ) 2003 US Dist LEXIS 23654} and 
(criticized in DIRECfV. Inc. v Legans (2004. WD Tenn) 2004 US Dist LEXIS 972) and (critidzed in DirecTV, Inc. v Dyrhaug 
(2004. ND III) 2004 US Dist LEXIS 5008} and (critidzed in DirecTV. Inc. v Figueroa (2004, DC NJ) 2004 US Dist LEXIS 
28000) and (critidzed in DirecTV, Inc. v Dillon (2004, ND III) 2004 US Dist LEXIS 7229). 
Defendant's text messages, supplied by electronic communication providers in response to search warrants were not 
"interceptions" under 18 USCS § 2510(4), but instead were governed by 18 USCS § 2703(a}, and were admissible due to 
probable cause for warrants; unlike Wiretap Act, Stored Communications Act contained no express requirement that 
government demonstrate necessity. United States v Jones (2006, DC Dist Col) 451 F SURD 2d 71. 
Where dty employees sued city and many officials after defendants installed call recording system at public safety 
complex, asserting, inter alia, daim under Title III of Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Street Act of 1968, 18 USCS §§ 
2510 et seq., pursuant to 18 USCS § 2520, they asserted suffident cause of action under 18 USCS § 2511 to survive 
summary judgment and defendants failed to show that either of two exceptions to Act applied; inter alia, defendants failed 
to show that their conduct fell within ordinary course of business exception pursuant to 18 USCS § 2510(5)(a)(ii); while 
defendants suggested that recording was utilized for private purposes, long distance, or "900" calls, and to preserve and 
accurately recall messages relating to emergendes or offidal police business, such proffered justification did not square 
with number of defendants' statements; thus, whether purpose of system was routine and non investigative was called into 
question, and system did not unequivocally fall within exception. Walden v City of Providence (2007, DC RI) 495 F SUDD 2d 
245.26 BNA IER Cas 580. 
Where city employees sued dty and many offidals after defendants installed call recording system at public safety 
complex, asserting, inter alia, daim under Title III of Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Street Act of 1968, 18 USCS §§ 
2510 et seq., pursuant to 18 USCS § 2520, they asserted sufficient cause of action under 18 USCS § 2511 to survive 
summary judgment and defendants failed to show that either of two exceptions to Act applied; inter alia, defendants failed 
to show that their conduct fell within consent exception as there was no evidence suggesting that plaintiffs were aware 
that their conversations were being recorded; while it was true that e-mail was drculated to at least number of employees, 
there was no indication that e-mail was sent to plaintiffs; additionally, there was no "beep" or similar warning emitted from 
telephone lines, no offidal memorandum drculated advising employees that lines were being recorded, and no effort to 
seek consent from employees. Walden v City of Providence (2007, DC RI) 495 F SUDP 2d 245, 26 BNA IER Cas 580. 
Where motel derk answered switchboard call from motel room, received no reply upon answering, but heard commotion 
over telephone and recorded commotion without mechanically interfering with telephone line, resulting tape recording was 
not result of "intercept" as defined in 18 USCS § 2510(4), since motel clerk merely recorded that which he, as proper 
party to telephone line, could hear and he did so without violation of physical integrity of telephone line. Williams v State 
(1973, Okla Crim) 507 P2d 1339. 
Unpublished Opinions 
Unpublished: District court's remarks at defendant's suppression hearing regarding government's establishment of "super 
probable cause" satisfied probable cause assessment required by 18 USCS §§ 2510-2520 because district court 
demonstrated full awareness of relevant statutory standards for judidal authorization of wire and electronic surveillance. 
United States v Brewer (2006, CA4 Md) 204 Fed ADDX 205 (critidzed in United States v Rice (2007. CA6 Ky) 478 F3d 704, 
2007 FED ADP 88P). 
"'; 20. Electronic, mechanical, or other device, generally 
It is not violation of 18 USCS § 2510 for father to listen in on conversations between his wife and his eight year old 
daughter, from his own phone, in his own home, and fact that he taped conversations which he permissibly overheard does 
not violate statute since such construction would create distinction without difference. Anonymous v Anonymous (1977, 
CA2 NY) 558 F2d 677 (criticized in United States v Murdock (1995, CA6 Michl 63 F3d 1391. 1995 FED ADD 258P) and 
(critidzed in Pollock v Pollock (1998. CA6 Ky) 154 F3d 601. 1998 FED ADD 271P) and (criticized in Milke v Milke (2004, DC 
Minn) 2004 US Dist LEXIS 11199). 
Where telephone company installed telephone monitoring devices on phones in its departments dealing with general 
public, in order to allow supervisory personnel to monitor business calls to give employees more training and also to serve 
as protection for employees from abusive calls, exception to definition of "electronic, mechanical, or other device" found in 
18 USBR!l:Ef1!)INVS@roBfli'eOf'!'@\fw1?E',£:Jency Corp. (1979, CAlO Utah) 591 F2d 579. 18 BNA FEP Cas 1547, 18 
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CCH EPD P 8914 (criticized in Schmerling v Injured Workers' Ins. Fund (2002) 368 rv1d 434, 795 A2d 715, 18 BNA IER Cas 
873). 
Beepers are governed by laws concerning electronic surveillance. United States v Sweeney (1982, CA7 III) 688 F2d 1131, 
11 Fed Rules Evid Serv 665 (criticized in State v Rothlisberger (2004, Utah ApD) 2004 UT App 226, 95 P3d 1193,203 
Utah Adv Rep 19) and (superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Ragland v State (2005) 385 Md 706, 870 A2d 
609) and (criticized in State v Rothlisberger (2006) 2006 UT 49, 147 P3d 1176, 560 Utah Adv Rep 4). 
Overhearing conversation by listening on same earpiece as participant to conversation is not interception of 
communication within meaning of 18 USCS § 2510. United States v Chiavola (1984, CA7 III) 744 F2d 1271, 16 Fed Rules 
Evid Serv 685 (criticized in State v Samuel (2000, App) 2001 WI APD 25, 240 Wis 2d 756, 623 NW2d 565}. 
Federal judge is authorized to enter order permitting agents of government to visually monitor, and through video 
electronic equipment record, all activities in organizations safe houses dedicated exdusively to illicit business. United 
States v Torres (1984, CA7 III) 751 F2d 875, cert den (1985) 470 US 1087,85 LEd 2d 150, 105 S Ct 1853. 
Seizure of electronic transfer funds for forfeiture purposes was not prohibited interception under 18 USCS § 2511(1), since 
government did not use "device" within meaning of 18 USCS § 2510(4) to obtain electronic transfer funds or information. 
United States v Daccarett (1993, CA2 NY) 6 F3d 37,72 AFTR 2d 6248, 93 TNT 212-11, cert den (1994) 510 US 1191. 510 
US 1192, 127 LEd 2d 648, 114 S Ct 1294 and cert den (1994) 511 US 1030, 128 LEd 2d 190, 114 S Ct 1538 and 
(criticized in United States v $ 87,118.00 in United States Currency (1996, CA7 III) 95 F3d 511) and (superseded by 
statute on other grounds as stated in United States v Mondragon (2002, CA4 Md) 313 F3d 862). 
Corporation's use of voice logger, which recorded all telephone conversations on some telephone lines with extensions in 
security office, did not fall within business-use exception of 18 USCS § 2510(5)(a)(i), since voice logger is not telegraph 
instrument, equipment or facility, or component thereof, and was not used in ordinary course of its business, even though 
corporation claimed that it feared bomb threats. Sanders v Robert Bosch Corp. (1994, CA4 SC) 38 F3d 736, 10 BNA IER 
Cas 1. amd (1994, CA4) 10 BNA IER Cas 479 and reh, en banc, den (1995, CA4 SC) 10 BNA IER Cas 480 and (criticized in 
Dillon v Massachusetts Bay TransD. Auth. (2000) 49 Mass App 309,729 NE2d 329, 16 BNA IER Cas 634). 
Recording of all incoming and outgoing calls, including employee plaintiffs' conversations, by Dictaphone machine attached 
to telephone system of company providing central alarm services was in ordinary course of business under 18 USCS § 
2510, and alleged lack of notice was justified; recording is standard practice within central station alarm industry and is 
intended at least in part to deter criminal activity, was recommended by company's underwriters and relevant trade 
association, and may be required by authorities in certain instances. Arias v Mutual Cent. Alarm Servo (2000, CA2 NY) 202 
F3d 553, 15 BNA IER Cas 1683, 140 CCH LC P 58873. 
Anonymous source's hacking into defendant's computer to gain evidence of child pornography implicated neither Fourth 
Amendment nor Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 USCS §§ 2510 et seq., and thus evidence did not have 
to be suppressed. United States v Steiger (2003, CAll Ala) 318 F3d 1039, 16 FLW Fed C 197, cert den (2003) 538 US 
1051, 155 LEd 2d 1095, 123 S Ct 2120. 
Proposed distinction between "in transit" and "in storage" was rejected; term "electronic communication," 18 USCS § 
2510(12), includes transient electronic storage intrinsic to communication process for such communications. United States 
v Councilman (2005, CAl Mass) 418 F3d 67. 
Because e-mail messages did not cease to be "electronic communication," pursuant to 18 USCS § 2510(12), during 
momentary intervals, intrinsic to communication process, at which message resided in transient electronic storage, e-mail 
provider who had been copying his customer's e-mails could be prosecuted under 18 USCS § 2511, part of Wiretap Act. 
United States v Councilman (2005, CAl Mass) 418 F3d 67. 
Covert monitoring of conversations between plaintiff, a former Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs, 
and former Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs concerning presidential candidate's passport by officers at 
State Department communications center was not shown to be within ordinary course of business under 18 USCS § 2510 
so as to warrant dismissal of complaint; there was no reason presented as to need for secret monitoring nor was it shown 
to be routine and guidelines for center provided that calls should not be monitored unless parties so request. Berry v Funk 
(1998, App DC) 331 US App DC 62,146 F3d 1003 (criticized in Blake v Wright (1999, CA6 Ohio) 179 F3d 1003, 15 BNA 
IER Cas 297,1999 FED App 218P) and (criticized in Tapley v Collins (2000, CAll Ga) 211 F3d 1210, 16 BNA IER Cas 
665). 
Prison intercepts of telephone conversations between inmate and his sister need not be suppressed, where interception 
and recording of calls occurred in conformity with pre-established institutional plan not specifically aimed at siblings, 
because prison officials are "investigative or law enforcement officers" and routine monitoring pursuant to established 
policy is "in ordinary course of their duties" within meaning of 18 USCS § 2510(5)(a)(ij) exemption from § 2511 blanket 
prohibition of interception of wire communications. United States v Cheely (1992, DC Alaska) 814 F Supp 1430 (criticized 
in United States v Rivera (2003, ED Va) 292 F SUDP 2d 838) and (criticized in United States v Faulkner (2004, DC Kan) 
323 F Supp 2d 1111). 
Employer is denied summary dismissal of employees' claims that it violated 18 USCS § 2511 by monitoring and recording 
their telephone calls at work, even though employer contends its monitoring was exempt under § 2510(4) and (5) or § 
2511(2)(d), because (1) it is not at all clear that employees were aware of and consented to monitoring, and (2) employer 
does fB>Rd.§ ff;~JtfifuJlBlB@1Rasii)if,3£;rAiiFa'&atter of law, justifies indiscriminate recording of all business and 
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personal telephone calls received or made during particular shift. Ali v Douglas Cable Communs. (1996, DC Kan) 929 F 
SUPP 1362. 
Company's daims under Federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 USCS § 605, and Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 
18 USCS §§ 2510-2521, that named six defendants that allegedly pirated satellite television services, could be 
consolidated pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a) based upon common questions of fact and law and in interest of judicial 
economy and efficiency, and one named defendant's motion to drop claims against him or to sever daims were not 
warranted. Monon Tel. Co. v Bristol C2003, ND Ind) 218 FRD 614, 57 FR Serv 3d 933. 
Customers' claim that airline violated 18 USCS § 2702Ca)(3), part of Electronic Communications Privacy Act, when it 
provided National Aeronautical and Space Administration with addresses, credit card numbers, and travel itineraries of 
customers without their knowledge was dismissed for failure to state daim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) because 
"electronic communication services," as term was defined by 18 USCS § 2510(15), encompassed internet service providers 
and telecommunications companies whose lines carried internet traffic; however, term did not encompass businesses that 
were selling traditional products or services online; because airline sold its services over internet but did not sell access to 
internet itself, airline fell outside scope of 18 USCS § 2702. Dyer v Northwest Airlines CorDS. (2004, DC ND) 334 F SUPP 
2d 1196. 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act definition of "electronic communications service" of 18 USCS § 2510(15) clearly 
indudes internet service providers as well as telecommunications companies whose cables and phone lines carry internet 
traffic; however, businesses offering their traditional products and services online through website are not providing 
"electronic communication service." Dyer v Northwest Airlines Coros. (2004, DC ND) 334 F SURD 2d 1196. 
Electronic communications in interstate commerce as defined in 18 USCS § 2511(1)(a) were held not to have been 
illegally intercepted by defendant, who used "KeyKatcher" device to obtain keystrokes transmitted from victim's keyboard 
to her computer, because those keystrokes were not yet electronic transmissions in interstate commerce at time they were 
intercepted. United States v ROPR (2004, CD Cal) 347 F SURP 2d 831. 
Defendant's text messages, supplied by electronic communication providers in response to search warrants were not 
"interceptions" under 18 USCS § 2510(4), and were admissible due to probable cause for warrants; as used in Stored 
Communications Act, which, in 18 USCS § 2711(1), expressly adopted definitions provided in Wiretap Act, "electronic 
storage" meant any temporary, intermediate storage of wire or electronic communication incidental to electronic 
transmission thereof and any storage of such communication by electronic communication service for purposes of backup 
protection of such communication as provided in 18 USCS § 2510(17). United States v Jones (2006, DC Dist Col) 451 F 
SURR 2d 71. 
Defendant's text messages, supplied by electronic communication providers in response to search warrants were not 
"interceptions" under 18 USCS § 2510(4), but instead were governed by 18 USCS § 2703(a), and were admissible due to 
probable cause for warrants; as used in Stored Communications Act, which, in 18 USCS § 2711(1), expressly adopted 
definitions provided in Wiretap Act, "electronic communication service" was defined as any service which provides to users 
thereof ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications as prOVided in 18 USCS § 2510(15). United States v 
Jones (2006, DC Dist Col) 451 F SURR 2d 71. 
~ 21.--Extension telephone exemption 
There is no interception if acquisition of contents of communication is accomplished through telephone equipment used in 
ordinary course of business; to establish interception under 18 USCS § 2510(4), Government must establish beyond 
reasonable doubt that contents of wire or oral communication were acquired through electronic, mechanical, or other 
device other than telephone employed by subscriber or user in ordinary course of its business; however, telephone 
extension used without authorization or consent to surreptitiously record private telephone conversation is not used in 
ordinary course of business. United States v Harpel (1974, CAW Colo) 493 F2d 346 (criticized in United States v Murdock 
(1995, CA6 Mich) 63 F3d 1391. 1995 FED App 258P). 
Use of extension telephone by police officer to intercept telephone conversations between inmates in state correctional 
institution was not within exemption from statutory prohibition against secret monitoring of wire communications found 
within 18 USCS § 2510(5). Campiti v Walonis (1979, CAl Mass) 611 F2d 387,58 ALR Fed 579. 
Extension business telephone may be "device" as defined by 18 USCS § 2510(5) where circumstances surrounding 
employer's interception of employee's telephone conversation indicate that employee's supervisor had particular suspicions 
about confidential information being disclosed to business competitor, had warned employee not to disclose such 
information, had reason to believe that employee was continuing to disclose such information, and knew that particular 
phone call was with agent of competitor. Briggs v American Air Filter Co. (1980, CA5 Ga) 630 F2d 414. 
Business extension exception did not apply to employer's interceptions of employees' phone calls because monitoring 
system used, which consisted of "alligator chips attached to a microphone cable" and "interface connecting microphone 
cable to a VCR and a video camera" was not "telephone or telegraph instrument, equipment or facility or component within 
meaning of 18 USCS § 2510(5). Williams v Poulos (1993, CAl Me) 11 F3d 271 (criticized in Blumofe v Pharmatrak, Inc. 
(In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litig.) (2003, CAl Mass) 329 F3d 9). 
To meet business use exception of 18 USCS § 2510(5)(a)(i), both of that section's prongs must be met. Sanders v Robert 
BoschI5R:ffif1iU,9trt>fJO:RBfF@W'ID1'Q'PEAgER Cas L amd (1994, CM) 10 BNA IER Cas 479 and reh, en banc, den 
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(1995, CA4 SC) 10 BNA IER Cas 480 and (criticized in Dillon v iv1assachusetts Bay TransD. Autt-!. (2000) 49 iv1ass App 309, 
729 NE2d 329,16 BNA IER Cas 634). 
Tape recorder connected to extension phones in wife's home, which wife used to check on defendant husband's business 
dealings related to their funeral business and his possible marital infidelities, did not all fall within telephone or business 
extension exemption under 18 USCS § 2510(5), since recording mechanism does not qualify for exemption, and 
indiscriminate recording of both incoming and outgoing calls did not constitute conduct within ordinary course of funeral 
home business. United States v Murdock (1995, CA6 Mich) 63 F3d 1391. 1995 FED ADR 258P, reh, en banc, den (1995, 
CA6) 1995 US ARR LEXIS 28950 and cert den (1996) 517 US 1187. 116 S Ct 1672. 134 LEd 2d 776 and (criticized in In 
re Grand Jury (1997, CA3 Del) 111 F3d 1066) and (criticized in Chandler v United States Army (1997. CA9 Idaho) 125 
F3d 1296. 97 CDOS 7546, 97 Daily Journal DAR 12161) and (criticized in Berry v Funk (1998, ADR DC) 331 US ARR DC 
62, 146 F3d 1003) and (criticized in Miles v State (2001) 365 Md 488, 781 A2d 787) and (criticized in Smith v Mike 
Devers & Mike Devers Ins. Agencv. Inc. (2002. MD Ala) 2002 US Dist LEXIS 1125) and (criticized in United States v Lam 
(2003, ND Cal) 271 F SURD 2d 1182) and (criticized in Henson v State (2003, Ind ADR) 790 NE2d 524) and (criticized in 
Babb v Eagleton (2007, ND Okla) 2007 US Dist LEXIS 82246), 
Extension telephone is not intercepting device within meaning of 18 USCS § 251O(5)(a). United States v Christman (1974, 
ND Cal) 375 F SUDD 1354. 
In action brought by attorney and his hospitalized client against physician, hospital, and nurse, seeking monetary relief for 
alleged violations of wire and oral communication interception laws, unauthorized or non-consented to use of extension 
telephone to overhear conversation between attorney and client qualified as exception to definition of interception under 
18 USCS § 2510(5)(a). Gerrard v Blackman (1975, ND III) 401 F SUDD 1189, 
Operative factual test to determine applicability of extension phone exemption is whether extension phone is being used 
by subscriber "in ordinary course of business". Briggs v American Air Filter Co. (1978, ND Ga) 455 F SURD 179, affd (1980, 
CA5 Ga) 630 F2d 414. 
Supervisor who uses tape recorder on office telephone extension to intercept personal calls of employee without 
employee's consent or knowledge commits illegal wiretapping unless recording of telephone calls is in ordinary course of 
business. Abel v Bonfanti (1985, SD NY) 625 F SUDD 263,42 BNA FEP Cas 132, 39 CCH EPD P 35893. 
Wife cannot proceed with claim for relief from husband who wiretapped phone in marital home under 18 USCS § 2520, 
even though wife had filed for legal separation at time of wiretapping, where both parties resided in marital home and 
could have listened in on phone conversations by use of extension phones, because (1) 18 USCS § 2510(5)(a)0) 
"extension phone" exception is expression of congressional intent to leave matters of interspousal domestic conflict to 
realm of state courts, and (2) there is no evidence that wiretap ever intercepted conversation in which wife participated. 
Perfit v Perfit (1988, CD Cal) 693 F SUDD 851 (criticized in Milke v Milke (2004, DC Minn) 2004 US Dist LEXIS 11199). 
Husband's attorneys and guardian ad litem are entitled to summary dismissal of ex-wife's civil action under federal and 
state eavesdropping statutes, where husband had recorded, by means of extension phone answering machine, and 
attorneys and guardian had disclosed, son's conversations with his mother, because, unlike typical circumstances of 
interspousal wiretapping, interception of minor child's telephone conversations by use of extension phone in family home is 
permitted by broad reading of exemption in 18 USCS § 251O(5)(a)(i). Scheib v Grant (1993, ND III) 814 F SURD 736, affd 
(1994, CA7 III) 22 F3d 149. reh, en banc, den (1994, CA7 III) 1994 US ARD LEXIS 13371 and cert den (1994) 513 US 929, 
130 LEd 2d 280,115 S Ct 320 and (criticized in Pollock v Pollock (1998, CA6 Ky) 154 F3d 601. 1998 FED ADD 271P) and 
(criticized in Milke v Milke (2004, DC Minn) 2004 US Dist LEXIS 11199). 
Claim of former employees against former employer under 18 USCS §§ 2510-2521, arising out of employer's recording of 
employees' personal telephone conversations through voice-activated tape recorders attached to employer's telephones, is 
granted summarily, where recorders were attached to busboard installed by telephone company by means of wire installed 
by employer, because (1) wire, not busboard, was intercepting device so interception did not occur via instrument 
furnished by telephone company, and (2) recorders were not telephone instruments or equipment, so (3) business 
extension exception of 18 USCS § 2510(5) does not apply. Pascale v Carolina Freight Carriers CorR. (1995. DC NJ) 898 F 
SUDD 276, 10 BNA IER Cas 1804. 
Where city employee was allegedly unaware that system for recording telephone calls to city continued to record 
statements through employee's headset after calls were terminated, exemption under 18 USCS § 2510(5)(a)(j) for 
interception using business device in ordinary course of business did not apply to interception of employee's private 
conversation with co-workers which was unrelated to city business. Anderson v City of Columbus (2005, MD Ga) 374 F 
SURD 2d 1240. 
First Sergeant's listening on extension to orderly room phone to conversation between members of his organization was in 
ordinary course of business and therefore within exception under 18 USCS § 2510(4) and (5). United States v Sturdivant 
(1980, ACMR) 9 MJ 923. petition for review filed (1980, CMA) 9 MJ 427 and revd on other grounds (1982, CMA) 13 MJ 
323. 
On appeal from order in action instituted by plaintiff wife against defendant husband for alimony and child support, which 
order suppressed all evidence of plaintiff's adulterous conduct resulting from interception of her telephone 
communications, notwithstanding defendant's argument, relying on language in 18 USCS § 2510(5)(a), that 18 USCS §§ 
2510 et seq. did not apply to facts of this case because communications were intercepted by use of extension telephone 
furniEre~~?PORCP~rsCPW'fE"'Sch was being used in ordinary course of business, such interceptions were 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
1211/2008 12:22 P:1I 
Get a Document - by Citation - 18 uses § 25 https:llwww.lexis.comlresearchlretrieve? _ m=685e5d29bea913eall ... 
310f35 
illegal under federal law; notwithstanding defendant's testimony that he used teiephone to obtain information as to 
possible business calls, where parties were living in state of separation, where defendant had telephone company install 
extension telephone, which was connected to telephone in plaintiff's residence, in supply closet in defendant's office 
without plaintiff's knowledge or consent, where sound-activated recorder was installed by defendant and not by 
communications common carrier in ordinary course of business, and where neither defendant nor his employees placed 
calls or directly received incoming calls on telephone, trial judge's finding that defendant was not using extension 
telephone in ordinary course of business was supported by ample evidence. Rickenbaker v Rickenbaker (1976) 290 NC 
373,226 SE2d 347. 
:; 22. Person 
Dismissal of city as defendant was proper because Title III, 18 USCS § 2510(6), does not allow for suits against 
municipalities. Amati v Citv of Woodstock (1999, CA7 III) 176 F3d 952, 15 BNA IER Cas 1, 43 FR Serv 3d 351, cert den 
(1999) 528 US 985, 145 L Ed 2d 362, 120 S Ct 445, 16 BNA IER Cas 736 and (criticized in Adams v City of Battle Creek 
(2001, CA6 Michl 250 F3d 980,2001 FED ADD 157P). 
Federal Wiretap Act is inapplicable to municipalities; 18 USCS § 2510 does not include municipality within definition of 
"person" who can be held liable for interception under 18 USCS § 2511, even though 18 USCS § 2520 provides for 
recovery of civil damages against any "person or entity" who violates Act. Abbott v Village of Winthrop Harbor (2000, CA7 
III) 205 F3d 976, 16 BNA IER Cas 32, 140 CCH LC P 58863, reh den (2000, CA7 III) 2000 US ADP LEXIS 6359 and 
(criticized in Conner v Tate (2001, ND Ga) 130 F Supp 2d 1370) and (criticized in Williams v City of Tulsa (2005, ND Okla) 
393 F Supp 2d 1124) and (criticized in Walden v City of Providence (2007, DC RI) 495 F Supp 2d 245,26 BNA IER Cas 
580). 
Word "person" within meaning of 18 USCS § 2510 includes estranged individual living in same house. Kratz v Kratz (1979, 
ED Pal 477 F Supp 463 (criticized in Kirkland v Franco (2000, ED La) 92 F Supp 2d 578). 
:; 23. Investigative officers 
Agents of Intelligence Division, Internal Revenue Service, and agents of audit branch of same service working with 
Intelligence Division Agents are investigative or law enforcement officers within meaning of words as used in 18 USCS § 
2510(7), United States v Iannelli (1973, CA3 Pal 477 F2d 999, affd (1975) 420 US 770,43 LEd 2d 616, 95 S Ct 1284. 
On appeal from defendant's conviction for possession of heroin in violation of 21 USCS § 844(a), which appeal presented 
question of admissibility in federal court of evidence seized pursuant to arrest by California officers when that arrest was 
based on state agents' use of information gathered by wiretaps authorized under federal law but illegal under California 
law, California agents were "investigative or law enforcement officers" as that term is defined by 18 USCS § 2510(7), 
United States v Hall (1976, CA9 Cal) 543 F2d 1229, cert den (1977) 429 US 1075, 50 LEd 2d 793, 97 S Ct 814. 
Pursuant to 18 USCS § 2517, federal investigative officer may turn over wiretaps from federal investigation to state 
attorney grievance commiSSion that is investigating potential misconduct by attorney, since commission was empowered to 
investigate attorney's commission of federal crimes, including, but not limited to, those listed in § 2516, and thus its 
personnel were "investigative officers" within meaning of 18 USCS § 2510(7) to whom disclosure could be made. Berg v 
Michigan Attorney Grievance Comm'n (In re Electronic Surveillance) (1995. CA6 Mich) 49 F3d 1188. 1995 FED ADP 105P. 
Correctional officer, as employee who was authorized to use inmate telephone system under Mass. Gen. laws ch. 124, § 
1!hl and (g), and correctional facility's phone monitoring policy, was empowered to assist with investigations into events 
occurring at correctional facility; he was, therefore, investigative or law enforcement officer pursuant to 18 uses § 
2510(7), part of Title III of Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 uses §§ 2510-2522. United States v 
Lewis (2005 CAl Mass) 406 F3d 11, cert den (2006, US) 126 S Ct 2951. 165 LEd 2d 973. 
Prison intercepts of telephone conversations between inmate and his sister need not be suppressed, where interception 
and recording of calls occurred in conformity with pre-established institutional plan not specifically aimed at siblings, 
because prison officials are "investigative or law enforcement officers" and routine monitoring pursuant to established 
policy is "in ordinary course of their duties" within meaning of 18 USCS § 2510(5)(a)(ii) exemption from § 2511 blanket 
prohibition of interception of wire communications. United States v Cheely (1992, DC Alaska) 814 F SUPD 1430 (criticized 
in United States v Rivera (2003, ED Va) 292 F SUDP 2d 838) and (criticized in United States v Faulkner (2004, De Kan) 
323 F SUPD 2d 1111). 
For purposes of 18 uses § 2510(7), prison officials must be deemed, at least, to have authority to investigate potential 
criminal violations in interest of prison security. United States v Correa (2002, DC Mass) 220 F Supp 2d 61. subsequent 
app, remanded (2005, CAl Mass) 406 F3d 11. cert den (2006, US) 126 S Ct 2951, 165 LEd 2d 973. 
Defendants' motion to suppress phone conversation between them recorded pursuant to prison policy was denied; prison 
telephone system administrator's disclosure of recording to police was permitted under law enforcement exception at 18 
uses § 2510(5)(aWi). United States v Correa (2002, DC Mass) 220 F Supp 2d 61. subsequent app, remanded (2005, CAl 
Mass) 406 F3d 11. cert den (2006, US) 126 S Ct 2951, 165 LEd 2d 973. 
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Monitoring of conversation between prison inmate and outsider fell within "investigative or law enforcement officer" 
exception under 18 USCS § 2510 since monitoring took place within ordinary course of officer's duties, monitoring took 
place in prison, and prison inmates had reasonable notice that monitoring of conversations might occur. United States v 
Paul (1980, CA6 Kv) 614 F2d 115,61 AlR Fed 816, cert den (1980) 446 US 941, 64 LEd 2d 796, 100 S Ct 2165. 
Monitoring by correction officials of telephone conversations between 2 defendants and between woman and another 
inmate is excepted under 18 USCS § 2510(5)(a) since jail officials are free to intercept conversations between prisoner 
and visitor and since monitoring took place within ordinary course of officers' duties and is thus permissible under § 2510. 
United States v Paul (1980, CA6 Kv) 614 F2d 115,61 ALR Fed 816, cert den (1980) 446 US 941, 64 L Ed 2d 796, 100 S 
Ct 2165. 
Tape recordings of phone calls made from prison by federal prisoner to son outside prison, which were authorized by 
Bureau of Prison regulations, came within "investigative or law enforcement officer" exception of 18 USCS § 251O(5)(ii). 
United States v Feekes (1989, CA7 Wis) 879 F2d 1562, reh den (1989, CA7) 1989 US ADD LEXIS 12613 and (criticized in 
United States v Rivera (2003, ED Va) 292 F SUDD 2d 838) and (criticized in United States v Faulkner (2004, DC Kan) 323 
F Supp 2d 1111) and (criticized in United States v Faulkner (2006, CA10 Kan) 439 F3d 1221, 69 Fed Rules Evid Serv 
679). 
Where monitoring of inmate's telephone conversations by correctional officers was authorized by prior regulations, 
prisoners are notified about monitoring policy in 4 different ways, and Code of Federal Regulations provides public notice of 
possibility of monitoring, tapes were admissible under exception for evidence intercepted by law enforcement officer. 
United States v Sababu (1989. CA7 III) 891 F2d 1308,29 Fed Rules Evid Serv 332. 
Metropolitan Detention Center's routine taping of defendant's telephone conversations did not violate Title III, since center 
was law enforcement agency and interceptions were made in ordinary course of business and thus came within "law 
enforcement" exception, 18 uses § 2510(5}(a). United States v Van Povck (1996, CA9 Cal) 77 F3d 285, 96 COOS 1091, 
96 Daily Journal DAR 1850, subsequent app (1996, CA9 Cal) 77 F3d 491, reported in full (1996, CA9 Cal) 1996 US App 
LEXIS 4668 and cert den (1996) 519 US 912, 136 L Ed 2d 199,117 S Ct 276. 
Taping of confession to Catholic priest was in ordinary course of jailers' duties and did not violate Wiretap Act, since under 
18 USCS § 2510(5)(a) statute does not apply to interceptions by law enforcement officers in ordinary course of his duties. 
Mockaitis v Harcleroad (1997, CA9 Or) 104 F3d 1522, 97 CDOS 602, 97 Daily Journal DAR 957. 
Taping of police department's line, which had initially been left untapped to allow for person calls, came within statutory 
exclusion under 18 USCS § 2510(5}(a}(ii} for eavesdropping by investigative or law enforcement officer in ordinary course 
of his duties, notwithstanding claim by employees of police department that express notice was required; decision to tap 
was precipitated by an official use of line which showed that it had been a mistake to leave it untapped. Amati v City of 
Woodstock (1999, CA7 III) 176 F3d 952, 15 BNA IER Cas 1, 43 FR Serv 3d 351, cert den (1999) 528 US 985, 145 LEd 2d 
362, 120 S Ct 445, 16 BNA IER Cas 736 and (criticized in Adams v City of Battle Creek (2001, CA6 Mich) 250 F3d 980, 
2001 FED App 157P). 
County's recording of telephone calls made by state judges from their offices in county's detention center was not excused 
by law enforcement exception, 18 USCS § 2510(5}(a)(ii), since county did not record judges' conversations in ordinary 
course of its law enforcement duties, and Title III provides no basis for a good faith addition to exception; county did not 
have policy of monitoring judges' calls, and contended it recorded judges only by mistake, individuals responsible for 
installation and maintenance of recording system testified that they knew it was wrong to record judges, and county has 
not suggested any valid, law-enforcement related reason to record judges. Abraham v County of Greenville (2001, CA4 
SC) 237 F3d 386. 
Police department's use of duplicate or "clone" pager to tap police officer's pager without a warrant or notice because 
department erroneously thought that officer was assisting drug dealers was not in ordinary course of police department's 
business under 18 USCS § 2510(5). Adams v City of Battle Creek (2001, CA6 Mich) 250 F3d 980, 2001 FED App 157P, reh 
den (2001, CA6) 2001 US App LEXIS 16099 and (criticized in Anderson v City of Columbus (2005, MD Ga) 374 F Supp 2d 
1240). 
Title III did not proscribe disclosure to prisoner of recordings of prisoner's telephone calls to his attorney, which prisoner 
knew were monitored and recorded pursuant to a policy of Bureau of Prisons, since these recordings were not product of 
an interception because they were obtained by prison authorities in ordinary course of their duties pursuant to 18 USCS § 
2510(5)(a)(ii}. Smith v DOJ (2001, App DC) 346 US App DC 232, 251 F3d 1047. 
Telephone monitoring of prisoners' personal calls is permissible under 18 USCS § 2510(5)(a)(ij) when undertaken in 
ordinary course of prison officials' duties. Crooker v U. S. Dep't of Justice (1980, DC Conn) 497 F Supp 500 (criticized in 
United States v Rivera (2003, ED Va) 292 F Supp 2d 838) and (criticized in United States v Faulkner (2004, DC Kan) 323 
F Supp 2d 1111), 
Routine and random monitoring of inmate's personal telephone calls by prison officials is in ordinary course of prison 
officials' duties and thus is permissible under 18 USCS § 2510(5)(a)(ii) which excludes from proscriptions of § 2510 
interception of communications over equipment used by investigative or law enforcement officer in ordinary course of his 
duties. Crooker v U. S. Dep't of Justice (1980, DC Conn) 497 F Supp 500 (criticized in United States v Rivera (2003, ED 
Va) 292 F SUPD 2d 838) and (criticized in United States v Faulkner (2004, DC Kan) 323 F Supp 2d 1111). 
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Equipment used 1.0 rec:ord conversalion falis within 18 uses § 2510(5)(a) where reasons for installation and general use 
of equipment was to improve police emergency and investigative services and routine recording of all calls made on 
investigative line was thus for reasons well within proper scope of law enforcement; police chiefs decision to listen to 
particular tape, based on reasonable suspicions that police regulations, particularly those concerning private use of phones 
in conduct unbecoming officer, were being violated is justified by proper law enforcement purpose. Jandak v Brookfield 
(1981, ND TIl) 520 F SUDD 815. 
Tape recordings of inmates prison telephone conversations are not suppressible as illegally obtained where inmates, 
charged with aiding and abetting drug kingpin, had telephone conversations monitored and recorded by correctional 
officers as part of standard prison procedure because prison officers are investigative or law enforcement officers acting 
pursuant to thoroughly institutionalized ongoing policy at prison of randomly monitoring and comprehensively recording 
calls for purpose of maintaining prison security and thus are under 18 USCS § 2510 (5)(a)(ii). United States v Vasta 
(1986, SD NY) 649 F SURD 974, 
Tape recordings of telephone conversations between prison inmates and others by prison employees are exempt under 18 
USCS § 2510(5)(a)(ii) from prohibitions on electronic eavesdropping under 18 USCS § 2511, in motion to suppress use of 
recordings in criminal trial for introduction of marijuana into federal penitentiary, where (1) Bureau of Prisons regulations 
empower employees to conduct investigations relating to prison security and allow monitoring of inmates' telephone 
conversations and (2) sign was posted by each prison telephone notifying inmates that conversations might be monitored, 
because employees are "investigative officers" under § 2510(7) and recordings were made in ordinary course of 
employees' duties. United States v Clark (1986, MD Pal 651 F SURD 76, affd without op (1988, CA3 Pa) 857 F2d 1464 and 
affd without op (1988, CA3 Pa) 857 F2d 1464 and affd without op (1988, CA3 Pa) 857 F2d 1466 and affd without op 
(1988, CA3 Pa) 857 F2d 1466 and affd without op (1988, CA3 Pa) 857 F2d 1466 and affd without op (1988, CA3 Pa) 857 
F2d 1466 and affd without op (1988, CA3 Pa) 857 F2d 1466 and affd without op (1988, CA3 Pa) 857 F2d 1466 and affd 
without op (1989, CA3 Pa) 869 F2d 592, cert den (1989) 490 US 1073,104 LEd 2d 646, 109 S Ct 2082 and affd without 
op (1989, CA3 Pa) 872 F2d 414 and affd without op (1989, CA3 Pa) 872 F2d 412. 
Detained criminal defendant's Title III (18 USCS §§ 2510 et seq.) claim must fail, even though prison officials intercepted 
and disclosed virtually all of defendant's telephone conversations in prison, because interception was proper either (1) 
under § 2510(5)(a)(ii) exception for investigative or law enforcement officer in ordinary course of his duties, or (2) under 
§ 2511(2)(c) exception where inmate used prison telephone after being advised it was subject to monitoring. United States 
v Noriega (1991, SD Fla) 764 F SURD 1480. 
Prison intercepts of telephone conversations between inmate and his sister need not be suppressed, where interception 
and recording of calls occurred in conformity with pre-established institutional plan not specifically aimed at siblings, 
because prison officials are "investigative or law enforcement officers" and routine monitoring pursuant to established 
policy is "in ordinary course of their duties" within meaning of 18 USCS § 2510(5)(a)(ii) exemption from § 2511 blanket 
prohibition of interception of wire communications. United States v Cheely (1992, DC Alaska) 814 F SURR 1430 (criticized 
in United States v Rivera (2003, ED Va) 292 F SURR 2d 838) and (criticized in United States v Faulkner (2004, DC Kan) 
323 F SURR 2d 1111). 
Inmates' challenge to interception of calls originating from inmate telep~one system at privately run detention facility will 
not be denied summarily, where nothing in state or federal law or contracts under which facility operates empowers 
private security guards to conduct investigations of or make arrests for offenses enumerated in 18 USCS § 2516, because 
employees intercepting inmate calls are not "investigative or law enforcement officers" for purposes of § 2510(5)(a)(ii). 
Huguenin v Ponte (1998, DC RI) 29 F SUDD 2d 57. 
Defendant's motion for suppression of his recorded telephone calls from prison is denied, where calls fall under both law 
enforcement and consent exceptions to Title III (18 USCS §§ 2510 et seq,), because his counsel's argument that 
exceptions do not permit FBI's use of such recordings lacks any support from statutes or case law. United States v' 
Hammond (2001, DC Md) 148 F SURD 2d 589, affd (2002, CM Md) 286 F3d 189, cert den (2002) 537 US 900, 154 L Ed 2d 
172, 123 S Ct 215. 
Telephone companies that contracted with prison and were supervised by county were considered "law enforcement" under 
law enforcement exception to wiretap statute, specifically 18 USCS § 2510(a)(ii); thus, recordings of defendant prisoner's 
telephone conversations were not suppressed. United States v Rivera (2003, ED Va) 292 F SURD 2d 838 (criticized in 
United States v Faulkner (2004, DC Kan) 323 F SUDR 2d 1111) and subsequent app (2005, CA4 Va) 412 F3d 562,67 Fed 
Rules Evid Serv 683, cert den (2005) 546 US 1023, 126 S Ct 670, 163 LEd 2d 540 and post-conviction relief den (2007, 
ED Va) 494 F SURR 2d 383, app dismd, Certificate of appealability denied (2008, CA4 Va) 2008 US ADR LEXIS 3804. 
Despite broad prohibition of Title III of Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968's, 18 USCS §§ 2510-2520, 
government may intercept telephone communications without prior judicial authorization in two contexts: (1) when 
conversation is intercepted by investigative law enforcement officer in ordinary course of his duties, 18 USCS § 2510(5) 
.@lUll; and (2) when one of parties to communication has given prior consent to such interception, 18 USCS § 251H2)(c). 
United States v Rivera (2003, ED Va) 292 F SURR 2d 838 (criticized in United States v Faulkner (2004, DC Kan) 323 F 
SURR 2d 1111) and subsequent app (2005, CA4 Va) 412 F3d 562, 67 Fed Rules Evid Serv 683, cert den (2005) 546 US 
1023,126 S Ct 670, 163 LEd 2d 540 and post-conviction relief den (2007, ED Va) 494 F SURR 2d 383, app dismd, 
Certificate of appealability denied (2008, CA4 Va) 2008 US ARR LEX IS 3804. 
Where at least some of parties to conversations recorded by prison officials impliedly consented to monitoring and 
recording, defendant's motion to suppress was denied because Federal Wiretapping Act, specifically 18 USCS § 2511(c) and 
(d) PB1~.ifE;fi 1N~oo.~~}Pf~qnA>'TEa~ who worked for privately owned facility did not qualify for law 
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enforcement exception in 18 uses § 2510(7). United States v Faulkner (2004, DC Kan) 323 F SUPD 2d 1111, affd (2006, 
CAlO Kan) 439 F3d 1221, 69 Fed Rules Evid Serv 679. 
Village comptroller's daims that village mayor and police chief violated 18 uses § 2511(1)(a) by recording telephone calls 
on finance department's lines survived summary judgment in part; law enforcement exception, 18 uses § 2510(5)(a)(ii), 
did not apply because recording, which was allegedly initiated to check on asserted employee misbehavior or to investigate 
threats against employees, was either unrelated to law enforcement or targeted in nature; however, consent exception 
under 18 USCS § 2511(2)(c) applied to calls recorded after comptroller became aware of recording. Narducci v ViII. of 
Bellwood (2006, ND III) 444 F SURD 2d 924. 
Unpublished Opinions 
Unpublished: In state prisoner's action under 42 USCS § 1983 and 18 USCS §§ 2510 et seq. in which prisoner alleged that 
defendants monitored outgoing calls made from his prison phone account to home of another inmate suspected of 
smuggling drugs, district court did not abuse its discretion in denying prisoner's motion for additional discovery under Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 56(0 because prisoner did not indicate how continuance would have allowed him to produce evidence showing 
that defendants were not law enforcement officers using monitoring equipment in ordinary course of their duties; law 
enforcement exception of 18 USCS § 2510(5)(a) applies to prison's policy of routine taping of outgoing inmate calls. 
Rhodes v Alameda County Sheriff Dep't (2006, CA9 Cal) 207 Fed APDX 781. 
-;; 25. Aggrieved person 
Defendant in whose residence was located telephone which was object of intercept, was "aggrieved person" as defined in 
18 uses § 2510(11); defendant who was principal figure in narcotics conspiracy and who used as headquarters residence 
which was occupied by paramour was "aggrieved person" as defined in 18 uses § 2510(11) and had leave to raise 
question of legitimacy of surveillance of headquarters under 18 USCS § 2518(10). United States v Bynum (1973, CA2 NY) 
475 F2d 832. 
"Aggrieved person" under 18 USCS § 2510(11) does not indude one who is not implicated and against whom no one has 
made proffer of information derived from defectively authorized tap. United States v Gibson (1974, CA4 Va) 500 F2d 854, 
cert den (l975) 419 US 1106,42 LEd 2d 802,95 S Ct 777. 
Defendants who moved to suppress evidence seized as result of second wiretap based on first illegal wiretaps were not 
"aggrieved persons" within meaning of 18 USCS § 2510(11) where issue was moot as to named party in second tap whose 
conversations had been overheard because he died prior to suppression hearing, and as to remaining defendants, there 
were no allusions to their identity or conduct in conversations intercepted on first tap. United States v Scasino (1975, CAS 
Fla) 513 F2d 47. 
Defendants who did not partiCipate in conversations overheard upon extension of initial wiretap authorization and having 
no interest in premises where phone was tapped, were not aggrieved persons within meaning of 18 USCS §§ 2510(11), 
2518(10)(a) and had no standing to contest admission of evidence at trial. United States v Bynum {1975, CA2) 513 F2d 
533, cert den (1975) 423 US 952, 46 LEd 2d 277, 96 S Ct 357. 
Witness who does not show he was party to intercepted wire or oral communication or person against whom interception 
was directed is not aggrieved person under 18 USCS § 2510(11) and has no standing to raise daim of illegal surveillance 
under 18 USCS § 2518. In re Berry (1975, CAlO NM) 521 F2d 179, cert den (1975) 423 US 928,46 LEd 2d 256, 96 S Ct 
276, reh den (1975) 423 US 1039,46 LEd 2d 414,96 S Ct 577. 
Aggrieved person under 18 USCS § 2510(11) is one who has had his conversations intercepted during wiretap, or is 
person against whom Wiretap is directed. United States v Fury (1977, CA2 NY) 554 F2d 522, cert den (1977) 433 US 910, 
53 L Ed 2d 1095.97 S Ct 2978 and cert den (1978) 436 US 931, 56 LEd 2d 776, 98 S Ct 2831. 
Under 18 USCS § 2510(11), "aggrieved person" relates to standing to object to unauthorized electronic surveillance, but it 
does not expressly encompass standing to object to allegedly unauthorized entries to place or recharge bugs; only one 
present at seizure or with recognized interest, either possessory or proprietary, in premises, can daim required 
expectation of privacy needed to object to such illegal entries. United States v Scafidi (1977, CA2 NY) 564 F2d 633. cert 
den (1978) 436 US 903, 56 LEd 2d 400,98 S Ct 2231 and cert den (1978) 436 US 903, 56 LEd 2d 401, 98 S Ct 2231 
and cert den (1978) 436 US 903, 56 LEd 2d 401, 98 S Ct 2231 and cert den (1978) 436 US 912, 56 LEd 2d 413, 98 S Ct 
2252, reh den (1978) 439 US 960, 58 LEd 2d 353, 99 S Ct 366. 
Defendant had no standing to obtain information received as result of wiretaps since he was not "aggrieved person" within 
meaning of 18 USCS § 2510(11). United States v Cruz (1979, CAl Mass) 594 F2d 268, cert den (1979) 444 US 898, 62 L 
Ed 2d 133, 100 S Ct 205, reh den (1979) 444 US 946,62 LEd 2d 315, 100 S Ct 308. 
Person may not object to agent's answering telephone at house in violation of 18 USCS §§ 2510 et seq. where person does 
not have such ownership or control over house as to give him standing for such objection. United States v Vadino (1982. 
CAll Fla) 680 F2d 1329, 11 Fed Rules Evid Serv 221, reh den (1982, CAll Fla) 691 F2d 977 and cert den (1983) 460 US 
1082,76 LEd 2d 344,103 S Ct 1771. 
Witness in criminal prosecution, even one who has been granted immunity, whose identity was first discovered by 
gover~PYJ.w~pfpOR"fuOF~Mmieved person" with standing under 18 USCS § 2518(10)(a), in effect, to 
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suppress his own testimony by objecting to questions posed to him by government, which questions are based directly or 
indirectly on unlawful wiretap. United States v Cohen (1973, SD Ny) 358 F SUDD 112. 
Term "aggrieved party" is to be construed in accordance with existing standing rules in order to invoke Fourth Amendment 
for suppression motion. Haina v State (1976) 30 Md ADD 295,352 A2d 874, cert den (1977) 430 US 906, 51 LEd 2d 582, 
97 S Ct 1175, 
Term "aggrieved person" should be interpreted identically under both 18 USCS § 2510 and under 50 USCS § 1801; 
therefore, if person lacks standing under § 2510, he also lacks standing under § 1801; only persons with standing to 
suppress fruits of illegal wiretap are parties at whom Wiretaps were directed, parties to call that was intercepted, or parties 
owning premises where conversations were intercepted. In re Flanagan (1982, ED NY) 533 F SURR 957,10 Fed Rules Evid 
Serv 764, revd on other grounds (1982, CA2 NY) 691 F2d 116, 11 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1215. 
"Aggrieved person" must be party to communications which government seeks to use at trial or be able to assert that 
conversations took place on his premises; only defendants overheard in earlier interception are "aggrieved persons" 
entitled to assert that later interception was tainted by earlier one. United States v Torres (1984, ND III) 583 F SURR 86, 
revd on other grounds, remanded (1984, CA7 III) 751 F2d 875, cert den (1985) 470 US 1087,85 L Ed 2d 150, 105 S Ct 
1853. 
Only person who' has standing to challenge admissibility of wiretap is person aggrieved by interception. United States v 
Cresta (1984, DC Me) 592 F SURR 889. 
Minimization claim, whether based upon 18 USCS § 2518 or intercept order itself, may be raised only by one with privacy 
interest in place of surveillance, and being aggrieved person does not confer standing, by itself, to raise challenge based on 
minimization. United States v Massino (1985, SD Ny) 605 F SUDR 1565, revd on other grounds (1986, CA2 NY) 784 F2d 
153. 
Minimization challenge to electronic surveillance evidence fails for lack of standing, even though suppression movants are 
"aggrieved persons" within meaning of 18 USCS § 2510(11), because movants whose conversations were intercepted 
during surveillance of another person's home and telephones had no privacy interest that was invaded. United States v 
Squittieri (1988, DC NJ) 688 F SURR 163, affd without op (1989, CA3 NJ) 879 F2d 859 and affd without op (1989, CA3 NJ) 
879 F2d 859 and affd without op (1989, CA3 NJ) 879 F2d 861. cert den (1989) 493 US 954, 107 L Ed 2d 352, 110 S Ct 
366 and affd without op (1989, CA3 NJ) 879 F2d 861 and affd without op (1992, CA3 NJ) 961 F2d 210. 
Claims by those defendants who were not captured on recordings of intercepted telephone calls, of being "implicated" by 
evidence, did not give rise to standing, and thus, those defendants' motion to suppress recordings under 18 USCS § 
2518(10)(a) was denied. United States v Eiland (2005, DC Dist Col) 398 F SURR 2d 160. 
Unpublished Opinions 
Unpublished: Defendant lacked standing under 18 USCS § 2510(11) to challenge admission of Wiretapping evidence where 
defendant was not party to any intercepted communication and was not person against whom any interception was 
directed; evidence was directed only against defendant's alleged co-conspirators. United States v Weaver (2007, CA3 Pal 
220 Fed ARDX 88. cert den (2007, US) 128 S Ct 408, 169 LEd 2d 286. 
-;; 26. Judge of competent jurisdiction 
District court may not delegate review of Title III orders to magistrate judges; magistrate judge is not "judge of competent 
jurisdiction" under 18 USCS § 2510(9) authorized to issue wiretapping order. In re United States (1993, CA2 NY) 10 F3d 
931, cert den (1994) 513 US 812,130 L Ed 2d 21. 115 S Ct 64. 
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TITLE 18. CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
PART 1. CRIMES 
CHAPTER 121. STORED WIRE AND ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS AND 
TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS 
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18 USCS § 2703 
~ NITA Commentary: 
Review expert commentary from The National Institute for Trial Advocacy preceding 18 
USCS § 2701 (relating to computer records). 
§ 2703. Required disclosure of customer communications or records 
(a) Contents of wire or electronic communications in electronic storage. A governmental 
entity may require the disclosure by a provider of electronic communication service of 
the contents of a wire or electronic communication, that is in electronic storage in an 
electronic communications system for one hundred and eighty days or less, only 
pursuant to a warrant issued using the procedures described in the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure by a court with jurisdiction over the offense under investigation or 
equivalent State warrant. A governmental entity may require the disclosure by a 
provider of electronic communications services of the contents of a wire or electronic 
communication that has been in electronic storage in an electronic communications 
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Federal Procedure: 
> 27 Moore's federal Practice 
(Matthew Bender 3d ed) ch 641. 
Search and Seizure § 641.121. 
Criminal Law and Practice: 
> 1 Criminal Defense Techniques 
(Matthew Bender), ch 5, Electronic 
Surveillance Under Federal Law § § 
5.11,5.13. 
> 4 Criminal Defense Techniques 
(Matthew Bender), ch 84. Computer 
Crime §§ 84.02, 84.06. 
Texts: 
> Homeland Security Deskbook 
(Matthew Bender). ch 6, 
Communications and Cyber Security 
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> Homeland Security Deskbook 
(Matthew Bender) ch 12, 
Cooperatlon,With Law Enforcement 
Agencies § 12.09. 
> 3 The Law of Advertising (M aMew 
Bender), ch 53, Cable Television 
Advertising § 53.04. 
system for more than one hundred and eighty days by the means available under subsection (b) of this section. 
(b) Contents of wire or electronic communications in a remote computing service. 
(1) A governmental entity may require a provider of remote computing service to disclose the contents of any wire or 
electronic communication to which this paragraph is made applicable by paragraph (2) of this subsection--
(A) without required notice to the subscriber or customer, if the governmental entity obtains a warrant issued using 
the procedures described in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by a court with jurisdiction over the offense under 
investigation or equivalent State warrant; or 
(B) with prior notice from the governmental entity to the subscriber or customer if the governmental entity--
(i) uses an administrative subpoena authorized by a Federal or State statute or a Federal or State grand jury or trial 
subpoena; or 
(ii) obtains a court order for such disclosure under subsection (d) of this section; 
except that delayed notice may be given pursuant to section 2705 of this title [18 USCS § 2705]. 
(2) Paragraph (1) is applicable with respect to any wire or electronic communication that is held or maintained on that 
service--
(A) on behalf of, and received by means of electronic transmission from (or created by means of computer processing 
of communications received by means of electronic transmission from), a subscriber or customer of such remote computing 
service; and 
(B) solely for the purpose of providing storage or computer processing services to such subscriber or customer, if the 
provider is not authorized to access the contents of any such communications for purposes of providing any services other 
than storage or computer processing. 
(c) R~FP'l]'~n~c~:rrrco~~ervice or remote computing service. 
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(1) A governmental entity may require a provider of electronic communication service or remote computing service to 
disclose a record or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such service (not including the contents 
of communications) only when the governmental entity--
(A) obtains a warrant issued using the procedures described in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by a court with 
jurisdiction over the offense under investigation or equivalent State warrant; 
(B) obtains a court order for such disclosure under subsection (d) of this section; 
(C) has the consent of the subscriber or customer to such disclosure; 
(D) submits a formal written request relevant to a law enforcement investigation concerning telemarketing fraud for 
the name, address, and place of business of a subscriber or customer of such provider, which subscriber or customer is 
engaged in telemarketing (as such term is defined in section 2325 of this title [18 USCS § 23251); or 
(E) seeks information under paragraph (2). 




(C) local and long distance telephone connection records, or records of session times and durations; 
(D) length of service (including start date) and types of service utilized; 
(E) telephone or instrument number or other subscriber number or identity, including any temporarily assigned 
network address; and 
(F) means and source of payment for such service (including any credit card or bank account number), 
of a subscriber to or customer of such service when the governmental entity uses an administrative subpoena authorized 
by a Federal or State statute or a Federal or State grand jury or trial subpoena or any means available under paragraph 
(1). 
(3) A governmental entity receiving records or information under this subsection is not required to provide notice to a 
subscriber or customer. 
(d) Requirements for court order. A court order for disclosure under subsection (b) or (c) may be issued by any court that 
is a court of competent jurisdiction and shall issue only if the governmental entity offers spedfic and articulable facts 
showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the 
records or other information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation. In the case of a State 
governmental authority, such a court order shall not issue if prohibited by the law of such State. A court issuing an order 
pursuant to this section, on a motion made promptly by the service provider, may quash or modify such order, if the 
information or records requested are unusually voluminous in nature or compliance with such order otherwise would cause 
an undue burden on such provider. 
(e) No cause of action against a provider disclosing information under this chapter. No cause of action shall lie in any court 
against any provider of wire or electronic communication service, its officers, employees, agents, or other spedfied persons 
for providing information, faCilities, or assistance in accordance with the terms of a court order, warrant, subpoena, 
statutory authorization, or certification under this chapter [18 USCS §§ 2701 et seq.]. 
(f) Requirement to preserve evidence. 
(1) In general. A provider of wire or electronic communication services or a remote computing service, upon the request 
of a governmental entity, shall take all necessary steps to preserve records and other evidence in its possession pending 
the issuance of a court order or other process. 
(2) Period of retention. Records referred to in paragraph (1) shall be retained for a period of 90 days, which shall be 
extended for an additional 90-day period upon a renewed request by the governmental entity. 
(g) Presence of officer not required. Notwithstanding section 3105 of this title [18 USCS § 3105), the presence of an 
officer shall not be required for service or execution of a search warrant issued in accordance with this chapter [18 USCS 
§§ 2701 et seq.] requiring disclosure by a provider of electronic communications service or remote computing service of 
the contents of communications or records or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such service. 
'+ History: 
(Added Oct. 21, 1986, P.L. 99-508, Title II, § 201(a), 100 Stat. 1861; Nov. 18, 1988, P.L. 100-690, Title VII, Subtitle B, 
§§ 7038, 7039, 102 Stat. 4399; Sept. 13,1994, P.L. 103-322, Title XXXIII, § 330003(b), 108 Stat. 2140; Oct. 25, 1994, 
P.L. 103-414, Title II, § 207(a), 108 Stat. 4292; April 24, 1996, P.L. 104-132, Title VIII, Subtitle A, § 804, 110 Stat. 
1305; Oct. 11, 1996, P.L. 104-293, Title VI, § 601(b), 110 Stat. 3469; Oct. 11,1996, P.L. 104-294, Title VI, § 605(f), 110 
Stat. 3510; June 23, 1998, P.L. 105-184, § 8, 112 Stat. 522; Oct. 26,2001, P.L. 107-56, Title II, §§ 209(2), 210, 
212(b)(1), 220(a)(1), 220(b), 115 Stat. 283, 285, 291, 292; Nov. 2,2002, P.L. 107-273, Div B, Title IV, § 4005(a)(2), 
Div C, Title I, Subtitle A, § 11010, 116 Stat. 1812, 1822; Nov. 25, 2002, P.L. 107-296, Title II, Subtitle C, § 225(h)(1), 
116 Stat. 2158; Jan. 5,2006, P.L. 109-162, Title XI, Subtitle C, § 1171(a)(1), 119 Stat. 3123.) 
'+ Historyj Ancillary Laws and Directives: 
.±. 1. Effective date of section 
.±. 2. Amendments 
.± 3. Other provisions 
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7{' 1. Effective date of section: 
This section became effective 90 days after enactment, pursuant to § 202 of Act Oct. 21, 1986, P.L 99-508, which 
appears as 18 uses § 2701 note. 
'+ 2. Amendments: 
1988. Act Nov. 18, 1988, in subsecs. (b)(l)(B)(i) and (c)(l)(B)(i), inserted "or trial"; and in subsec. (d), inserted "may be 
issued by any court that is a court of competent jurisdiction set forth in section 3126(2)(A) of this title and". 
1994. Act Sept. 13, 1994, in subsec. (d), SUbstituted "section 3127(2)(A)" for "section 3126(2)(A)". 
Act Oct. 25, 1994, in subsec. (c)(l), in subpara. (B), deleted cI. (i), which read: "uses an administrative subpoena 
authorized by a Federal or State statute, or a Federal or State grand jury or trial subpoena;", and redesignated cis. (ii)-(iv) 
as cis. (i)-(iii), respectively, and added subpara. (C); and, in subsec. (d), substituted "A court order for disclosure under 
subsection (b) or (c) may be issued by any court that is a court of competent jurisdiction described in section 3126(2)(A) 
and shall issue only if the governmental entity offers spedfic and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable 
grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other information sought, are 
relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation." for "A court order for disclosure under subsection (b) or (c) of 
this section may be issued by any court that is a court of competent jurisdiction set forth in section 3127(2)(A) of this title 
and shall issue only if the governmental entity shows that there is reason to believe the contents of a wire or electronic 
communication, or the records or other information sought, are relevant to a legitimate law enforcement inquiry.". 
1996. Act April 24, 1996 added subsec. (f). 
Act Oct. 11, 1996, P.L 104-293, in subsec. (c)(l)(C), inserted "local and long distance". 
Act Oct. 11, 1996, P.L 104-294, in subsec. (d), substituted "3127(2)(A)" for "3126(2)(A)". 
1998. Act June 23, 1998, in subsec. (c)(l)(B), in cI. (ii), deleted "or" after the concluding semicolon, in cI. (iii), substituted 
"; or" for a concluding period, and added cI. (iv). 
2001. Act Oct. 26, 2001, substituted the section heading for one which read "§ 2703. Requirements for governmental 
access"; in subsec. (a), in the heading, substituted "Contents of wire or electronic" for "Contents of electronic" and, in the 
text, substituted "contents of a wire or electronic" for "contents of an electronic" in two places, substituted "using the 
procedures described in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by a court with jurisdiction over the offense under 
investigation" for "under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure"; in subsec. (b), in the heading, substituted "Contents of 
wire or electronic" for "Contents of electronic", in para. (1), in the introductory matter, substituted "any wire or electronic" 
for "any electronic", in subpara. (A), substituted "using the procedures described in the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure by a court with jurisdiction over the offense under investigation" for "under the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure" and, in para. (2), in the introductory matter, substituted "any wire or electronic" for "any electronic"; in subsec. 
(c), in para. (1), substituted "A governmental entity may require a provider of electronic communication service or remote 
computing service to" for "(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), a provider of electronic communication service or 
remote computing service may", and deleted "covered by subsection (a) or (b) of this section) to any person other than a 
governmental entity. 
"(B) A provider of electronic communication service or remote computing service shall disclose a record or other 
information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such service (not including the contents of communications 
covered by subsection (a) or (b) of this section) to a governmental entity" 
following "communications" I redesignated subpara. (C) as para. (2), redeSignated former para. (2) as para. (3), and, in 
para. (2) as redesignated, redesignated cis. (i)-(iv) as subparas. (A)-(D), respectively, in subpara. (A) as redesignated, 
substituted "using the procedures described in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by a court with jurisdiction over the 
offense under investigation" for "under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure", in subpara. (D) as redeSignated, 
substituted "; or" for a concluding period, and added subpara. (E), and, in the concluding matter, substituted "paragraph 
(1)" for "subparagraph (B)"; and, in subsec. (d), deleted "described in section 3127(2)(A)" following "jurisdiction". 
Such Act further, in subsec. (c)(2) as redesignated, substituted "entity the--", subparas. (A)-(F), and "of a subscriber" for 
"entity the name, address, local and long distance telephone toll billing records, telephone number or other subscriber 
number or identity, and length of service of a subscriber", and, in the concluding matter, deleted "and the types of services 
the subscriber or customer utilized," following "service". 
2002. Act Nov. 2, 2002, in subsec. (c)(l)(E), made a technical correction which did not affect the text; and added subsec. 
(g). 
Act Nov. 25, 2002 (effective 60 days after enactment, as provided by § 4 of such Act, which appears as 6 USCS § 101 
note), in subsec. (e), inserted ", statutory authorization". 
2006. Act Jan. 5, 2006, in subsec. (c)(l)(C), deleted "or" following the concluding semicolon. 
-:;. 3. Other provisions: 
APE,llc!"tion of section. For 'SQlication of this section, see Act Oct. 21, 1986, P.L 99-508, Title II, § 202, 100 Stat. 
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± 2. Applicability 
± 3. Relationship with other laws 
± 4. Construction 
± 5. Constitutionality 
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± 6. Grand jury subpoena 
± 7. Probable cause standard 
± S. Specific and articulable facts standard 
± 9. Prima facie claim 
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± 11. Cell phone tracking requests 
± 12. Violation established 
± 13. Violation not established 
LIN GENERAL 
:; 1. Generally 
While warrants for electronic data are often served like subpoenas (via fax), Congress called them warrants and Congress 
intended them to be treated as warrants, under lS USCS § 2703(b)(1)(A). United States v Bach (2002, CAS Minn) 310 
F3d 1063, reh den, reh",$p banc, den l2003,y..bASj 2003 US ApD LEXIS 141 and cert den (2003) 53S US 993, 123 S Ct 
lS17.BIMEEdlNl8iU.tat'i~~r:bIpj\~o:t), CAS Minn) 400 F3d 622, reh den (2005, CAS) 2005 US APD LEXIS 
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7041 and cert den (2005) 546 US 901. 126 S Ct 243, 163 L Ed 2d 223. 
Under Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986r 18 USCS §§ 2701 et seq'r even if Internet service provider (ISP) 
acts without lawful authority in disclosing informationr this does not absolve government from unlawfully requesting or 
soliciting ISP's disclosure; violation by one does not excuse other. Freedman v Am. Online, Inc. (2004, DC Conn) 303 F 
SURD 2d 121. 
With respect to telecommunications provider that provided records to government without court order when government 
was investigating kidnappingr 18 USCS § 2703(d) did not authorize court to issue order sought by u.s. Attorney that 
would somehow validate retroactively disclosure of records to government. In re United States (2005, DC Mass) 352 F 
SURR 2d 45. 
18 USCS § 2703 does not authorize court to enter prospective order to turn over data as it is captured insteadr statute 
establishes mechanism for compelling disclosure of information existing at time order is issued and for compelling 
preservation of such information in period before such order is obtained. In re United States for an Order Authorizing the 
Use of a Pen Register (2005, ED NY) 396 F SURD 2d 294, 15 ALR Fed 2d 803 (criticized in In re United States for Order for 
Disdosure of Telecommunications Records (2005, SO NY) 405 F SUDD 2d 435) and (criticized in In re United States for 
Order for Prosoective Cell Site Location Info. (2006, SD NY) 460 F SURD 2d 448) and (criticized in In re United States 
Orders pursuant to 18 U.s.c. 2703(d) (2007 r DC Mass) 509 F SUDR 2d 64) and (criticized in In re United States for an 
Order: Authorizing the Installation & Use of a Pen Register & TraD & Trace Device (2007, SD Tex) 2007 US Dist LEXIS 
77635). 
Order under 18 USCS § 2703 can only authorize provider's disclosure of information, not interception by law enforcement. 
In re United States for an Order Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register (2005, ED NY) 396 F SUDR 2d 294, 15 ALR Fed 2d 
803 (criticized in In re United States for Order for Disclosure of Telecommunications Records (2005. SD NY) 405 F Supp 2d 
435) and (criticized in In re United States for Order for Prosoective Cell Site Location Info. (2006, SD NY) 460 F SURR 2d 
448) and (criticized in In re United States Orders pursuant to 18 U.s.C. 2703(d) (2007, DC Mass) 509 F SURD 2d 64) and 
(criticized in In re United States for an Order: Authorizing the Installation & Use of a Pen Register & Trap & Trace Device 
(2007. SD Tex) 2007 US Dist LEXIS 77635). 
Nothing in 18 USCS § 3117(b) definition of mobile tracking device places limitation on "records or other information" 
obtainable pursuant to 18 USCS § 2703(d) order. In re United States Orders pursuant to 18 U.s.c. 2703(d) (2007, DC 
Mass) 509 F SURR 2d 76 (criticized in In re United States for an Order Directing Provider of Elec. Commun. Servo to 
Disclose Records to the Gov't (2008, WD Pal 534 F SURP 2d 585). 
Stored Communications Act, 18 USCS §§ 2701 et seq., did not require federal prosecutors and law enforcement agents to 
provide plaintiff with notice of search warrants; 18 USCS § 2703(b)(1)(A) required notice only if government elected to 
obtain information via subpoena. Bansal v Russ (2007, ED Pal 513 F SURP 2d 264. 
Servicemember could not have reasonable expectation of privacy in registration information he gave to Internet service 
provider when 18 uses § 2703(c)(I)(A) did not preclude Internet service provider from disclosing information to 
non-government third parties. United States v Ohnesorge (2005, NMCCA) 60 MJ 946, 2005 CCA LEXIS 51. 
"+ 2. Applicability 
18 USCS § 2703(c), which states that provider of electronic communication service may only give subscriber information if 
government has warrant, applies to service provider and not government. Guest v Leis (2001. CA6 Ohio) 255 F3d 325, 
2001 FED App 206P. 
"+ 3. Relationship with other laws 
When governmental entity invokes Wis. Stat. § 968.135 or any equivalent route to compel telephone company to produce 
terminating automated message accounting report, it has obtained information under 18 USCS § 2703. Ameritech Corp. v 
McCann (2005, CA7 Wis) 403 F3d 908, reh denr reh r en banc, den (2005, CA7 Wis) 2005 US ApR LEXIS 8563. 
Government application is granted for disclosure of narrowly speCified information about certain customers of Internet 
services provider, which is also cable operatorr but ultimate reconciliation of statutory conflict between required disclosures 
under 18 USCS § 2703(d) and privacy protections of 47 uses § 551 is left for another day, because issue of statutory 
conflict is not presented in ripe, sharpened manner since customer information has not yet been disclosed and no claims 
have been made against company pursuant to § 551(f). In re United States for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.s.c. 2703(d) 
(1999, DC Mass) 36 F SURR 2d 430. 
Challenge to order, requiring cable internet service provider to provide government with subscriber's name r home address, 
telephone number, e-mail address, and other identifying information without disclosing investigation to subscriber, must 
fail, where latest definition of "other service" specifically makes 47 USCS § 55Hh)(2) requirement of disclosure to cable 
subscribers inapplicable to recipients of cable internet service, because only statute applicable here is 18 USCS § 2703(d), 
requiring release of subscriber records for ongoing criminal investigation. In re United States (2001, SD NY) 157 F SURR 2d 
286. 
Plain~eIJl1f JShl1?E:Cli.:f76Wa£j[Amx)ressed legislative intent to limit out-of-district authority to cases 
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involving terrorism, and words actually chosen by Congress and codified in Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(b) and 18 USCS §§ 2703. 
2711 did not support government's argument that Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (Patriot Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56,2001 H.R. 3162, 115 Stat. 
272,291 (October 26, 2001) expanded district court authority to issue out-of-district warrants for every conceivable 
non-terrorism crime in prosecutors' arsenal where statutory language of §§ 219 and 220 of Patriot Act was clear and 
unambiguous in limiting district court authority to issue out-of-district warrants to investigations of terrorism; therefore, 
Florida district court had no authority to issue and declined to issue search warrant to seize electronic data maintained by 
"dot-com" in Northern District of California in child pornography investigation. In re Search Warrant (2003, MD Fla) 362 F 
Supp 2d 1298 (criticized in In re Yahoo, Inc .. 701 First Ave .. Sunnvvale, Cal. 94089 (2007, DC Ariz) 2007 US Dist LEXIS 
37601). 
Judges accepting ex parte applications for order authorizing installation and use of pen register and trap-and-trace device 
and authorizing release of subscriber and other information, including cell-site information have focused on explicit text of 
statutes, which states that cell-site information may not be obtained solely pursuant to Pen Register Statute, 47 USCS § 
1002(a)(2); those courts permit government to obtain cell-site information after meeting requirements of both Pen 
Register Statute and 18 USCS § 2703(c)(1), which allows government to obtain customer records from electronic 
communication providers; those courts point out that 18 USCS § 2703 meets purpose of 47 USCS § 1002 exception, to 
require more than minimal authorization imposed under Pen Register Statute, but does not require probable-cause 
showing. In re United States (2006, SD Tex) 433 F Supp 2d 804 (criticized in In re the Application of United States (2006, 
SD Tex) 441 F SUPP 2d 816) and (criticized in In re United States for an Order Directing Provider of Elec. Commun. Servo 
to Disclose Records to the Gov't (2008, WD Pal 534 F Supp 2d 585). 
Pursuant to Pen Register Statute, 18 USCS § 3123, and Stored Communications Act, 18 USCS § 2703, government was 
authorized to use pen register with trap device to obtain prospective cell site location information regarding certain cellular 
telephone without warrant or showing of probable cause. In re United States for Order for Prospective Cell Site Location 
Info. (2006, SD NY) 460 F Supp 2d 448 (criticized in In re United States for an Order Directing Provider of Elec. Commun. 
Servo to Disclose Records to the Gov't (2008. WD Pal 534 F Supp 2d 585). 
In order for 18 USCS § 2703(c) to apply, information requested must pertain to "wire or electronic communications," and 
as defined in 18 USCS § 2510(15), that does not include location information. In re Application of United States (2007, DC 
Puerto Rico) 497 F Supp 2d 301. 
-:; 4. Construction 
Communications company loses argument that it is lawfully required only to produce long-distance cellular telephone 
billing records since local cellular telephone billing records are not "telephone toll billing records" under 18 USCS § 
2703(c)(1)(C), even if some local customers choose to prepay for specified amount of air time and are not assessed 
separate charge for each call, because common-sense plain meaning of phrase includes all billing records that contain 
information which was used or could be used to charge for telephone calls or services. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas (1995, 
WD Mo) 894 F Supp 355. 
Where U.s. sought order to require cell phone company to provide cell site information for criminal suspect, application 
was denied because information could not be obtained pursuant to combination of Pen Register statute, 18 USCS § 3123, 
and Stored Communications Act, 18 USCS § 2703(c), absent warrant issued pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 41, supported by 
probable cause to believe that information sought was itself evidence of crime, not merely relevant to investigation. In re 
Order Authorizing the Release of Prospective Cell Site Info. (2006, DC Dist Col) 407 F Supp 2d 134 (criticized in In re 
United States for Order for Prospective Cell Site Location Info. (2006, SD NY) 460 F Supp 2d 448). 
Stored Communications Act (SCA), 18 USCS § 2703, either alone or in tandem with Pen Registry Statute, 18 USCS § 
3121. or pursuant to Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 47 USCS §§ 1001 et seq., does not 
authorize access to individual's cell-ph one-derived location information, either past or prospective, on simple showing of 
articulable relevance to ongoing investigation (a reasonable relevance standard); SCA expressly sets movement/location 
information, such as that obtained from cellular phones, outside its scope by defining "electronic communications" to 
exclude any communication from tracking device as defined in 18 USCS § 3117. In re United States for Order Directing 
Provider of Elec. Commun. Servo to Disclose Records to Gov't (2008, WD Pal 534 F SUpp 2d 585. 
-:; 5. Constitutionality 
District court's issuance of court order for cell site information under 18 USCS § 2703 and Pen Register Statute was not 
unconstitutional in violation of Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures because 
Government did not seek to install "tracking device," as individual had chosen to carry device (cell phone) and to permit 
transmission of its information to third party, carrier and provision of such information to third party carrier did not 
implicate Fourth Amendment; for purposes of Fourth Amendment, cell site information sought did not provide "virtual 
map" of user's location and did not pinpoint user's location within building, but only identified nearby cell tower. In re 
United States for Order for Disclosure of Telecommunications Records (2005, SD NY) 405 F Supp 2d 435 (criticized in In re 
Application of the United States for an Order for Prospective Cell Site Location Info. on a Certain Cellular Telephone (2006, 
SD NY) 2006 US Dist LEX IS 11747) and (criticized in In re the Application of United States (2006, SD Tex) 441 F SUPD 2d 
816) and (criticized in In re United States for Order for Prospective Cell Site Location Info. (2006, SD NY) 460 F SUDP 2d 
448~nd critidzed in In re United States for an Order Directin Provider of Elec. Commun. Servo to Disclose Records to 
the W EoIN 
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Government's reliance on Stored Communications Act (SCA) was objectively reasonable because there was no indication in 
2003, when applications for SCA orders were filed in case, that statute was unconstitutional, and neutral magistrate judge 
approved government's applications. United States v Ferguson (2007, DC Dist Col) 508 F Supp 2d 7. 
II.ENFORCEMENT 
-:; 6. Grand jury subpoena 
Annunzio-Wylie Act provided bank with immunity for disclosing bank records pursuant to grand jury subpoenas, 
notwithstanding defendant's claim that bank's disclosure violated 18 USCS § 2703, part of the ECPA, since even if ECPA 
technically deprived grand jury of authority to demand account records, bank, as a witness, was not in a poSition to test 
limits of grand jury's authority. Coronado v BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc. (2000, CAll Fla) 222 F3d 1315, 13 FLW Fed C 998, 
cert den (2000) 531 US 1052, 148 LEd 2d 559, 121 S Ct 656. 
-:; 7. Probable cause standard 
Where government refused to provide sworn affidavit attesting to facts demonstrating probable cause so as to permit court 
to issue warrant under Fed. R. Crim. P. 41, court denied government's application for pen register to capture and report 
prospective cell site information in connection with investigation of fugitive; Pen/Trap Statute, 18 USCS §§ 3121 et seq., 
and 18 USCS § 2703fdl. part of Stored Communications Act, did not allow order for capture of prospective cell site 
information to be issued upon less than probable cause. In re Order AuthOrizing Installation and Use of Pen Register 
(2006, DC Md) 439 F SUPD 2d 456 (criticized in In re United States for Order for Prosoective Cell Site Location Info. (2006, 
SD NY) 460 F SUPD 2d 448). 
Defendant's text messages, supplied by electronic communication providers in response to search warrants were not 
"interceptions" under 18 USCS § 2510(4), but instead were governed by 18 USCS § 2703(a), and were admissible due to 
probable cause for warrants; unlike Wiretap Act, Stored Communications Act contained no express requirement that 
government demonstrate necessity. United States v Jones (2006, DC Dist Col) 451 F SUDP 2d 71. 
Government was not entitled to court order under Stored Communications Act, 18 USCS § 2703, giving government 
access to individual's cell-ph one-derived location information, either past of prospective, on simple showing of articulable 
relevance to ongoing investigation; such information could only be obtained upon showing of probable cause under Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 41 in accordance with settled Fourth Amendment standards. In re United States for Order Directing Provider of 
Elee. Commun. Servo to Disclose Records to Gov't (2008, WD Pal 534 F SUPD 2d 585. 
-:; 8. Specific and articulable facts standard 
One of three ways in which government can obtain cell site information is that government may obtain court order 
pursuant to 18 USCS § 2703(c) and (d), part of Stored Communications Act, 18 USCS §§ 2701 to 2712, upon showing of 
specific and articulable facts that information sought is relevant to and material to ongoing criminal investigation. In re 
Application of United States (2007, DC Puerto Rico) 497 F SUPD 2d 301. 
For court to issue order compelling telecommunication service provider to disclose historical cell site information under 18 
USCS § 2703(d) to federal law enforcement agents, government did not have to establish probable cause, but instead 
lesser specific and articulable facts standard applied. In re United States Orders pursuant to 18 U.s.c. 2703(d) (2007, DC 
Mass) 509 F SURR 2d 76 (criticized in In re United States for an Order Directing Provider of Elec. Commun. Servo to 
Disclose Records to the Gov't (2008, WD Pal 534 F SUPR 2d 585). 
Government's application for order directing certain cellular telephone companies to disclose historical cell site information 
under Stored Communications Act, 18 USCS §§ 2701 et seq., was granted because 18 USCS § 2703(d) order requiring 
disclosure of historical cell site information could issue on showing of "specific and articulable facts" and no more. In re 
United States Orders pursuant to 18 U.s.C. 2703(d) (2007, DC Mass) 509 F SURR 2d 76 (criticized in In re United States 
for an Order Directing Provider of Elec. Commun. Servo to Disclose Records to the Gov,t (2008, WD Pal 534 F SURD 2d 
585). 
Because historical cell site information clearly satisfies each of three definitional requirements of 18 USCS § 2703(c), 18 
USCS § 2703(d) order requiring disclosure of historical cell site information may issue on showing of "specific and 
articulable facts" and no more. In re United States Orders pursuant to 18 U.s.C. 2703(d) (2007, DC Mass) 509 F SUDD 2d 
76 (criticized in In re United States for an Order Directing Provider of Elec. Commun. Servo to Disclose Records to the 
Gov't (2008, WD Pal 534 F SUDD 2d 585). 
-:; 9. Prima facie claim 
Bank customer stated prima facie claim under 18 USCS § 2703, which provides that if electronic communication service 
has held contents of electronic communications in electronic storage for one hundred eighty days or less, it may disclose 
that communication to government only pursuant to federal or state warrant, where customer alleged that on same day 
funds were electronically transferred to her account, bank disclosed contents pursuant to verbal instructions. LORez v First 
Unio 11 FLW Fed C 760 reh, en banc, den (1998; CAll Fla) 141 F3d 1191 
and c 5911 ~ 9 CA2 NY 166 F3d 540 14 BNA IER Cas 1389 and (criticized in Stoutt v 
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Banco PORuiar de P.R. (2001, DC Puerto Rico) 158 F SUPD 2d 167) and (criticized in Stoutt v Banco Popular de P.R. (2003, 
CAl Puerto Rico) 320 F3d 26) and (criticized in In re JetBlue Airways CorD. PrivacY Litig. (2005, ED NY) 379 F SURP 2d 
299). 
:; 10. Subpoena 
Suppression of information about suspected child molester is not required, even though government obtained information 
via invalid subpoena served on his Internet service provider, because, for Fourth Amendment purposes, court does not find 
that Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (18 USCS §§ 2510 et seq.) has legislatively determined that individual 
has reasonable expectation of privacy in his name, address, social security number, credit card number, and proof of 
Internet connection. United States v Hambrick (1999, WD Va) 55 F SUpp 2d 504, affd (2000, CA4 Va) 225 F3d 656, 
reported in full (2000, CA4 Va) 2000 US App LEXIS 18665 and cert den (2001) 531 US 109Q, 148 LEd 2d 714,121 S Ct 
832 and (criticized in United States v Bach (2001. DC Minn) 2001 US Dist LEXIS 22109). 
Federal agency's subpoena, issued pursuant to FRCP 45 during pretrial discovery phase of underlying civil action, does not 
constitute "trial subpoena" as contemplated by 18 USCS § 2703(c)(1)(C), which provides that provider of electronic 
communication service must disclose private customer information to government entity only in response to, inter alia, 
trial subpoena served by government entity. FTC v Netscape Communs. Corp, (2000, ND Cal) 196 FRD 559,28 Media L R 
1821. 2000-1 CCH Trade Cases P 72900, 46 FR Serv 3d 920, 
-:; 11. Cell phone tracking requests 
Denial of cell phone tracking request under 18 USCS § 2703(d) was upheld because government's showing of specific and 
articulable facts was insufficient to permit real-time acquisition of prospective cell site "tracking" information and required 
showing of probable cause. In re United States for an Order Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register (2005, ED NY) 396 F 
Supp 2d 294, 15 ALR Fed 2d 803 (criticized in In re United States for Order for Disdosure of Telecommunications Records 
(2005, SD NY) 405 F SUpp 2d 435) and (criticized in In re United States for Order for Prosoective Cell Site Location Info. 
(2006, SD NY) 460 F SURP 2d 448) and (criticized in In re United States Orders pursuant to 18 U.s.c. 2703(d) (2007, DC 
Mass) 509 F Supp 2d 64) and (criticized in In re United States for an Order: Authorizing the Installation & Use of a Pen 
Register & Trap & Trace Device (2007. SD Tex) 2007 US Dist LEXIS 77635). 
Permitting surreptitious conversion of cell phone into tracking device without probable cause raised serious Fourth 
Amendment concerns, especially when phone was monitored in home or other places where privacy was reasonably 
expected; therefore, court denied U.s.'s request for motion to compel access to subscriber records maintained by phone 
company pursuant to 18 USCS § 2703(c), including location of cell site/sector at call origination, call termination, and, if 
reasonably available, during progress of call. In re Pen Register & Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location Auth. (2005, 
SD Tex) 396 F Supp 2d 747 (criticized in In re United States for Order for Disclosure of Telecommunications Records 
(2005. SD NY) 405 F SURP 2d 435) and (criticized in In re United States for Order for Prosoective Cell Site Location Info. 
(2006, SD NY) 460 F SURP 2d 448) and (criticized in In re United States Orders pursuant to 18 U.s.c. 2703(d) (2007, DC 
Mass) 509 F SUpp 2d 64) and (criticized in In re United States for an Order: Authorizing the Installation & Use of a Pen 
Register & Trap & Trace Device (2007, SD Tex) 2007 US Dig LEXIS 77635) and (criticized in In re United States for an 
Order Directing Provider of Elec. Commun. Servo to Disclose Records to the Gov't (2008, WD Pal 534 F Supp 2d 585). 
Cell site information is not record concerning electronic communication service or remote computing service and therefore 
is not covered by 18 USCS § 2703(c). In re Application of the United States of America for an Order Authorizing the 
Installation and Use of a Pen Register (2005, DC Md) 402 F Supp 2d 597 (criticized in In re United States for Order for 
Prospective Cell Site Location Info. (2006, SD NY) 460 F Supp 2d 448). 
Cell site or tracking information constituted "information" pertaining to customers or users of electronic communications 
services under 18 USCS § 2703(c) and consequently was sort of "information" that Government was entitled to seek 
pursuant to order under § 2703(d). In re United States for Order for Disdosure of Telecommunications Records (2005, SD 
NY) 405 F Supp 2d 435 (criticized in In re Application of the United States for an Order for Prospective Cell Site Location 
Info. on a Certain Cellular Telephone (2006, SD NY) 2006 US Dist LEXIS 11747) and (criticized in In re the Application of 
United States (2006, SD Tex) 441 F Supp 2d 816) and (criticized in In re United States for Order for Prospective Cell Site 
Location Info. (2006, SD NY) 460 F Supp 2d 448) and (criticized in In re United States for an Order Directing Provider of 
Elec. Commun. Servo to Disclose Records to the Gov't (2008, WD Pa) 534 F Supp 2d 585). 
Government was entitled to order that would allow for pen register and trap and trace device on phone number assigned to 
cellular telephone and was further entitled, pursuant to Pen Register Statute, 18 USCS §§ 3121 et seq., and Stored 
Communications Act, 18 USCS § 2703, to record cell site information, but only when cell phone was being used for calls 
and only if location information was used only to give approximate location of phone, based upon cell sites, and was not 
used to pinpoint exact location of cell phone. In re United States (2006, WD La) 411 F SUPD 2d 678 (criticized in In re 
Application of the United States for an Order for Prospective Cell Site Location Info. on a Certain Cellular Telephone (2006, 
SD NY) 2006 US Dist LEXIS 11747) and (criticized in In re the Application of United States (2006, SD Tex) 441 F SURP 2d 
816) and (criticized in In re United States for an Order Directing Provider of Elec. Commun. Servo to Disclose Records to 
the Gov't (2008, WD Pa) 534 F Supp 2d 585). 
Government could not use combined authority of 18 USCS § 3122, part of Pen/Trap Statute, 18 USCS §§ 3121 et seq., 
and ~RlmF~N7gtrP'POR~cuF~ .. ~J:~ons Act (SCA), 18 USCS §§ 2701 et seq., to obtain disclosure of 
pros~ft5mb~ ~E5'N§IDItftAlff6Nrminating cellular towers for calls to and from particular cellular 
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telephone; although cell site information constituted signaling information under 18 USCS § 3127(3), such information 
could not be obtained solely under Penffrap Statute pursuant to 47 USCS § 1002(a)(2), part of Communications 
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 47 USCS §§ 1001 et seq., because it could disclose cellular subscriber's 
physical location, and legislative history indicated that Congress did not intend for Pen/Trap Statute to be used in 
conjunction with SCA to obtain information. In re United States (2006, ED Wis) 412 F SURP 2d 947 (criticized in l!:U:.e 
United States for Order for Prospective Cell Site Location Info. (2006, SD NY) 460 F SUDD 2d 448) and (criticized in In re 
United States for an Order: Authorizing the Installation & Use of a Pen Register & Trap & Trace Device (2007, SD Tex) 
2007 US Dist LEXIS 77635). 
Government's application for order authorizing telecommunication service provider to disclose cell site tower location 
information made and received by identified cellular telephone was denied because court did not agree with government 
that it should impute to Congress intent to "converge" provisions of Pen Register and Trap and Trace Statute, Stored 
Communications Act, and Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994 to create vehicle for disclosure of 
prospective cell location information on real time basis on less than probable cause. In re Application of the United States 
for an Order Authorizing the Installation and Use of a Pen Register (2006, WD NY) 415 F SURD 2d 211 (criticized in In re 
United States for Order for Prosoective Cell Site Location Info. (2006, SD NY) 460 F SUPD 2d 448) and (criticized in In re 
United States Orders pursuant to 18 U.s.c. 2703(d) (2007, DC Mass) 509 F SUPD 2d 64) and (criticized in In re United 
States for an Order: Authorizing the Installation & Use of a Pen Register & Trap & Trace Device (2007, SD Tex) 2007 US 
Dist LEXIS 77635). 
-:; 12. Violation established 
Internet service provider (ISP) subscriber was awarded summary judgment finding that two police officers violated l.8. 
USCS § 2703(c), part of Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA), 18 USCS §§ 2701 et seq., by using invalid 
search warrant application to solicit information about subscriber from ISP; under 2001 amendments to ECPA, 
governmental entities could be held liable for soliciting information from ISP without complying with processes specified in 
ECPA, and officers' argument--that they merely requested and did not require ISP to disclose information--was 
disingenuous and did not absolve them from liability. Freedman v Am. Online, Inc. (2004, DC Conn) 303 F Supp 2d 121. 
'+ 13. Violation not established 
Task force investigating on-line obscenity, which seized computer bulletin boards, did not violate 18 USCS § 2703(a}, (b), 
or (c) by searching plaintiffs' electronic communications and subscriber information, since access was pursuant to a valid 
warrant. Guest v Leis (2001. CA6 Ohio) 255 F3d 325, 2001 FED App 206P. 
Defendant's Internet information was properly disclosed to police authorities under 18 USCS § 2703(d), and was not 
violation of any privacy right, where defendant had shared child pornography with other parties and was charged with 
violations of 18 USCS §§ 2252(a)(2), 2252(a)(4)(B), 922(g)(I), and 924(a){2). United States v Perrine (2008, CAW Kan) 
518 F3d 1196. 
Governmental defendants including city, its police department, and certain government officials, could not be held liable 
under 18 USCS § 2703(a), part of Stored Communications Act (SCA), for divulging text messages because application of § 
2703(a) is limited to governmental actions during criminal investigations; it has no application to employer, who happens 
to be governmental agency, in its effort to manage its own workforce by auditing electronic equipment provided to its 
employees to determine whether they have engaged in workplace malfeasance. Quon v Arch Wireless Operating Co. 
(2006, CD Cal) 445 F Supp 2d 1116, 25 ALR6th 649. 
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James A. Adams 
Drake University Law School 
The National Institute for Trial Advocacy 
Computer Records Generally 
The computer and its many facets of communication and preservation of information provide increasingly complex issues of 
maintaining individual privacy while providing legitimate Government access to relevant information concerning criminal 
activity. The Government obtains access to computer related information in mUltiple ways, including standard search 
warrants, subpoenas, and congressional statutory authorization (see, e.g., 18 USCS §§ 3121-3127 and 50 USCS §§ 
1841-1842 (pen register and trap and trace devices)). In addition to attempting to breach the shield of computer privacy 
by a search for stored electronic information on individual computers or through Internet Service Providers, the 
Government is now using computers as a sword to obtain, compare and store information about individuals. For instance, 
computer programs are now part of surveillance devices such as face recognition systerns where crowds or neighborhoods 
are scanned and the computer program attempts to match faces to persons suspected of criminal activity. Scanned faces 
based on digitized information, although not matched to criminal activity, may remain stored in the program and may 
document an individual's location. Government data mining programs collect information to search for predictive or 
anomalous patterns that might be associated with either terrorist or criminal conduct. The National Crime Center 
maintains data files on approximately 200,000 suspected terrorists and violent criminals. Fingerprint databases are being 
used to check passengers on airlines, watch lists are being used to track identified individuals, and programs identify ticket 
purchasing and travel on all airlines to look for suspicious travel plans. 
In-Home Computer Records 
Fourth Amendment protection remains strongest in the home. Consequently, to be entitled to enter the home to seize a 
computer, hard drive, storage disks and other related hardware and software, the Government must obtain a search 
warrant meeting Fourth Amendment guidelines. The warrant issues most commonly associated with in-home seizure of 
computers and computer records relate to specificity of the items to be seized and the scope and duration of the 
Government's seizure needed to achieve its goals. United States v. Davis, 226 F.3d 346 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v. 
Lacy, 119 F.3d 742 (9th Cir. 1997). Once computers and related hardware and software are seized based on a probable 
cause warrant, the Government is free to use any system that will provide the officers with access to the sought-after 
stored information. Frequently, government agents must remove the physical equipment from the search location to a 
government laboratory to conduct an efficient and not overly intrusive forensic analysis for the desired stored digital 
information. A complete computer forensic analysis may deny the owner use of the computer system for an extensive time. 
Further, when the computer system contains both seizable and non-seizable data, denying the owner access to the 
non-seizable data may result in financial or other harm and exposure of the non-criminal data may invade the owner's 
personal privacy. 
Encrypted Records 
The Government has long sought legislation limiting citizen access to sophisticated encryption codes that prevent the 
Government from gaining access to properly seized computer records. On the other hand, citizen privacy, both from the 
Government and from other individuals who may hack into computer records, has supported creation of strong encryption 
programs. A 2001 Federal District Court decision opened the way for a combination of warrant and electronic access to 
passwords for encrypted files. United States v. Scarfo, 180 F. Supp. 2d 572 CD.N.J. 2001). The Government obtained a 
warrant to enter defendant's business to install a "Key Logger System" (KLS) on defendant's personal computer keyboard. 
The Government was not required to give notice of the entry or installation to defendant. The Government also presented 
suffi~1t~ES1jq~~TmtQap ~E~sified Information Procedures Act (18 USCS Appendix 3) protected the 
KLS ti6Mtrtsc5t;ecy 't51. deYeR~e counsel. Ailfiol}.gl\ defendant was provided with a summary of the KLS, the court was not 
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specific about precisely how the Gu. _.,lment acquired the keystroke information or entered the encrypted fIles. The court, 
however, stated that the Government configured the KLS so that it did not violate the wiretap statute, 18 USCS § 2510. In 
other words, the KLS did not record any keystrokes of any e-mail or wire communications made over a telephone or cable 
line while the modem operated. If any communication port on the modem was open, the KLS did not record keystrokes. 
While offering some protection of other communications, not all e-mail communications are typed while the individual is 
on-line or has a communication port open. For example, a person may type and store an e-mail communication on a laptop 
or home computer while not on-line preferring to hold the e-mail for future transmission. Although the Government 
response configured the KLS not to search for or record any fixed data stored in the computer, presumably the government 
would record the keystrokes of an e-mail composed while the computer was not on-line. Nevertheless, based on the 
Government's representations about the KLS, the court denied suppression of evidence and denied discovery about details 
of the KLS. Instead the court ambiguously stated that KLS "obtained the pass phrase to the [suspect] file and retrieved 
information." 
In pressing the suppression motion, the defendant had to rely on the judge's review of information provided by the 
Government under the Classified Information Procedures Act. The defendant was unable to discover or examine witnesses 
about precisely what information the Government obtained, was unable to research the system, and was unable to provide 
expert testimony concerning the system. 
Access to Content of Stored Wire or Electronic Communications 
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act ("ECPA")(18 USCS §§ 2701 et seq.), governs Government access to stored wire 
and electronic communications in a "facility" through which an electronic communication service is provided. "Electronic 
storage" is defined as "(A) any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic communication incidental to the 
electronic transmission thereof; [and] (B) any storage of such communication by an electronic communication service for 
purposes of backup protection of such communication; ... " 18 USCS § 2510(17). The ECPA provides guidelines for 
Government access primarily to e-mail or voice communications induded within e-mail. The communications typically are 
stored either within a local network server or on the server for an Internet Service Provider (ISP) using either of the two 
main e-mail protocols, IMAP or POP3. When POP3 is used the e-mail is stored on the ISP server until opened by the 
reCipient at which time the e-mail is downloaded to the individual computer. Once downloaded the communication may be 
deleted from the ISP server, although some systems retain the communication on the server at the request of the 
subscriber or through backup procedures. E-mail providers also use other protocols such as HTTP that also may involve 
storage of communications. 
By definition, stored wire and electronic communications mean temporary or intermediate storage incidental to the 
transmission of the communication. Once delivered to the subscriber or customer, the communication is no longer in 
temporary storage and it becomes the same as any other stored information. The service provider, however, may store a 
backup for protection of the communication in case of a power failure. Backups may also be preserved on parallel hard 
drives in different locations. The backup appears to be included within the definition of stored communication to which the 
Government has access. 
Originally, the ECPA in 18 USCS § 2703 dealt only with stored electronic communications. The USA PATRIOT Act (Public 
Law 107-56) amended § 2703 to include stored wire communications as well as electronic communications because some 
e-mails may have voice components. Previously, the Federal Wiretap Statute governed wire communications involving 
voice components. 18 USCS § 2510. The USA PATRIOT Act also amended § 2510 to remove stored wire communications 
from the Federal Wiretap Statute and include such communications in the ECPA. Direct interception of wire 
communications en route to the recipient or to electronic storage is still governed by the statutory requirements set out in 
18 USCS §§ 2510 et seq. Nevertheless, the broader protection afforded by the Federal Wiretap Statute, at least from 
direct interception of wire communications, may prove illusory in situations where the communication is stored prior to 
access by its recipient. The concept of "interception" does not apply to electronic or wire communications while in storage 
because Government acquisition is not simultaneous with transmission. Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v, U.s. Secret Service. 
36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 1994). If Government officials become aware of a stored electronic or wire communication but not its 
contents, the officials may immediately apply for a search warrant or a court order in some circumstances to obtain the 
contents of the communication while in storage. A warrant to seize must only satisfy Fourth Amendment requirements, 
which are considered less onerous than a wiretap request meeting statutory guidelines. Thus, by minimal delay after 
transmission, the Government may get access to the communication while in storage using the less burdensome search 
warrant process. 
Authorization for obtaining the contents of the stored communications depends on two variables--the type of facility 
controlling the storage and the duration of the storage. To gain access to content of materials stored in an "electronic 
communications system" (defined in 18 USCS § 2510(14» that have been stored for 180 days or less, the Government 
can require disclosure only by resorting to a Fourth Amendment search warrant. The search warrant issuance process was 
amended to permit issuance by any judge having jurisdiction over the offense regardless of the locus of the electronic 
storage system. Thus, such warrants are valid nationwide regardless of where they were issued. 
If the communications have been stored in excess of 180 days, or if the communications are stored in a "remote computing 
service," the Government may obtain access from any "electronic communication service" (defined in 18 USCS § 
2510(15») in three ways: (1) a Fourth Amendment search warrant without notice to the subscriber or customer; (2) a 
Federal or State administrative subpoena or a Federal or State grand jury or trial subpoena with notice to the subscriber or 
customer; or (3) a court order for disclosure. The court order for disclosure requires only that the Governmental entity 
provide specific and articulable facts demonstrating reasonable grounds to believe the communications are relevant to an 
on\BME~Bu~or·0~l@FAm'Y(d). 
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Further, 18 USCS § 2704 permits the Government, when proceeding by subpoena or court order under 18 USCS § 
2703(b), to require the service provider to create a backup cop of the contents of the communication. The backup is made 
without notice to the subscriber or customer to avoid entia Governmental loss of such information. The subscriber is 
required to be notified of the creation of the backup copy three days after the Government is notified that the backup has 
been made. In some circumstances, notice may be further delayed if the court believes there is danger to persons or 
danger of flight, destruction of evidence, intimidation of witnesses or serious jeopardy to the investigation. 18 USCS § 
2705. 
Access to Non-Content Information 
The USA PATRIOT Act dramatically expanded the non-content information available to the Government under the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act. Under the statute prior to amendment, most of the accessible information related 
to telephone communications. Now the Act authorizes information access beyond telephone records to records of all 
providers of electronic communication services and remote computer services concerning a specific subscriber or customer. 
The Government is authorized to request the records in several ways: a Fourth Amendment search warrant issued in 
accord with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 or a comparable state process; consent of the customer or subscriber; a 
formal written request concerning a subscriber or customer suspected of telemarketing fraud; an administrative, grand 
jury or trial subpoena; or a court order complying with § 2703(d). Under § 2703(d), to obtain a court order the 
Government need only list specific facts providing reasonable grounds that the information requested is relevant and 
material to a criminal investigation. 
In addition, the USA PATRIOT Act expanded the type of records that must be disclosed to the Government by the electronic 
communication service or remote computer service. The Act now specifies permissible Government access to the following 
information about a subscriber to or customer of such services: name; address; local and long distance telephone 
connection records; recOrds of session times and durations; length of service and types of service; telephone numbers, 
instrument numbers or other subscriber numbers or identities, presumably including Internet Protocol numbers; and 
means of payment, including credit card and bank account numbers. The expanded list of available information, 
particularly credit cards and bank accounts, is designed to provide the Government with more options for quickly and 
accurately identifying computer users and tracking their Internet contacts and communications. These records are 
available through any of the means described in the previous paragraph. 18 USCS § 2703. 
Access to Content and Non-Content Electronic and Wireless Communications Transmitted or Stored by Cable Companies 
When first created, cable companies primarily supplied television viewers with access to packages of television programs. 
The Cable Act (47 USCS § 551) placed substantial restrictions on Government access to identifying information about cable 
company subscribers and about the selection of video services by specific subscribers. The government entity seeking the 
information has to present in a court proceeding clear and convincing evidence that the subscriber is reasonably suspected 
of criminal activity and that the desired information would be material evidence in the case. More recently, cable 
companies are offering telephone services and Internet access. In recognition of the multiple electronic services cable 
companies provide, the USA PATRIOT Act added a provision that the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, the wiretap 
statute and the pen register and trap and trace provisions shall determine Government access to electronic and wireless 
communications that are part of the cable company's communication services. Consequently, substantial subscriber 
information and content information is accessible to the Government, which is consistent with the Government's access to 
comparable information held by Internet Service Providers. 
Voluntary Disclosure to the Government 
The USA PATRIOT Act amended 18 USCS § 2702 to expand the situations in which an electronic service provider or a 
remote computing service provider may voluntarily disclose content and non-content information. The provider may 
disclose information whenever it reasonably believes an emergency exists involving immediate danger of death or serious 
physical harm to any person. Further, the provider may disclose information incident to provision of services to customers 
or for the protection of the provider's rights or property. The requirements of "immediate danger" and "serious physical 
injury" may provide a civil plaintiff with some room to litigate the provider's exercise in judgment in deciding to disclose 
information. In criminal cases, suppression is highly unlikely because the disclosure is likely to be treated as a private 
search. The amended Act does not require vigilance and disclosure by the provider; it merely protects the provider if the 
provider chooses to disclose in certain situations. Less clear are the Situations in which a provider can disclose subscriber 
information to protect the provider's rights and property. For example, assume a provider becomes aware of computer 
fraud, hacking or other illegal acts involving use of the provider's services. It is unclear when the provider would or should 
determine that the activity sufficiently affects the provider's rights and property justifying disclosure of the relevant 
information to the Government without incurring civil liability for the disclosure. 
Remedies 
When the Government violates statutory provisions governing access to stored wire and electronic communications and 
non-content information, remedies are unclear. The ECPA provides that one method of Government access to information 
is a search warrant issued in accord with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 or a similar state procedure. In most 
situations, a violation of the search warrant process required by Rule 41 permits suppression of the evidence. The 
Government, however, has alternative methods of requesting the information and the ECPS limits a subscriber or customer 
to civil remedies for non-constitutional violations of 18 USCS §§ 2701 et seq. 18 USCS § 2708. For intentional violations 
of ttJ~~ct.-.a subscriber or customer may be given declaratory or equitable relief that would presumably include a cessation 
of ~~Wrl:leIihln8lJPJt~1f M>llh&lJideIiE?Slready obtained does not appear to be a remedy for non-constitutional 
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Related Commentaries 
For additional commentaries dealing with electronic surveillance and related subjects, see--
NITA Commentary, Title 18, preceding § 2510 (relating to video surveillance). 
NITA Commentary, Title 18, § 2516 (relating to wire and electronic communications). 
NITA Commentary, Title 18, § 3117 (relating to electronic tracking and thermal imaging devices). 
NITA Commentary, Title 18, preceding § 3121 (relating to pen registers and trap and trace devices). 
NITA Commentary. Title 49. § 44901 (relating to airport security). 
NITA Commentary. Title 50. preceding § 1801 (relating to foreign intelligence surveillance). 
NITA Commentary. Title 50, preceding § 1841 (relating to use of pen registers and trap and trace devices in foreign 
intelligence surveillance). 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
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LEOTIS B. BRANIGH III, 
Defendant. 
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CASE NO. CR-07-8107 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHARLES E. KOVIS IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DETERMINE 
COMPETENCY 
Charles E. Kovis, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am the Court-appointed attorney for Mr. Leotis Branigh. 
2. Attached to this affidavit at Exhibit "A" are true and accurate copies of police reports 
received by Mr. Branigh and me. These reports were received from the State of 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHARLES E. KOVIS 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DETERMINE 
COMPETENCY 1 
Idaho after discovery requests in the above-entitled action. 
3. All documents attached to this affidavit at Exhibit "A" are incorporated herein as 
though fully set forth. 
DATED this :I g 1!l day of November 2008. 
~~,{~ 
Charles E. Kovis 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this 'Let day of November 2008 . 
. Q 
Notary Public in and for the State ofIdaho 
Residing at Moscow therein. 
My commission expires: ______ -'---__ _ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
¢ ~ I hereby certifY that on the I day of 
2008, a true and correct copy of this Affidavit of Charles 
E. Kovis in Support of Motion To Determine Competency 
was hand-delivered to: 
DANIEL SPICKLER 
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
P.O. BOX 1267 LEru::::;; ~~Ol~ 
Charles E. Kovis 
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Lewiston Police Supplemental Narrative 
On 10-03-07 at approximately 1330 hours I was contacted at the Lewiston Police 
Department oy Desiree Anderson. Anderson is the ex wife of the victim, Michael 
Johnston and a former girlfriend/fiance' of the suspect, Leotis Branigh III. I 
cond~cted an interview with Anderson in interview room two of the Lewiston 
Police Department, Investigative section, Also present was Lt. Tom Greene. 
Anderson told me that she had received a divorce from Johnston on 08-03-06. 
She stated that they were married in 1999 and had been married for 
approximately seven years. She further stated that they had two children in 
common, Eliah age 12, and John age 8. At the time of their divorce, she went 
to live with her aunt for a while. During spring break of 2007, Johnston asked 
her to house sit while he went on a Spring vacation with Eliah and John to 
Vermont. From that time forth, she lived at 1029 Cedar Avenue #23. 
Even though she was living with her ex husband and children, she had met Leotis 
Branigh through Lacey Jackson who is Anderson's sister. Branigh and Anderson 
went to Sandpoint to visit Lacey and went to her sentencing in March of 2007. 
Lacey had met Branigh, via letters, while they were in prison. Lacey's 
husband, Daniel Jackson, had known Branigh for quite a period of time. 
Anderson began a dating relationship with Branigh during the week of her 
children's school spring break. Upon returning from spring break vacation Mike 
Johnston asked Anderson to renew their relationship. At this point in time 
Anderson was unsure about her relationships with Branigh and Johnston. 
Anderson said that she was on again off again with both of them quite 
frequently. Anderson stated that during the end of May, she went to Seattle 
with Leotis Branigh for the weekend. During this time Mike was extremely 
depressed and upset and said he was going to kill himself. She decided to stop 
seeing Branigh who had begun to change and seemed to be a different type of 
person whI'ch;-'-A:naerson attributed td "meth" arld drug use. 
During the months of June, July, and August, Branigh p'~gCJ:P-J!lai;Lil}!L!lt:!ltIerous 
.ma;blil).9.s to Desiree as she haci __ changed her phone number so that he could'-no 
longer call her. 
In September of 2007, Leotis obtained her phone number from an unknown location 
or source and started calling again. Anderson began seeing Branigh in her 
neighborhood and receiving numerous calls and text messages from Branigh. 
Anderson again began having a dating relationship with Branigh near the end of 
August first part of September. She stated that it lasted a couple of weeks or 
less. Anderson said there was discussion about her and Branigh moving in 
together. Later Anderson determined that Branigh had changed and was not the 
same person as during the beginning of their relationship. Upon breaking it 
off with Branigh at this time she described Branigh as "terroristic". Branigh 
would not let Anderson leave his trailer for approximately one (1) hour, even 
after numerous requests by Anderson for Branigh to let her leave. Anderson 
told Branigh she was not going to have a relationship with him. Anderson and 
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Johnston both told Branigh not to have contact with them. 
On September 6th, 2007 Leoti~~anigh, III confronted Anderson at H & R Block 
~-.,.~.. - .... , 
where she was' t'ciking classes. He threatened to "-snap her neck"- and refused to 
leave until confronted by Officer Krakalia who had-'been summoned to the scene 
by a concerned classmate. 
She stated she saw Leotis Branigh two times after september 6th. Branigh had 
shown up at the Anderson/ Johnston re sfdenceandJofins ton --a-ru:f :a'ranigh exchanged 
words. Branigh began to taunt Johnston.about Branigh's past relationship with 
Anderson. . '11 was-approxlm1ftery-one'we-;k l;t;;;;,~'ona ''i'hursClaY"''ano''ri'l.day, "'she 
stopped by Leotis's trailer in Clarkston, Washington and they, Anderson and~ 
Branign'decidedthey-woul:d meet somewhere and talk about the future on Sunday. 
That Sunday Leotis arrived at their trailer at 1029 Cedar Avenue #23. This 
caused friction bet~een Branigh and Anderson, Branigh and Johnston, and 
Anderson and Johnston. 
On September 6th Anderson told Leotis that .she ~Q~ldno longer, consider living 
together with him:'" Hils ~was'aue-tctthe'fa'Cttiiat 'Jorm~ton had rssue<ran'---~" 
ufurmn:tftll that his children would never see her at that residence as long as 
Branigh was living there, due to his drug use and his past criminal record. 
Anderson told me that she has had three Dnicel phone numbers, the first one was 
canceled in May of 2007, it was 791-0123, originally an Inland Cellular number 
but was changed to Unicel. Approximately June 2007 she again changed her 
number, it was 553-1576. Just a short time later in June, 2007 she changed it 
again to 553-2015, that one also being a Unicel number. She stated this was 
du~ to numerous text messages and phone calls from Leotis Branigh. She stated 
she began receiving angry text messages from Branigh in May and June of 2007. 
,-- She said the last time she actually spoke with Branigh on the phone was 
september 10th or 11th, until Monday. The only time she would respond to him 
during these times was to t.ell Branigh to leave her and her family alone. She 
advised that on June 19th she went to SJRM where she found out she had 
miscarried and believed it was Branigh's baby that she miscarried. She was 
also adamant that Johnston was never suicidal. Anderson later signed a Medical 
Release which I took to St. Joseph's Regional Medical Center and retrieved the 
medical records pertaining to the miscarriage. Those records were placed in 
the original case file. 
Anderson described one incident where Branigh was "brainwashing" her. What he 
told her and the manner in which he talked to her at the time "just creeped me 
out ", no one she ever knew or talked to talked to her like that .-Thi'~" was 
another factor in Anderson terminating the relationship with Branigh. 
Leotis told Anderson that Anderson hurt him so much that he was contemplating 
hurting his own mother. 
Anderson stated that on 10/01/07 she received, as did Johnston, numerous text 
messages from Branigh. For further details on these see Officer Hopple's 
supplemental and the search warrant and subpoena of telephone text messages 
between these three individuals. 
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Anderson stated that the messages became threatening and it angered Johnston. 
He went out to smoke and took his cell phone and continued to receive text 
messages from Branigh. She stated Johnston was not armed and all he had with 
him was his cell phone and cigarettes. She stated at one point he even gave 
her his cell phone as the battery became weak and she took it into the trailer 
where it was charging. After it charged she was going to take it back out to 
him, and changed her mind. Johnston continued to pace at the end of the 
driveway at 1029 Cedar Avenue from one edge of the gravel driveway to the other 
edge and back. She stated he was very upset at Branigh for the text messages 
received that day. At one point she looked out the window and did not see 
Johnston. A short while later she heard five sounds that she wanted to believe 
were fireworks or some other source but said that she knew at that time they 
were gunshots. She waited a brief period of time and since Johnston did not 
return she finally called police dispatch. Awhile later an officer was 
dispatched to her location and she later spoke with Officer Mundell. 
Anderson sLated that to the best of her knowledge t Branigh did not have a 
firearm, but he always carried a knife on his person and or his vehicle. She 
did not know where he may access a firearm. She does believe that Branigh's 
father has some firearms as does his mother, and his father and mother do not 
reside together any longer. 
I asked Anderson to explain a letter to me that she had written to Branigh in 
which it states "why did you send that ring to me? You said you'd keep it. 
Does this mean you've moved on? You know I cant leave where I'm at. The only 
way I'll ever be free is if he dies or decides he don't want me and you know 
that will never happen." 
Anderson s.tated previous to my pointing this letter out to her that she could 
~ never be free of Johnston due to the fact that he is family and he is the 
father of their common children. She stated in the letter that what she was 
trying to tell Branigh·. It was quite apparent that Anderson was extremely 
distraught over the fact that this may have planted a seed in Branigh's 
thoughts. 
Investigation Continuing. 
Sgt J. Arneson #216 
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Ofc. Doug Boyle #320 
11-16-98 
Typed by: 292 
Lewiston Police Department 
On 11-17-98 at about 0000 hours, I was dispatched to 3625 17th 
Street in reference to a battery. I arrived and contacted 
Michael Johnston. Johnston stated that approximately 2345 hours 
on 11-16-98 his ex girlfriend, Desiree Anderson came to his 
travel trailer to pick up their son. Johnston stated that he and 
Anderson began arguing at the door way to the traile~, with 
Anderson standing outside and him in the door way. He stated 
that the arguing was about another trailer they had just lived 
in together four days prior at 1029 Cedar Ave. #?3, which he was 
informing her that he was going to move back into and that she 
needed to move out. He stated that while he was explaining this 
to Anderson, she jumped up into his trailer and began hitting and 
scratching his face. Johnston stated that he grabbed her to hold 
her arms down so she could not hit him anymore and she then bit 
him on the left side of his cheek and neck area just below his 
ear. Johnston stated he pushed her out of the trailer to get her 
away from him and she then took their son, Elijah Jobnston with 
her and left the area. 
r-- I looked at Michael Johnston's face and could see three dig marks 
in his forehead which appeared to be caus'ed from fingernails. 
These three marks were now starting to scab but blood was 
noticable on the wounds. Johnston then showed me his neck and 
cheek area on the left side of his face just in the front and 
below his left ear. There I could see a swollen area which was 
oval in shape and was where he was bitten by Anderson. I asked 
Jobnston if anything else happened that he did not tell me in 
regards to their argument and fight at that location. Johnston 
stated that was all that went on and that he did not hit her or 
do anything more than hold her and then push her away from him 
after being bitten. 
I next talked to Lora Bay. I asked Bay if she saw anything that 
had occurred. She stated that she did not see it, but when the 
arguing was getting more intense she had her son, Nathanial Bay 
and also the son of Johnston and Anderson, Elijah Johnston come 
back with her to the back of the trailer to watch the TV while 
they were arguing. She stated she did this so that both the 
small boys did not have to witness the argument between Jobnston 
and Anderson. Bay did state that her and the children could hear 
the arguing and the fighting from their location because of 
the fight being so loud. 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHARLES E. KOVIS IN SUPPORT 
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I next took photographs with the patrol camera of Johnston's 
forehead and left cheek neck area for evidence in this case. 
I checked out at 1029 Cedar Ave. #23 and contacted Desiree 
Anderson at that location. I informed Anderson why I was there 
and asked her to tell me what had occurred earlier at 3625 17th 
Street. Anderson immediately stated that it was her fault and 
that she had lost her temper, that she had hit, scratched and 
bitten Johnston. I asked her if at any time Johnston had hit her 
or anything to that effect. She stated that he did not, that the 
only thing that he did was push her away from him. She then 
again stated that it was her that lost her temper and that she 
was the only one that acted violently in the situation. Given 
the situation, with Anderson having her son, Elijah Johnston 
already asleep at that location, and it being an hour since the 
incident occurred, Anderson was issued a C&S for Domestic Battery 
for hitting, scratching and biting Michael Johnston. No other 
charges are filed in this case. 
End of Report 
Ofc. Doug Boyle #320 
Reviewed by: 
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~W~IT ~F  E. KOVIS IN SUPPORT 
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STON POLICE OEPARTM£ 
:, 
Medical Release 
On JVaJ G ('1/ Cl-W 7, at n 00 hours, J>Eo I R~ ])fttd Nt th.>J> e;-&so,d 
(DATE (TIME) NAME (FIRST, MIDDLE, LAST) 
received medical attention from st. Joseph Regional Medical Center personnel. 
It was determined that He/She: 
o Could be safely released into police custody and incarcerated if necessary. 
o Should not be incarcerated due to the injury/illness for which he/she was examined. 
o Should be hospitalized due to the injury/illness examined for. 
o Refused the medical attention which was offered. 
The subject was treated for (complete after release signed): ..J.tYI-,-,-,i:..;:::S==--~...:fl-'-LR.>..JRLl..L.I..LA--,-""Ci,,-,t ...... - : ..:::..~ ____________ _ 
Special instructions and/or medication prescribed: 
Attending Physician: 
Ambulance Attendant: 
Officer(s): ~. Ag';:rGS';')d.)...tt=.:;;:zr G . 
Related Case No.: 07-1:..../79L5-
RELEASE OF INFORMATION 
I authorize St. Joseph Regional Medical Center, its employees and members of its medical-dent~l staff, to 
release the information 'contained on this form, together with any other information it has aboutfthe condi-
tion or conditions for which I was examined or tre3.ted on this date (including information conce~ng men-
tal health or drug and alcohol abuse, if any), to the Lewiston Police Department, to the Nez Perce County 
Sheriff's Office, to any representative of either onhese organizations, and to any physician who provides 
follow-up care to me while I am in the custody of either of those organizations. I further authorize St. 
Joseph Regional Medical Center to furnish photocopies of information extracted from patient-related 
medical and billing records (including information concerning mental health or drug and alcohol abuse, if 
any, in accordance with. federal law) to any person or entity who is or may be responsible to pay, 
authorize, review or otherwise act on claims for payment of any part of the care received by me at the 
hospital, including any insurer, employer, governmental agency or individual. This consent is subject to 
revocation at any time. If not previously revoked, this consent will terminate 90 days from the date hereof, 
but revocation will not affect iruormation furnished while it is in force. 
Signature of Patient:)C-~ Aj~ ~~~~t:1:){\ 
PORT 
OF MOTION TO DETERMINE COMPETENCY 
WHITE COPY - Lewiston Police Department YELLOW COpy - St. Joseph Regional Medical Center PINK/tOPY - Ne~ Perce County Sheriffs Office 
Y~f' 210 
HISTORY OF PRESENT ILLNESS: 
This is a 30 year-old female. Cramping abdominal discomfort, pelvic 
~~ scomfort and vaginal bleeding. She thinks she is about 4 or 5 weeks 
~gnant. Her last period was May 13th but she has been having some 
cramping this morning and bleeding this morning about 8. She has had a 
couple other deliveries. She cannot take Tylenol, Ibuproi'en or Aspirin. 
PAST MEDICAL HISTORY: 
Includes depression and some suicidal ideations in the past and 
deliveries and thoracic outlet syndrome. 
SOCIAL HISTORY: 
She is divorced. She does not work. Her doctor is Dr. Black. 
REV~EW OF SYSTEMS: 
Crampy pelvic discomfort, some vaginal bleeding, spotting. No right or 
left quadrant adnexal tenderness, no upper abdominal pain, no flank pain, 
no fever, no chills, no coughing. She has not been pla.gued by headaches 
or vomiting with this. 
PHYSICAL EXAMINATION: 
VITAL SIGNS: Temperature 98.3, blood pressure 107/70, pulse of 84. she 
is in room B. She was quite upset because she had to wait a while. She 
has no facial asymmetry, no scleral icterus, conjunctiva pallor. LUNGS: 
are clear, no flank tenderness. 
Note she has slight suprapubic tenderness. No guarding, no rebound, no 
abdominal distention, no upper abdominal tenderness. No leg swelling, 
calf tenderness or redness. Speculum exam - there is mild, small amount 
of blood in the vaginal vault. The uterus is not particularly large or 
-jer. 
LABORATORY, X-RAYS & OTHER STUDIES: 
CT was done to look for ectopic and basically no pregnancy is seen. She 
does have a small cyst. Her blood type is A-. White count 11,100, 
hemoglobin 14.5. 
IMPRESS ION: 
Probable missed overt abortion. 
PLAN: 
RhoGAM was ordered. Oxycodone for pain. She states she can take that. I 
will discharge her home. The patient was never happy the whole time she 
was here. Always upset. 
EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT REPORT Patient Name: ANDERSON,DESIREE D 
Acct/Unit Number:J8649253 J083899 









PCI **LlVEAFFllAA:VI13IOB~ES:rE) KOVIS IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION TO DETERMINE COMPETENCY 
RuuL: 10/04/07 09:01 by HAm~TZ,CARLA Page 1 of 2 137 211 
NOTE: I did offer her Deme 
MR. LXG 
D: 06/19/2007 20:02:27 
T: 06/23/2007 14:30:01 
482436 
and she refused this cause drove. 
R. HOCUM, M.D. 
EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT REPORT Patient Name: ANDERSON/DESIREE D 
Acct/Unit Number:J8649253 J083899 





Location/Room # ER 
Discharge Date: 06/19/07 
PCI * *LIv4ttIQA:'fF MF &~~lM;J?~lh lZOVIS IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION TO DETERMINE COMPETENCY 
Run: 10/04/07-09:01 by HAUNTZ,CARLA Page 2 of 2 
P1<~TIENT: .~JDERSON,DESIREE D ACCT #: J8649253 LOC: ~R U #: J083899 
AGE/SX: 30/F ROOM: REG: 06/19/07 
DOB:  BED: DIS: 
REG DR: HOCUM, BRIAN STATUS: DEP ER TLOC: DOC.PT.ID: 
-
SPEC if: 0619:STOO043S COLL: 06/19/07-UNK STATUS: COMP REQ if: 01143836 
RECD: 06/19/07-1526 SUBM DR: HOCUM, BRIAN 
ENTERED: 06/19/07-1521 OTHR DR: 
ORDERED: CT/NG DNA SDA 
Test Result Flag Reference 
CT!ftG DNA SDA I I 
> CHLAMYDIA TRACHOMATIS DNA, SDA 
I NOT DETECTED I I NOT DETECTED 
> NEISSERIA GONOt.RHOEAE DNA, SDA 
I NOT DETECTED I I NOT DETECTED 
I 
I Test performed at QUEST DIAGNOSTICS-PORTLAND 
I 6600 SW HAMPTON STREET 
I PORTLAND, OR 97223-8348 
I Director: JOEL M. SHILLING, MD 
I 
QU - QUEST DIAGNOSTICS 
Patient: ANDERSON/DESIREE D Age/Sex: 30/F 
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PATIEhTT: .Al~DERSOlJI DESIREE L 
REG DR: HOCUM, BRIAN 
> 
ABO/RH TYPE 
BLOOD TYPE I A NEG 
ACCT #: J8649253 
AGE/SX: 30/F 
DOB  
STATUS: DEP ER 
ML - PATHOLOGISTS' REGIONAL LABORATORY 
415 6TH ST. LEWISTON, ID 83501 
Patient: ANDERSON, DESIREE D Age/Sex: 30/F 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHARLES E. KOVIS IN SUPPORT 












PATIENT: F.NDERSON,DESIREE L- ACCT #: J8649253 LOC: ,~ ,c,J:\. U #: J083899 
AGE/SX: 30/F ROOM: REG: 06/19/07 
DOB  BED: DIS: 
REG DR: HOCUM, BRIAN STATUS: DEP ER TLOC: DOC.PT.ID: 
SPEC ft.: 0619:HOO167S COLL: 06/19/07-1505 STATUS: COMP REQ ft.: 01143818 
RECD: 06/19/07-1508 SUBM DR: HOCUM, BRIAN 
ENTERED: 06/19/07-1450 OTHR DR: 
ORDERED: CBC/ADIFF/PLT 
Test Result Flag Reference 
CBCLAUTO DIFFiPLT 
> WBC It 11 1 
> RBC I 4.53 
> HGB I 14.5 
> HCT I 41.5 
> MCV I 91.4 
> MeH I 32.0 
> MCHC I 35.0 
> RDW I 12.7 
> PLT CT I 262 
> MPV I 8.1 
> GRAN % I 72 .1 
> LYMPH % I 22.8 
> MONO % I 3.7 
> EOSIN% I 0.9 
> BASO% I 0.5 
> GRAN # I 8.0 
> LYMPH # I 2.5 
MONO # I 0.4 
> EOSIN # I 0.1 
> BASO # I 0.1 
ML - PATHOLOGISTS' REGIONAL LABORATORY 
415 6TH ST. LEWISTON, ID 83501 
Patient: ANDERSON,DESIREE D Age/Sex: 30/F 
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*H I 4.5-11.0 K/mcL I ML 
I 4.00-5.20 M/meL I ML 
I 12.0-15.0 g/dL I ML 
I 36.0-48.0 % I ML 
I 80.0-100.0 fL I ML 
I 26.0-34..0 pg I ML 
I 31.0-36.0 g/dL I ML 
I 11.5-14.5 % I ML 
I 140-440 K/meL I ML 
I 7.4-10.4 fL I ML 
I 38.0-78.0 % I ML 
I 15.5-49.0 % I ML 
I 1.0-9.0 % I ML 
I 0.0-7.0 % I ML 
I 0.0-2.0 % I ML 
I 1.8-8.0 K/meL I ML 
I 1.5-4.8 K/mnL I ML 
I 0.1-0.9 K/meL I ML 
I 0.0-0.7 K/meL I ML 
I 0.0-0.3 K/meL I ML 
Aeet#J8649253 Unit#J083899 
PATIENT: ~~DERSON,DESIREE D 
REG DR: HOCUM, BRIAN 
SPEC #: 0619 :U00036S 
ACCT #: J8649253 
AGE/SX: 30/F 
DOB  










REQ #: 01143713 COLL: 06/19/07-1235 
RECD: 06/19/07-1235 SUBM DR: HOCUM, BRIAN 
~ERED: 06/19/07-1229 OTHR DR: 
ORDERED: UA AUTO, UA MICROSCOPIC 
CO~S: Added Tests: Micro & C&S, if indicated 















































ML - PATHOLOGISTS' REGIONAL LABORATORY 
415 6TH ST. LEWISTON, ID 83501 
Patient: ANDERSON,DESIREE D Age/Sex: 30/F 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHARLES E. KOVIS IN SUPPORT 





I 1. 003-1. 030 
I 5.0-9.0 
I <:30 mg/dL 
I NORM mg/dL 
I NEG mg/dL 
I NORM mg/dL 
I NEG mg/dL 
I H <5 ery/mcL 
I NEG 
I NEG /mcL 
l 
I H 0-2 /hpf 
I 0-4 /hpf 
I FEW /hpf 





















HISTORY OF PRESENT ILLNESS: 
Desiree is a 30 year-old who was seen yesterday by Dr. Hocum for 
spontaneous abortion. She returns for administration of RhoGAM. She 
states she is still having some pain but is doing reasonably well on the 
·codone. 
I spent some time talking to her about miscarriage and the rational 
behind giving the RhoGAM. The patient will follow up with Dr. Black. 
MR. LXG 
D: 06/20/2007 07: 24: 01 
T: 06/23/2007 20:05:41 
481490 
JAY A. HUNTER, M.D. 
MINOR CARE DEPARTMENT REPORT Patient Name: ANDERSON, DESIREE D 
Acct/Unit Number:J8650244 J083899 
ST JOSEPH REGIONAL 
MEDICAL CENTER 
Lewiston, Idaho 
Physician: HUNTER, JAY 
Admit Date: 
Location/Room # MC 
Discharge Date: 06/20/07 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHARLES E. KOVIS IN SUPPORT 
PCI **LIV(jPMO'ffof.Pfc9m-fETavfim COMPETENCY 
Run: 10/04/07 09:01 by HAUNTZ,CARLA 
DRAFT COPY 
ft/s 017 
St. Joseph Regional Medical Center P.O. BOX 816 .. illiISTOIl.lDAHO 83501 (2M) 7.(3·2511 
PATIENT HAIIE/ADORfSS ACCOUNT 110. 1R()(li/BEO ITIPE LOCATION/SERVICE IMEDICAL RECORD NO. 
ANDERSON ,11:5 IREE 0 J8649253 ER ER J083899 
1029 CEMR AVE TRLR 17 DATE OF elm lASE SEX M.S. RElIG[QM I~ IARRIVAL MODE 
LEWISTON,ID 83501 12115176 30 F 0 t() PREFEREN W WALK 
POOHE (208)553-1516 PERSON TO NOTI FYI AIJIlRESS RElATIONSHIP 
SOC. SEC. NO. 538-90-9318 ANI1:RSON.NADlNE I1JTHER 
EMPLOYER UNEMPLOYED 1029 CEOAR AVE #11 
GJARAJITOR tWtEf ADDRESS LEWISTON. m 83501 
AlVERSON. DES IREE 0 H~E PHONE (208)746-5741 WORK PHONE 
1029 CEMR AVE TRLR 17 NEXT OF KIN/ADDRESS RElATIONSHIP 
LEWISTON.ID 83501 J(}INSTON. HIOfAEL EXH 
PHONE (208}553-1576 1029 CEDAR AVE #23 
RElATIONSHIP SM-IE f.S PAT! ENT LEWISTON,rn 83501 
EMPLOYER UNEMPLOYED 
FIIWICIAl ClASS SELF HaiE PHONE (208)790-2740 WIJRI( PHONE SCHWABS SCREW 
INSURANCE NNIE POLlCY N~BER COVERAGE NUMBER SUBSCRIBER INSURED NAHE 
SELF PAY ANDERSON.DESIREE 0 
ACCIDENT INFORMATIOII REASON FOR VISIT HAIDEN/OTllER 7WiE 
CIO ABD CRAMPING/VAG BLEEDING J(}INSTON DESIREE 
ACCIDENT DATEITIHE CC»IHEHTS URGENT ADVANCEO DIRECTIVES 
Faro Dr: BLACK. ELIZABETH UNK 
AIlfISSION DATEfTIHE ADKITl1NG PKYSrCIAN ATTENDING PHYSICIAN REGISTRAR 
06/12107 12: 15 HOCUM BRIAN AD.SJH 
DISCHARGE DATE/TIME DISCHARGED TO: HOSPITAL DAYS SERVICE 
~~~{CONOITIOH AfTER SllJOY RESPONSIBLE FOR Af)!ISSION) 
filf~M'~~~l~ 
~~ ...... ~·· ... r: ~:ta.:~r.<.;~;~ 
~~ . .' 
CONSULTAIITS 
CONDITICII ON RECOVERED 1I1PROVED NOT IMPROVED DIED: UNDER 48 Hrs. -
DISCHARE£: OVER 46 Krs. - - - -
I certify that the narr~ive descr1ptions of the principal AI: 1111111111 mil Mil II DRlII.IIIIU 
and secondary diDgnosis and the major procedures performed 
are accurate and canplate to the best of IIY 1:n0000ledge. 
Uf: HIIIIII ill 11111 Bill 111111111 
X Lf: IIIIIIIIIIIIUII 
SIGNATURE OF AlTENOIIiG PKYSICIAN I DATE 
FORH ID: FS (Face Sheet) IIIIUIIWIIII ANESltlESIA PHYSICIAN 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHARLES E. KOVIS IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION TO DETERMINE COMPETENCY 
CHART Inpt/Opt Admission Record 
lIme: '-L.t? \Pall6fltNaml3: A,A\..t.r~,-., /J.......J: .. ·I,;'<L'~ Injury Dyes DNo 
TRiAGE/.£HI~COUPt..AlIiT: .:k. A~D c.."'''..,-(Ai--. r IJ"'~;N"{ ,~~ (.w_"';""~-k..~ /"'1(-1 
N&.~ ~-t- -t- hr I-,A .. ~':5.. )pIJ...., ;i;. \.~&... ....K.a....- A ",.JJ .... ~ I )O~, ~ 14, ...L 
rl,~·cL." rl'A""""L--.. -...,,,,.. IJ.~:~ , ~...' 
M.-,~·,· ~1,.l- ....... JiITIIKlt ~pocludlng arc &. haobaI) ......!.-=..::-::....L • ..l.I-'----"!L:....=...-=---__________________________ _ 
L.aIex Allergy Aisle: ~~ ) Delayed / Immed1a18 
ON RY If Yes: (ee. .. HypeswRlOllMty Hyper&oo6ltM1y 
Pr.M-i: ..!¥None 0 COPO/Astilma 0 Cardlae PBtienl'a PI1mary Care Physician TIme NotIIIed 11me Respond NIJr.le Init. AuthOItz:ed Denied 
o 0Iab.taa 0 Setzures 0 Hypenentlon 
Other. E.D. DoctOr to see 0 
Tobacco Use ,QfYesC No tJYB8~ 
I ~~Node: 0 ,.---' ..... aJr BP IO~--;;;..... TflmPq i!J.
T 
Weight # PoAIN. hi (0-1) (2-16) 
~: .. ".. n' ...... '" , :::::-_;LY (L')1 =NoPwn NEOfUo.TAL/PB>IATRIC 
o Ambulance 0 Ponce kg 1 = 1oI1k! PdIn I i> Age Appropnata: 
o Carried 0 Stretcher P c: ~ 00 AI~ R J -") 2= ModEIratB Pan 0 o Nr 0 Transler I- I _.. <:....- Hei!tlt 3= Quite a Lal 01 Pain Growl!"! 0 Development 
t-==------=---=-:.::..:..:--+-~~-=::....:..:~L-~.:::;:--,-L:,;:;~--__I OOFC < 2 yrs. PAN 
Pul$a ())jmeter Dale 0113$t Tetanus \LNMP n-S" .. ..t.... ~ 4= Vr:ryRad Pail 0 Invnuntlalloos Current 
O 0 
"1 -~~ '",,". 5= Unbearable 
t-_Room __ M_' __ 02 __ L ___ "'".r.... ________ .l-_.&:. 10':..;::.. ~~ ............ ;,;: ,:~l-'~ ... ~t-I (Describe Oumioo. Loca1ion & Ouaity in 0 Information GillenJPCP 
'Q. \. . -' Chiel Complainlj ruferral for 1o/!?N-1.Ip 
PRE·HOSPITAL CARE: "'< N/A 0 Refer 10 EMS Report/Radio Communlcallon Form -
~, ~lable IEII/eI 01 psin control 10 
,I-Q res 0 No ________________ the pt./ family. LEll'ELG-S ~,.,~'-tf~1=_---------I 
________________________ ---'-___ ~anaoementEdu~o lHIAGEACl!ITY: 
CARE AT HOME: 
Airway: ~P8Ief1t 0 PartlaHy Obstructed OObslrucled 
Breathing: 4lNOfTTIaJ OLaborad OShanew 
arculatlon: iflPink o Pale OCyarotic 
Skln: PW3ITT1 OHol DQ)d DOry 
Pain Scale:lmpor1ance of dfectiI,oe Non-U . 
Pain Managll<T1l>l1t, Intarwntlons '1;0-..... rgent ~ 
~=ad~m~moo~.~---------~~~. ~~~ Me 
o Diaphoretic TRIAGE INTERVEH'TlON: 0 NA Emergent 
Isolation Menta.! Statva: ~Alert OCoopemtille OAnxlous OLethargic 
k=::-::-:-:-=~~~OrIenIad~~~X~===--...-:O~CO~nfused~~-=O~co~m~ba1~iIIQ~~O~u~nco~n~soous~·  Precautions: 0 Yes 0 No 
VISUAL ACUrrY 0 lea 0 SpI"KTI 0 Drasslng 
AddltiooaJ Record Supplements 
o Focus 01 Can! / T realmen1 (pg 4) 
o Code 4 Sheet 
o Bum Flow Sheet 
o Cardiac Row Shea! 
o Neuro Row Sheet 
o Special Spiritual Religious 
~OS~:~~~==~O~~~.~~~~~~O~w~~~~~II~~~~~O~~~==~a~I~==~~O~Wft~h~~~m.~md3~~ ~ds _______ _ 
"'.N. Signature: ... ~ ) .,( ~ . ~ ) Time: 12 I ~ 0 O1her 
.:-RAY PeMs ~AATO~ P .(; leIan Orders: 0 Upgmde to ED 0 Pt nollftad of upgrade 
CheSt (one) '::oor ~ ~ d) t-_~Jlle::....l' 0-"--'A'--.L'J-'.rtu,~.L.: . L¥-:...17cr:::~=.£))----------------~ 
~~!:) ~~;:) ~~3!c.hr-______________ -O ___ ·~~--------__ ------------------------------~ 
ABO (two) Anlde (canp) Yfardlae PaneI/ _.AT /1 
Initials 
fool (corrp) CKt: MB Strt If ... • I ~ L4"1 .... Y 
Hand Toes Triponin I I'" I ~ .A' / 0_ .A 
Rll\Icrs Bela HeG )' v " I J ~ J \ 
Wrist Ribs L R NlG V 
fGnIann IVP Dig level ~ 
7~ 
/ -') .J 
Elbow Mardlble WSR "7J ..... 
=I''''''~ ~ ___ ~-x:J /' 
Humerus Nasal S""h Glucose ~ I ". / ~.... ~~...7"-.. ........... 1'1 /' 
US l\1 Monospot (!-I- ({, "I 1.J r -~ \4 / 
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St. Joseph Regional al Center 
415 6TH STREET· P.O. BOXSI6' ' 
(208) 799·5;. 
IDAHO B3501 
DIAGNOSTIC IMAGING REPORT 
Name: ANDERSON,DESIREE D 
Phys: HOCUM,BRIAN 
DOB:  Age: 30 Sex: F 
Acct!  Loc: ER 
Exam Date: 06/19/2007 Status: REG ER 
Radiology No: 071804 
Unit No: JOB3B99 
EXAM' TYPE/EXAM 
00053829B US/PELVIC US 
History: Abdominal and pelvic pain and cramping with vaginal bleeding. 
Findings: 
The pelvis was imaged both transabdominally and 
endovaginally. The uterus is 4.B x 5.4 x B.4 cm. In the 
myometrium anteriorly in the upper body there is a submucosal 
hypoechoic mass 'which measures 1.8 x 1.9 x 2.0 cm. The 
endometrium is s.:mIil in thickness. Within the endometrial 
can~l·t:here are 'small focal areas of echogenic material which 
coutd be qlood Glots. No gestational sac is seen in the 
utetus:.9r-. ·'In: th~,adnexa. The right ovary is 2.7 x 3.0 x 3.4 
em.~; With.:l;.n:· i't t,here is a simple cyst which measures 2.0 x 2.0 
cm. ~ ThE{tlef.t .ovary is normal and measures 2.3 x 2.7 cm. There 
is ~o othe;r,"evi:dence of a pelvic mass, cyst, free fluid or 
ect9Pic pregnancy. 
' .. : .' 
Impression: : 
1. ~. ~ 11.?F 1. 9 ~ 2: em submucosal mass in tbe fundus of tbe 
uterus. This is probably a submucosal fibroid. 
2., Ecbogenic material within the endometrial canal 
consistent with acute blood products. 
Mark W. Peterson, M.D. 
CC: ELI ZABETH BLACK, M . D. i BRIAN HOCUM 1M. D . 
Transcribed Date/Time: 06/19/2007 (1658) 
Transcriptionist: RD.KJF 
Printed Date/Time: 06/19/2007 (1703) 
PAGE 1 CHART COpy 
~UMM1fjfu§)F CHARLES E. KOVIS IN SUPPORT 




Nez Perce County I Idaho 
Post Office Box 1267 
Lewiston{ Idaho 83501 
Telephone: (208) 799-3073 
Ft LED 
2J8 DEC l PtPl 'f '+7 
CLERK OF THE DIST. COURT 
~ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNlY OF NEZ PERCE 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ) CASE NO. CR2007-0008107 
Plaintiff, ) STATE'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTIONS 
vs. ) 
LEOnS B. BRANIGH III, ) 
Defendant. ) 
Herewith submitted are STATE'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS numbered 
consecutively ONE through FOURTEEN. 
~ 
DATED this day of December 200 
STATE'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS 
DANIEL L. SPICKLER 
Prosecuting Attorney 
jSJ, 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 1 
The Defendant, LEOTIS B. BRANIGH III, is charged by Amended Information 
with the crime of MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE, I.e. § 18-4001, 18-4002 and 18-
4003, a felony, alleged to have been committed in Nez Perce County, State of 
Idaho, on or about the 1st day of October 2007, the charging part of the 
Information being: 
That the Defendant, LEOTIS B. BRANIGH III, on or about the 1st day 
of October 2007, in the County of Nez Perce, State of Idaho, did willfully, 
unlawfully, deliberately, with premeditation, and with malice aforethought 
and/or by lying in wait, kill and murder MICHAEL S. JOHNSTON, a human 
being, by shooting him in the back with a gun from which he died. 
To this Information, the Defendant pled "not gUilty." 




DATED this ___ day of December 2008. 
JUDGE 
STATE'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS 
t53 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 2 
It is not necessary that every that every fact and circumstance put in 
evidence on behalf of the State be established beyond a reasonable doubt, but it is 
necessary to sustain a conviction that all facts and circumstances in evidence, when 
taken together, establish beyond a reasonable doubt the material elements of the 
offense charged. 
State v. Strickland, 136 Idaho 264, 32 P.3d 158 (Ct.App. 01) 




DATED this ___ day of December. 2008. 
JUDGE 
STATE'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 3 
It is alleged that the crime charged was committed "on or about" a certain 
date. If you find the crime was committed, the proof need not show that it was 
committed on that precise date. 
ICJI 208; 
I.e. § 19-1414; State v. Mundell, 66 Idaho 297, 158 P.2d 818 (1945). 




DATED this ___ day of December 2008. 
JUDGE 
STATE'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS 
[55 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 4 
Under our law and system of justice, the Defendant is presumed to be 
innocent. The presumption of innocence means two things. 
First, the State has the burden of proving the Defendant guilty. The state has 
that burden throughout the trial. The Defendant is never required to prove his 
innocence, nor does the Defendant ever have to produce any evidence at all. 
Second, the State must prove the alleged crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 
A reasonable doubt is not a mere possible or imaginary doubt. It is a doubt based 
on reason and common sense. It is the kind of doubt which would make an ordinary 
person hesitant to act in the most important affairs of his or her own life. If after 
considering all the evidence you have a reasonable doubt about the Defendant's 
guilt, you must find the Defendant not guilty. 
ICJI 103A 




DATED this ___ day of December 2008. 
JUDGE 
STATE'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 5 
In order for the Defendant to be guilty of Murder, the State must prove each 
of the following: 
1. On or about the 1st day of October 2007, 
2. in the State of Idaho 
3. the Defendant, LEOTIS B. BRANIGH III, engaged in conduct which 
caused the death of MICHAEL S. JOHNSTON, 
4. the Defendant acted without justification or excuse, and 
5. with malice aforethought. 
If you find that the State has failed to prove any of the above beyond a 
reasonable doubt, you must find the Defendant not guilty of First Degree Murder. If 
you find that all of the above have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then 
you must decide if the Defendant is guilty of first degree murder. 
ICJI 704; 
I.e. § 18-4001. 




DATED this ___ day of December 2008. 
JUDGE 
STATE'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS 
iS7 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. _=6 __ 
In order for the Defendant to be guilty of First Degree Murder, the State 
must prove that the murder: 
was a willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing. Premeditation means to 
consider beforehand whether to kill or not to kill, and then to decide to kill. 
There does not have to be any appreciable period of time during which the 
decision to kill was considered, as long as it was reflected upon before the 
decision was made. A mere unconsidered and rash impulse, even though it 
includes an intent to kill, is not premeditation. 
If you unanimously agree that the State has proven the above special 
circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the Defendant guilty of 
first degree murder. If you unanimously agree that the special circumstance has 
not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the Defendant 
guilty of second degree murder. 
All other murder is murder of the second degree. 
ICJI705 




DATED this ___ day of December 2008. 
JUDGE 
STATE'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 7 
You heard testimony that the Defendant, Leotis B. Branigh III, made a 
statement to the police concerning the crime charged in this case. You must decide 
what, if any, statements were made and give them the weight you believe is 
appropriate, just as you would any other evidence or statements in the case. 
ICJI 323 




DATED this ___ day of December 2008. 
JUDGE 
STATE'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 8 
"Malice" and "maliciously" mean the desire to annoy or injure another or the 
intent to do a wrongful act. 
IC]I343 




DATED this _____ day of December 2008. 
JUDGE 
STATE'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 9 
Malice may be express or implied. 
Malice is express when there is manifested a deliberate intention unlawfully 
to kill a human being. 
Malice is implied when: 
1. The killing resulted from an intentional act, 
2. The natural consequences of the act are dangerous to human 
life, and 
3. The act was deliberately performed with knowledge of the 
danger to, and with conscious disregard for, human life. 
When it is shown that a killing resulted from the intentional doing of an act 
with express or implied malice, no other mental state need be shown to establish 
the mental state of malice aforethought. The mental state constituting malice 
aforethought does not necessarily require any ill will or hatred of the person killed. 
STATE'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS 
The word "aforethought" does not imply deliberation or the lapse of time. It 
only means that the malice must precede rather than follow the act. 
ICJI703; 
I.e. § 18-4002. 




DATED this ___ day of December 2008. 
JUDGE 
STATE'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 10 
A witness who has special knowledge in a particular matter may give an 
opinion on that matter. In determining the weight to be given such opinion, you 
should consider the qualifications and credibility of the witness and the reasons 
given for the opinion. You are not bound by such opinion. Give it the weight, if 
any, to which you deem it entitled. 
ICJI 345 




DATED this ___ day of December 2008. 
JUDGE 
STATE'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. _=1=1 __ 
The death penalty is not a sentencing option for the court or the jury in this 
case. 
ICJI 1701; 
I.e. § 18-4004A(2). 




DATED this ___ day of December 2008. 
JUDGE 
STATE'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 12 
A "deadly weapon or instrument" is one likely to produce death or great 
bodily injury. It also includes any other object that is capable of being used in a 
deadly or dangerous manner if the person intends to use it as a weapon. 
ICJI 1206; 
State v. Missenberger, 86 Idaho 321, 386 P.2d 559 (1963); 
State v. Lenz, 103 Idaho 632, 651 P.2d 566 (Ct. App. 1982). I.e. § 18-905(d). 




DATED this ___ day of December 2008. 
JUDGE 
STATE'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. _..:::1=3 __ 
In this case you will return a verdict, consisting of a series of questions. 
Although the explanations on the verdict form are self-explanatory, they are part of 
my instructions to you. I will now read the verdict form to you. It states: 
"We, the Jury f for our verdict, unanimously answer the question(s) 
submitted to us as follows: 
QUESTION NO.1: Is LEOTIS B. BRANIGH III, guilty or not guilty of 
MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE? 
Not Guilty __ Guilty ___ _ 
If you unanimously answered Question No.1 "Guilty", then proceed to 
answer Question No.2. If you unanimously answered Question No.1 "Not 
Guilty" , then you should simply sign the verdict form and advise the bailiff. 
QUESTION NO.2: Did LEOTIS B. BRANIGH III, personally use a deadly 
weapon in the commission of the crime of which you have found him guilty? 
YES: NO: ___ _ 
The verdict form then has a place for it to be dated and signed. You should sign the 
verdict form as explained in another instruction. 
ICJI223 




DATED this ___ day of December 2008. 
JUDGE 
STATE'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 14 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 




CASE NO. CR2007-0008107 
VERDICT FORM 
We, the Jury, duly impaneled and sworn to try the above-entitled action, for 
our verdict, unanimously answer the question(s) submitted to us as follows: 
QUESTION NO.1: Is LEOTIS B. BRANIGH III, guilty or not guilty of 
MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE? 
Not Guilty __ Guilty ___ _ 
If you unanimously answered Question No.1 "Guilty", then proceed to 
answer Question No.2. If you unanimously answered Question No.1 "Not 
Guilty" f then you should simply sign the verdict form and advise the bailiff. 
QUESTION NO.2: Did LEOTIS B. BRANIGH III, personally use a deadly 
weapon in the commission of the crime of which you have found him guilty? 
YES: NO: ----
DATED this __ day of December 2008. 
Presiding Officer 
STATE'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS 
rip 7 
Charles E. Kovis 
Attorney at Law 
312 S. Washington 
Post Office Box 9292 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
Telephone: (208) 882-3939 
Fax: (208) 882-5379 
Idaho State Bar # 4700 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 









CASE NO. CR-07-8107 
MOTION FOR PSYCHOLOGIST 
FEES AND COSTS 
UNDER SEAL 
COMES NOW, CHARLES E. KOVIS, attorney for Leotis B. Branigh III and moves this 
court for an allowance of psychologist fees and costs in this matter. This Motion for Psychologist 
Fees and Costs is supported by the affidavit of the undersigned submitted with this motion. 
~ 1U-
DATED this d i day of November, 2008. f(l 
L/~ E,(~~ 
Charles E. Kovis 
Attorney for Leotis B. Branigh III 
MOTION FOR PSYCHOLOGIST FEES AND COSTS 1 
r6Y 
Charles E. Kovis 
312 S. Washington 
Post Office Box 9292 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
Telephone: (208) 882-3939 
Fax: (208) 882-5379 
Idaho State Bar # 4700 
Attorney for Defendant 
F\lED 
'Ui2 1l1J t P (i\ 2. 1\-3 
~":'-'" 
~ . , 
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LEons B. BRANIGH III, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
:ss. 










CASE NO. CR-07-8107 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHARLES E. KOVIS 
UNDER SEAL 
Charles E. Kovis, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
1. My name is Charles E. Kovis. I am the attorney appointed to represent Mr. Leotis 
B. Branigh III. 
2. On June 21, 2008, I employed a licensed psychologist, Dr. Craig W. Beaver, to 
assist me in the defense of Mr. Branigh. The employment of Dr. Beaver was previously 
approved by Judge Brodie. 
3. Attached to this affidavit is Dr. Beaver's billing invoice which accurately 
AFFIDA VIT OF CHARLES E. KOVIS 1 
depicts all of the time he has expended up to November 13,2008. The amount requested for 
Dr. Beaver's fees at $300.00 per hour is $7,441.75. 
1]1 
Dated: November 'J <b ,2008 
CHARLES E. KOVIS 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this 2. ~ day of November, 2008. 
~\\\\\lIII"I/"111: 
'!>.,"\ \C\f>.. M. FOt!/~ 
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~llt'-47tOF\O"~~\\\: 
flllflllllllll\\\\'\ 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHARLES E. KOVIS 
Notary Public in and for the State of Idaho 
Residing at Moscow therein. 




Craig . Beaver, Ph.D., -eN 
Licensed Psychologist 
250 Bobwhite Court, Suite 220 Boise, Idaho 83706 (208) 336-2972 Fax (208) 336-4408 
Mailing Address: P.O. Box 5445, Boise, Idaho 83705 
Charles Kovis 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 9292 




SSN/TAX 10:  
INVOICE 
RE: leotis B. Branigh, III 
Case # CR-07-8107 
1 hour Review of Records @ $300.00/hr 
4 hours travel time @ $150.00/hr 
2V2 hours Diagnostic Interview @ $300.00/hr 
Total Due: $1650.00 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHARLES E. KOVIS 07.15.2008 
f7/ 
Craig . Beaver, Ph.D., A -eN 
Licensed Psychologist 
250 Bobwhite Court, Suite 220 Boise, Idaho 83706 (208) 336-2972 Fax (208) 336-4408 
Mailing Address: P.O. Box 5445, Boise, Idaho 83705 
Charles Kovis 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 9292 









SSNjTAX ID:  
INVOICE 
RE: leotis B. Branigh, III 
Case # CR-07-8107 
prior invoice - balance due $1650.00 
112 hour Consultation w/ attorney @ $300.00/hr 
2 hours travel time @ $150.00/hr 
airfare @ $277.01 
rental car @ $52.75 
lodging @ $101.99 
9 hours Neuropsychological testing @ $250.00/hr 
2 hours travel time @ 150.00/hr 
Total Due: $5081.75 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHARLES E. KOVIS 08.22.08 
f7~ 
RED LION ----OTEL 
LE\\1IS'TON 
621 21 st Street Lewiston, Idaho 83501 (208) 799-1000 or 800-232-6730 
Reservations BOO-Red lion (800-733-5466) or redlion.com 
DENISON, MR JAMES ROOM NUMBER: 701 
DR CRAIG W. BEAVER DAILY RATE: Muti 
250 BOB WHITE CT STE 220 ROOM TYPE: QQN 
BOISE, ID 83706 USA ACCOUNT: 93600261750 
CLERK: 
DATE DESCRIPTION REFERENCE AMOUNT 
S1l912008 ROOM TAX (2%) ROOM TAX (2%) $1.88 
8/1912008 SALES TAX (6.5%) SALES TAX (6.5%) $6.11 
8/\ 9/2008 ROOM CHARGE #701 DENISON, MR JAMES $94.00 
BALANCE DUE: $101.99 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHARLES E. KOVIS 
fi3 
D ......... 1 ..... ... l 
,;,:"11 
1).\ ~j r\:,j-I'''n i( nl\ Dn""lIil1p n" 7;::'!'C4£fon,~ ~. i\..~~l \. ffii _"-_ .. I ~ 'Jt-"TU .,!. It! 
SERVATI~i # c~7&1948-US-2B 
Rlt 0 1 2 1 5 3 2 5 Cdr SI'QllO C 
K CHPJ COBA 4DR WA 419X.RZ ' 
DENISON, JAMES 
Out lEWISTO~{, ID APT 19AU608!1841 
In IE..IISTON, ID APT 20AUG'~!153"0 
Miles-Out 5551 Miles-In 55&4 
Miles lli'iveil 13· Fuel In €l/8 
Method 0 fDa ... = cum 
AI~EX XXXXXXXXXXX1005 
Rate AGIC 0 DY 20 HR 
o MI @ .00 = 
20 HR @ 22..50 = 
o DY @ 44.99 = 
o WK @ 314s93 = 
MIN IDY iAlliC 13FM = 
TIME & MILEAGE = 
it$ 0. 47/DY E~c + = 
*4.30/DHY FEE + = 
Subtotal = 
Tax 6.000~ + = 
Totai Charges = 
AMOUNT DUE CV usn = 
*$J.80!DY CONCESbION FEE & 
$.50/DY VEH LIC FEE RECOUP 









il·· he allollot that appears in "AlIouot Due" has been billed to 'four AMEX Card. , All char'ges al'e subiect to audit and ch.:mge if any et'l'm's al'!! found. . at' local inquil'ies" call 208-746-0488. Tfiank you for rent ing fl'OIll Bmiget 
7D5B! 1CD5/082331 18:31!F 






Peggy Doyle [peggydoyle@comcast.net] 






DR CRAIG BEAVER 
PO BOX 5445 
BOISE ID 83705-0445 
Ticketless confirmation 
DENISON/JAMES*PD 
AUG 13 2008 INVOICE:ITIN LOCATOR:ZLGZNG 
6BQPD 
19 AUG 08 - TUESDAY 
ALASKA 2218 COACH CLASS OPERATED BY-HORIZON AIR 
LV: BOISE 650P NONSTOP MILES- 198 
AR: LEWISTON/CLKS 645P 
SEAT-18B 
FREQ FLYER AS 41864104 
20AUG08-~DNESDAY 
ALASKA 2217 COACH CLASS OPERATED BY-HORIZON AIR 
LV: LEWISTON/CUtS 440P NONSTOP MILES- 198 
AR: BOISE 635P 
SEAT-18B 
FREQ FLYERAS 41864104 
CONFIRMATION FOR TKTLESS TRAVEL IS CF-NAUCYD 
AIR TRANSPORTATION 221.40 TAX 30.61 TIL 252.01 
PROCESSING FEE 25.00 
SUB TOTAL 277.01 
CREDIT CARD PAYMENT 277.01-
AMOUNT DUE 0.00 
PAGE: 01 
AFFIDA VII OF CHARLES E. KOVIS 
1 
Craig . Beaver, Ph.D., A .. eN 
Licensed Psychologist 
250 Bobwhite Court, Suite 220 Boise, Idaho 83706 (208) 336-2972 Fax (208) 336-4408 
Mailing Address: P.O. Box 5445, Boise, Idaho 83705 
Charles Kovis 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 9292 







SSN/TAX ID:  
INVOICE 
RE: Leotis B. Branigh, III 
Case # CR-07-8107 
prior invoice - balance due $5081.75 
Psychological testing @ $150.00 
Psychological testing @ $110.00 
Psychological testing @ $150.00 
2 hours Diagnostic Interview @ $300.00/hr 
2 hours travel time @ 150.00/hr 
Total Due: $6391.75 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHARLES E. KOVIS 09.19.2008 
f7b 
Crai . Beaver, Ph.D., P-CN 
Licensed Psychologist 
250 Bobwhite Court, Suite 220 Boise, Idaho 83706 (208) 336-2972 Fax (208) 336-4408 
Mailing Address: P.O. Box 5445, Boise, Idaho 83705 
Charles Kovis 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 9292 






SSNjTAX ID:  
INVOICE 
RE: Leotis B. Branigh, III 
Case # CR-07-8107 




1 112 hours 
Total Due: 
Consultation w/ attorney @ $300.00/hr 
Collateral Interview @ $300.00/hr 
Review of Records @ $300.00/hr 
Diagnostic Interview @ $300.00/hr 
$72.91.75 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHARLES E. KOVIS 
10.22.2008 
i77 
Crai '. Beaver, Ph.D., 
licensed Psychologist 
250 Bobwhite Court, Suite 220 Boise, Idaho 83706 (208) 336-2972 Fax (208) 336·4408 
Mailing Address: P.O. Box 5445, Boise, Idaho 83705 
Charles Kovis 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 9292 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
10.22.2008 
11.13.2008 
SSN/TAX ID:  
INVOICE 
RE: Leotis B. Branigh, III 
Case # CR-07-8107 
prior invoice - BALANCE PAST DUE $7291.75 
V2 hour Consultation wI attorney @ $300.00/hr 
Total Due: $7441.75 
AFFIDA VIT OF CHARLES E. KOVIS 11.20.2008 
Ylf 
Date: 12/8/2008 
Time: 07:41 AM 
Page 1 of 1 
Second Judicial District Court - Nez Perce County 
Minutes Report 
User: JANET 
Hearing type: Hearing 
Assigned judge: Jeff M. Brudie 
Court reporter: carlton 
Case: CR-2007-0008107 








Minutes clerk: JANET Audio tape number: C 1 
Prosecutor: Daniel L Spickler 
Defense attorney: Charles Kovis 
Tape Counter: 14044 
Tape Counter: 14411 
Tape Counter: 14422 
Tape Counter: 14816 
Tape Counter: 14832 
Tape Counter: 14848 
Tape Counter: 14959 
Tape Counter: 14927 
Tape Counter: 15150 
Tape Counter: 15420 
Tape Counter: 15606 
Tape Counter: 15854 
Tape Counter: 20816 
Tape Counter: 21243 
Crt addresses potential jurors. 
Crt q counsel. 
Counsel are ready to proceed. 
Clerk call roll. 
Crt q State. 
State has no challenges to panel. 
Crt q Mr. Kovis. 
Mr. Kovis has no challenges to panel. 
Crt explains process. 
Clerk swears in potential panel. 
Crt explains process re random drawing for seating. 
Crt introduces self and staff. 
Crt introduces Mr. Spickler from the State. 
Crt introduces Def Mr. Branigh and Mr. Kovis his attorney. 
Crt reads Information. 
Crt reads preliminary instructions. Crt explains general questions. 
Crt begins general questions. 
Crt admonishes potential jurors. 
Crt explains questionnaire. 
Potential jurors may leave after they have filled out the questionnaire. 




IN THE DISTRIC~O~~ O~ ~~~S~OND JDuICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO r "IN,AND~:FOR THE COUNTY OF ~
Plainti~) ~ ~ C ~'{)J~~tXL :~:~~T~O:~~~CAST 
v. ) AND lOR PHOTOGRAPH A 
(L'{9-h1 ~ ~ COURT PROCEEDING 
Defendant (s) . ) 
) 
I hereby request approval to broadcast and/or photograph the 






I have read the attached rule permitting cameras in the 
courtroom and will comply in a~l respects with the Rule and Or.der 






The Court f having considered the request under the rule 
permitting cameras in the trial courtrooms, hereby orders that 
permission to broadcast and/or photograph the above hearing is: 
C><r Granted under the following restrictions: 
C.A)<V\~ \ I f\N<£ W \N Mj;o\llr G.,.h 0': 
] Denied. 
Dated this ~ day of ~~ . 
~ ~~istrate Judge 
Request to Obtain Approval to Broadcast 
AND ORDER 
and/or Photoqraph a Court 
Charles E. Kovis 
Attorney at Law 
312 South Washington Street 
Post Office Box 9292 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
Telephone: (208) 882-3939 
Fax: (208) 882-5379 
LS.B. # 4700 
ckovis@turbonet.com 
Attorney for Defendant 
FI LED 
1m3 fIO Y. FH~ 11. ,3kf 
, • 1', '~;" , i, ":~':~; i2rr 
'0.,.' ~- ~'i' [ . ! l' J r·- .~, .-~ 
," , \,',' I ' 
[=1 L 
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 











CASE NO. CR-07-8107 
MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS 
COMES NOW the Defendant, Leotis B. Branigh III, by and through his Attorney of Record, 
Charles E. Kovis, and at the request of Mr. Branigh, moves this Court for an order staying any 
further proceedings in this matter until Mr. Branigh's appeal of this Court's order dated November 
28,2008 denying his motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds is heard by the Idaho Supreme 
Court. 
This motion is based upon the case of Abney v. United States, 431 US 651 (1977). The 
MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS 1 fil 
United States Supreme Court has ruled that an order denying a petitioner's motion to dismiss on 
double jeopardy grounds is a "final decision" within the meaning of 28 U.S.c. § 1291 and thus 
immediately appealable. The U.S. Supreme Court states in Abney, "(a) Although lacking the finality 
traditionally considered indispensable to appellate review, such an order falls within the "collateral 
order" exception to the final judgment rule announced in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 
337 Us. 541, since it constitutes a complete, formal, and, in the trial court, final rejection of an 
accused's double jeopardy claim, the very nature of which is such that it is collateral to, and 
separable from, the principle issue of whether or not the accused is guilty ofthe offense charged." 
A defendant, in arguing that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment bars his 
prosecution, is contesting the very authority of the Government to hale him into court to face trial 
on the charge against him. 423 Us. 30 (1974); Robinson v. Neil, 409 us. 505, 409 Us. 509 (1923). 
The U.S. Supreme Court also states in Abney, "Finally, the rights conferred on a criminal accused 
by the Double Jeopardy Clause would be significantly undermined if appellate review of double 
jeopardy claims were postponed until after conviction and sentence. To be sure, the Double 
Jeopardy Clause protects an individual against being twice convicted for the same crime, and that 
aspect of the right can be fully vindicated on an appeal following fmaljudgment, as the Government 
suggests. However, this Court has long recognized that the Double Jeopardy Clause protects an 
individual against more than being subjected to double punishments." (Emphasis added) 
Also, Hawkins, in his pleas to the Crown, says that both the pleas of autrefois acquit and 
autrefois convict are grounded on the maxim that, 'a man shall ... not be brought into danger of his 
life for one and the same offence more than once,' cited in Ex Parte Lange, 85 Us. 163 (J 873) Also 
in Ex Parte Lange, 85 Us. 163 (1873), the u. S. Supreme court states, "There is no more sacred duty 
MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS 2 
of a court than, in a case properly before it, to maintain unimpaired those securities for the personal 
rights of the individual which have received for ages the sanction of the jurist and the statesman; and, 
in such cases, no narrow or illiberal construction should be given to the words of the fundamental 
law in which they are embodied." 
DATED this 4th day of December 2008. 
~~.(~ 
Charles E. Kavis 
Attorney for Defendant Leotis B. Branigh III 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Lf~ I hereby certify that on the day of December, 
2008, a true and correct copy of this Motion to Stay Proceedings 
was hand-delivered to: 
DANIEL SPICKLER 
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
P.O. BOX 1267 
LEWISTON, IDAHO 83501 
{k~ f. I~ 
Charles E. Kovis 
MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS 3 
Leotis Branigh III 
Nez Perce County Jail 
P.O. Box 896 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Pro Se Appellant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECO D JUDI IAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR NEZ PE CE COUNTY 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff- Respondent 
vs. 











CASE NO. CR-07-8107 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-
ENTITLED COURT: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named Appellant, Leotis B. Branigh III, appeals against the above-named 
respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Opinion and Order on Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss and Motion in Limine, entered in the above entitled action on the 28th day November 2008, 
Honorable JeffM. Brudie presiding. 
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgments or 
orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to LA.R. 11 (c)(3) 
and the case of Abney v. United States, 431 Us. 651 (1977). The United States Supreme Court has 
NOTICE OF APPEAL Page 1 
ruled that an order denying a petitioner's motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds is a "final 
decision" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and thus immediately appealable. The U.S. 
Supreme Court states in Abney, "(a) Although lacking the finality traditionally considered 
indispensable to appellate review, such an order falls within the "collateral order" exception to the 
final judgment rule announced in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 Us. 541, since 
it constitutes a complete, formal, and, in the trial court, final rejection of an accused's double 
jeopardy claim, the very nature of which is such that it is collateral to, and separable from, the 
principle issue of whether or not the accused is guilty of the offense charged." A defendant, in 
arguing that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment bars his prosecution, is contesting 
the very authority of the Government to hale him into court to face trial on the charge against him. 
423 U S. 30 (1974); Robinson v. Neil, 409 Us. 505, 409 Us. 509 (1923). The U.S. Supreme Court 
also states in Abney, "Finally, the rights conferred on a criminal accused by the Double Jeopardy 
Clause would be significantly undermined if appellate review of double jeopardy claims were 
postponed until after conviction and sentence. To be sure, the Double Jeopardy Clause protects an 
individual against being twice convicted for the same crime, and that aspect of the right can be fully 
vindicated on an appeal following final judgment, as the Government suggests. However, this Court 
has long recognized that the Double Jeopardy Clause protects an individual against more than being 
subjected to double punishments." (Emphasis added) 
Also, Hawkins, in his pleas to the Crown, says that both the pleas of autrefois acquit and 
autrefois convict are grounded on the maxim that, 'a man shall ... not be brought into danger of his 
life for one and the same offence more than once,' cited in Ex Parte Lange, 85 Us. 163 (1873) Also 
in Ex Parte Lange, 85 us. 163 (1873), the U.S.Supreme court states, "There is no more sacred duty 
NOTICE OF APPEAL Page 2 
ffS 
of a court than, in a case properly before it, to maintain unimpaired those securities for the personal 
rights of the individual which have received for ages the sanction of the jurist and the statesman; 
and, in such cases, no narrow or illiberal construction should be given to the words of the 
fundamental law in which they are embodied." 
3. The appellant intends to raise the following issues on appeal, provided that this list of 
issues is not exhaustive, and shall not prevent the appellant from asserting other issues on appeal. 
a. Did the District Court err in denying defendant's Motion to Dismiss on 
Grounds of Double Jeopardy? 
b. Did the District Court err in finding that the defendant was not "put in 
jeopardy of life or limb" in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution, when a deputy sheriff, who later admitted to consuming 
alcohol, prior to the incident, opened fire on defendant/defendant's vehicle 
with a military style assault rifle which he was not POST certified to use, and 
continued to fire at the defendant an unknown amount of times estimated to 
be in excess of a dozen, through approximately three miles of residential 
neighborhoods, though the defendant's vehicle slowed significantly and was 
disabled while the majority of the shots were fired and continuing to slow as 
the deputy who later said he "doesn't remember" firing the AR-l5 after the 
tire was deflated, continued to fire at an unarmed defendant who had made 
no threatening or provocative acts toward law enforcement? 
c. Did the District Court err in finding that the language of the Fifth 
Amendment which states: "nor shall any person .. for the same offense ... 
NOTICE OF APPEAL Page 3 
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb," cannot be interpreted literally in 
cases where a defendant is unnecessarily, unlawfully, and/or recklessly "put 
injeopardy oflife or limb" by law enforcement officers who act with wanton 
neglect, recklessness, or criminal intent, and that a defendant has the right to 
contest the very authority of the Government to then hale him into court to 
fact trial on the charge against him after being subject to such acts? 
4. There is a portion of the record that is sealed but that portion sealed has no bearing on this 
appeal. That portion sealed deals with financial matters. 
5. a. A reporter's transcript is requested. 
b. The appellant requests the preparation of the Pretrial Motions Hearing held 
on November 25, 2008. 
6. The appellant requests the standard clerk's record pursuant to LA.R. 28(b )(2). 
7. I certify: 
a. That a copy ofthis notice of appeal is being served on each reporter of whom 
a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below: 
Name and Address: 
Linda Carlton, Court Reporter 
Nez Perce County Courthouse 
P.O. Box 896 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
b. That the appellant is exempt from paying the estimated transcript fee because 
he is indigent. (Idaho Code § 31-3220, 31-3220A, IAR 27(e)) 
c. That the Appellant is exempt from paying for the preparation of the record 
NOTICE OF APPEAL Page 4 
vY7 
because the appellant is indigent. (Idaho Code § 31-3220, 31-3220A, IAR 
27(e)) 
d. That the appellant is exempt from paying the appellant filing fee because this 
is a criminal appeal. (I.A.R. 23 (a) (8)) 
e. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant 
to Rule 20 and the attorney general ofIdaho pursuant to Section 67-1401 (1), 
Idaho Code. 
DATED this ~ day of December, 2008. 
~.~6.&5~?j 
OTIS B. BRANIGHIIjro Se 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
:ss. 
County of Nez Perce ) 
Leotis B. Branigh, being sworn, deposes and says: 
That the party is the appellant in the above-entitled appeal and that all statements in this 
notice of appeal are true and correct to the best of his knowledge and belief. 
~tu-P<£44~ 
. EOTIS B. BRANI III, Appellant 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this ~day of December 2008. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Notary Public in and for the State ofIdaho 
Residing at Moscow therein. 
My commission expires: ! 1-. - (P - dteJ (J-
Page 5 
ppp 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this y -\-~ day of December, 2008, caused a true and correct 
copy of the attached NOTICE OF APPEAL to be hand delivered to: 
DANIEL SPICKLER 
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
P.O. BOX 1267 
LEWISTON, IDAHO 83501 
LINDA CARLTON, COURT REPORTER 
NEZ PERCE COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
P.O. BOX 896 
LEWISTON, IDAHO 83501 
and mailed, postage pre-paid, first class, to: 
LAMONT ANDERSON 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE 
P.O. BOX 83720-0010 
BOISE, IDAHO 83720 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
:e.dW~'1~ , eotis B. Branigh II , Pro Se Appellant 
Page 6 
Date: 12/8/2008 
Time: 07:35 AM 
Page 1 of 1 
Second Judicial District Court - Nez Perce County 
Minutes Report 
Case: CR-2007-0008107 
Defendant: Branigh, Leotis Brannon III 
Selected Items 
User: JANET 
Hearing type: Hearing on Motions Minutes date: 12/05/2008 
08:34 AM 
09:02 AM 
Assigned judge: Jeff M. Brudie Start time: 
Court reporter: carlton End time: 
Minutes clerk: JANET Audio tape number: C2 
Prosecutor: Daniel L Spickler 
Defense attorney: Charles Kavis 
Tape Counter: 83424 
Tape Counter: 83526 
Tape Counter: 83621 
Tape Counter: 83852 
Tape Counter: 84206 
Tape Counter: 84408 
Tape Counter: 94833 
Tape Counter: 85023 
Tape Counter: 85010 
Tape Counter: 85206 
Tape Counter: 85410 
Tape Counter: 85626 
Tape Counter: 85659 
Tape Counter: 90135 
Crt outside presence of jury in ct rm 2. Crt reviews previously ruling on mtns. Defs mtn to 
dismiss re double jeopardy issue and mtn in limine re cell phone records. 
Crt address mtn to reconsider re cell phone records. 
State reviews federal statute and presents statement. 
Mr. Kovis presents statement. 
State responds. 
Crt presents comments. Crt addresses issue of standing and presents comments and 
reviews case law. Def does have stal)ding to challenge the search warrant validity. Crt 
finds a governmental entity can include a state court and presents comments. 
Crt finds the federal statute does provide for a state service and presents comments. Crt 
does reconsider and reverses its previously ruling. 
Crt addresses mtn in limine re cell phone records is denied. State will still have to lay 
foundation for records. 
Crt addresses Defs mtn to dismiss re double jeopardy issue. Crt addresses Defs mtn to 
stay proceedings and appeal filed. Crt has reviewed. 
Mr. Kovis presents statement. 
State presents statement. 
Mr. Kovis responds. 
Crt reviews case law and presents comments. Crt reviews appellate law. Crt finds no right 
to automatic appeal. Crt reviews 12A permissive appeal. Crt finds no SUbstantial grounds 
have been laid and that is not appropriate. 
Crt denies Defsmtn to stay proceedings. Crt will return to ct rm 1 for jury selection. 
COURT MINUTES 
Date: 12/8/2008 
Time: 07:34 AM 
Page 1 of 8 
Second Judicial District Court - Nez Perce County 
Minutes Report 
User: JANET 
Hearing type: Jury Trial 
Case: CR·2007·0008107 
Defendant: Branigh, Leotis Brannon III 
Selected Items 
Minutes date: 
Assigned judge: Jeff M. Brudie Start time: 
12/05/2008 
09:02 AM 
12:00 AM Court reporter: carlton End time: 
Minutes clerk: JANET Audio tape number: C1 
Prosecutor: Daniel L Spickler 
Defense attorney: Charles Kavis 
Tape Counter: 90809 
Tape Counter: 91129 
Tape Counter: 91149 
Tape Counter: 91449 
Tape Counter: 91507 
Tape Counter: 91610 
Tape Counter: 91933 
Tape Counter: 92222 
Tape Counter: 92430 
Tape Counter: 92659 
Tape Counter: 93428 
Tape Counter: 94546 
Crt on record in Ct Rm 1 with potential jurors. Crt and attorneys have reviewed the jury 
questionnaire and the Crt has excused some of the potential jurors. 
Crt q State. 
State is ready to proceed. 
Crt q Mr. Kavis. 
Mr. Kavis is ready to proceed. 
Crt reviews trial process. Crt begins general questions. 
State q potential juror. 
Mr. Kavis objects to last question. 
Crt sustains objection. 
State continues q. 
Mr. Kavis has nothing further. 
Crt presents comments. Crt excuses #26 Walter Mcintosh. Crt replaces Chair #26 with 
Tiffany McFetridge (#44). Crt q Ms. McFetridge. 
Crt cant general qustions. 
State has no questions. 
Mr. Kavis challenges juror for cause. 
Crt grants request and excuses #23 Vance Aram for cause. 
State has no questions. 
Mr. Kavis challenges juror for cause. 
Crt grants request and excused #35 Karen Colpitts for cause. 
Crt moves Darlene Chase #45 to Chair #23. 
Crt moves Raymond Faling #46 to Chair #35. 
Crt cant general questions. 
State begins general questions. 
Crt explains individual voir dire. 
Tape Counter: 94627 Mr. Kavis begins general questions. 
Tape Cou~{JtJW.t{2:MINU'rnswill take recess at 10:30. Crt admonishes jury panel. 
f9/ 
Date: 12/8/2008 
Time: 07:34 AM 
Page 20f8 
Tape Counter: 105012 
Tape Counter: 105400 
Second Judicial District Court - Nez Perce County 
Minutes Report 
Case: CR-2007-0008107 
Defendant: Branigh, leotis Brannon III 
S~lected Items 
Back on record. All parties present and ready to proceed. 
User: JANET 
Crt addresses individual voir dire questioning. Crt releases audience. #47- #70 are to 
return at 1:15 p.m. #71 -#100 are to return at 3:00 p.m. Crt admonishes audience. 
Back on record outside presence of jury in jury room for individual voir dire. 
Crt will question 
#8 George Poleson 
#9 Janet Kaufman 
#12 Dale Frost 
#13 Shelly Wiemer 
#14 Aaron Clark 
#25 Daniel Quinlan 
#30 William Wicks. 
State request to question: 
#15 Mary Hudon 
#17 Scott Solom 
#22 Jolene Hopper 
#26 Tiffany McFetridge 
#28 Melvin Wilkinson 
Mr. Kovis request to question: 
#11 Kelly Harwick. (was previously released until 3:00 p.m. and will be questioned then) 
Crt released jurors #1 - #7 to come back at 3:00 p.m. 
Robert Simons, Richard Mitchell, Dana Fowler, Rian Vanleuven, Edwin Buettner, Sandra 
Brandolino, and Steve Luoma. 
Crt begins questions of #8 George Poleson. 
State questions Mr. Poleson. 
Mr. Kovis questions Mr. Poleson. 
Crt releases Mr. Poleson until 3:00 p.m. 
Crt begins questions of #9 Janet Kaufman. 
State questions Ms. Kaufman. 
Mr. Kovis questiohs Ms. Kaufman. Mr. Kovis challenges for cause. 
Crt agrees. Crt excuses Ms. Kaufman for cause. 
Crt moves Phil Heitstuman #47 to Chair #9. 
Crt releases #11 Kelly Harwick and #10 Rocky GoffineU until 3:00 p.m. 
Crt begins questions of #12 Dale Frost. 
State questions Mr. Frost. 
Mr. Kovis has no questions. 
Crt releases Mr. Frost until 3:00 p.m. 
COURT MINUTES 
Date: 12/8/2008 
Time: 07:34 AM 
Page 3 of 8 
Tape Counter: 0 
Tape Counter: 0 
Second Judicial District Court - Nez Perce County 
Minutes Report 
Case: CR-2007 -0008107 
Defendant: Branigh, Leotis Brannon III 
Selected Items 
Crt begins questions of #13 Shelly Wiemer. 
State questions Ms. Wiemer. 
Mr. Kovis questions Ms. Wiemer. 
Sate has no objections to Ms. Wiemer being released for hardship. 
Mr. Kovis has no objections. 
Crt excuses Ms. Wiemer for hardship. 
Crt moves Dennis Munden #49 to Chair #13. 
Crt begins questions of #14 Aaron Clark. 
State questions Mr. Clark. 
Mr. Kovis has no questions and challenges for cause. 
Crt excused Mr. Clark for cause. 
Crt moves Shawna Clark #50 to Chair #14. 
Crt releases remaining panel until 3:00 p.m. except 7 individuals. 
Crt begins questions of #15 Mary Hudon. 
State questions Ms. Hudon. 
Mr. Kovis has no questions. 
Crt releases Ms. Hudon until 3:00 p.m. 
Crt begins questiolns of #17 Scott Solom. 
State questions Mr. Solom. 
Mr. Kovis has no questions. 
Crt questions Mr. Solom. Crt releases Mr. Solom until 3:00 p.m. 
Crt begins questions of #22 Jolene Hopper. 
State questions Ms. Hopper. 
User: JANET 
Mr. Kovis questions Ms. Hopper. Mr. Kovis requests Ms. Hopper be released based on his 
personal knowledge of her. 
State has no objection. 
Crt excused Mr. Hopper. 
Crt moves Drew Piper #53 to Chair #22. 
Crt begins questions of #25 Daniel Quinlan. 
State indicates he knows Mr. Quinlan personally. 
Mr. Kovis has no questions and challenges for cause. 
Crt excuses Mr. Quinlan for cause. 
Crt moves Jerry Mallory #55 to Chair #25. 
Crt begins questions of #26 Tiffany McFetridge. 
State questions Ms. McFetridge. 
Mr. Kovis questions Ms. McFetridge. 
Crt releases Ms. McFetridge until 3:00 p.m. 
Crt begins questions of #28 Melvin Wilkinson. 
State questions Mr. Wilkinson. 
Mr. Kovis has no questions. 
Crt releases Mr. Wilkinson until 3:00 p.m. 
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Crt begins questions of #30 William Wicks. 
State questions Mr. Wicks. 
Crt questions Mr. Wicks. 
Mr. Kovis questions Mr. Wicks. Mr. Kovis requests to release. 
State agrees. 
Crt excuses Mr. Wicks. 
Crt moves Marjorie Tate #56 to Chair #30. 
Crt goes over replacements. 
Crt reviews process. 
Back on record at 1:30 p.m. All parties present and ready to proceed. 
Crt begins general questions. 
State begins general questions. 
Mr. Kovis has no general questions. 
Crt will start individual voir dire outside the presence of the panel. 
Individual voir dire begins in CrtRm 1 Jury Room. 
Crt begins questions of #9 Phil Heitstuman. 
State has no questions. 
Mr. Kovis has no questions and requests to excuse but not for cause. 
State will leave to the Crt's discretion. 
Crt will leave Mr. Heitstuman on panel for now. 
Crt questions counsel re individual voir dire of #13 Denis Munden. 
Mr. Kovis requests. 
Crt begins questions of #13 Denis Munden. 
State has no questions. 
Mr. Kovis questions Mr. Munden. 
Crt does not release at this time. 
Crt begins questions of #14 Shawna Parker. 
State questions Ms. Parker. 
Mr. Kovis questions Ms. Parker and challenges for cause. 
State will leave to the Crt's discretion. 
Crt excuses for cause. 
Crt moves Betty Shows #59 to Chair #14. 
Crt questions counsel re individual voir dire of Drew Piper #22. 




Time: 07:34 AM 
Page 5 of 8 
Tape Counter: 0 
Second Judicial District Court - Nez Perce County 
Minutes Report 
Case: CR-2007-0008107 
Defendant: Branigh, Leotis Brannon III 
Selected Items 
Crt begins questions of Drew Piper #22. 
State questions Mr. Piper. 
Mr. Kavis questions Mr. Piper. 
Crt qustions counsel re passing for cause. 
State requests Mr. Piper be excused. 
Crt excuses Mr. Piper for the month. 
Crt moves Linda Scott #60 to Chair #22. 
Crt begins questions of Jerry Mallory #25. 
State has no questions. 
Mr. Kovis challenges for cause. 
Crt excuses for cause. 
Crt moves Gerald Jenkins #61 to Chair' #25. 
Crt questions counsel re individual voir dire of Marjorie Tate #30. 
State requests. 
Crt begins questions of Marjorie Tate #30. 
State questions Ms. Tate. State challenges for cause. 
Mr. Kavis agrees. 
Crt excuses for cause. 
Crt moves Kari Johnson-Decicio #62 to Chair #30. 
Crt goes over excusals and replacements. 
Counsel req individual for #14 Betty Shows. 
Crt begins questions of Betty Shows #14. 
State questions Ms. Shows and challenges for cause. 
Mr. Kovis has no objection. 
Crt excuses for cause. 
Crt moves Ronda Knight #63 to Chair #14. 
Crt begins questions of Ronda Knight #14. 
State questions Ms. Knight. 
Mr. Kavis has no questions. 
Crt questions counsel re passing juror for cause. 
State passes. 
Mr. Kavis passes. 
Crt returns jury to courtroom. 
Crt questions Linda Scott #22. 
State questions Ms. Scott. 
Mr. Kavis questions Ms. Scott. 
Crt questions counsel re passes juror for cause. 
Counsel passes juror for cause. 
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Crt begins questions of Gerald Jenkins #25. 
State has no questions. 
Mr. Kovis questions Mr. Jenkins. 
Crt questions counsel re passing juror for cause. 
Counsel pass juror for cause. 
Crt returns juror to courtroom. 
Crt questions KariJohnson-Decicio #30. 
State questions Ms. Johnson-Decido. 
Mr. Kovis questions Ms. Johnson-Decido and challenges for cause. 
State has no objections. 
Crt excuses juror for cause. 
Crt moves Nancy Sattler #64 to Chair #30. 
Crt begins questions of Nancy Sattler #30. 
State questions Ms. Sattler. 
Mr. Kovis questions Ms. Sattler. 
Crt questions counsel re passing juror for cause. 
Counsel pass juror for cause. 
Crt returns juror to courtroom. 
Crt reviews 36 jurors being passed for cause. 
State agrees. 
Mr. Kovis agrees. 
Crt reviews panel seating. 
Mr. Kovis requests to individually voir dire Kelly Harwick #11. 
Crt begins questions of Kelly Harwick #11. 
State has no questions. 
Mr. Kovis questions Ms. Harwick. 
Crt questions Ms. Harwick. 
Crt questions counsel re passing juror for cause. 
Counsel pass juror for cause. 
Crt returns juror to courtroom. 
Tape Counter: 0 Crt continues review of panel seating. 
Counsel agree. 
Crt indicates 36 jurors have been passed for cause. 
Crt questions State. 
State passes panel for cause. 
Mr. Kovis passes panel for cause. 
Crt questions counsel re peremptory challenges. 
Mr. Kovis requests to do in courtroom. 
Crt will return to courtroom. Crt intends to release all other potential jurors. 
Crt explains peremptory challenge process to Mr. Branigh. 
Mr. Kovis questions Crt re moving chairs. 
COURT MINU1l!:tBxplains process. 
User: JANET 
Tape Counter: 30418 Back in session. All parties present and ready to proceed. Crt addresses panel. Crt will I/q/ 
release audience. Crt explains alternate process. {j 1{cJ 
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Crt in recess for attorneys to review their peremptory challenges. 
Peremptory Challenges: 
State: 
1. Sandra Brandolino #6 
2. Dale Frost #12 
3. Scott Solom #17 
4. George Poleson #8 
5.Justin Godwin #27 
6. Linda Scott #22 
7. Robert Simons #1 
8. Barbara Davis #24 
9. Tiffany McFetridge #26 
10. Rocky Goffinett #10 
11. Raymond Faling #35 
Peremptory Challenges: 
Mr. Kovis 
1. Bradley Whitcomb #16 
2. Karen Schmidt #19 
3. Denise Connolly #20 
4. Darlene Chase #23 
5. Phil Heitstuman #9 
6. Edwin Buettner #5 
7. Kelly Harwick #11 
8. Dana Fowler #3 
9. Jonathan Phipps #21 
10. Kathy Martin #34 
11. Colleen Hartshorn #32 
Crt seats jury panel. 
1. Richard Mitchell 
2. Rian Vanleuven 
3. Steve Luoma 
4. Denis Munden 
5. Ronda Knight 
6. Mary Hudon 
7. Roy Busch 
8. Gerald Jenkins 
9. Melvin Wilkinson 
10. Mary Assadi 
11. Nancy Sattler 
12. Nicole Holmes 
13. James White 
COURT MINumsMark Condrey 
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Crt addresses panel. 
Clerk swears in panel. 
Crt q State re panel 
State accepts panel. 
Crt q Mr. Kavis. 
Mr. Kavis accepts panel. 
Crt explains alternate juror process. 
Crt reviews schedule. 
Crt admonishes jury. 
Crt retires jury to jury room for instructions. 
Crt addresses audience panel and presents comments re jury duty. 
Crt q counsel. 
Counsel have nothing further. 
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I hereby request approval to broadcast and/or photograph the 
following court proceedings: 





I have read the attached rule permitting cameras in the 
courtroom and will comply in all respects with the Rule and Order 







The Court, having considered the request under the rule 
permitting cameras in the trial courtrooms, hereby orders that 
permission to broadcast and/or photograph the above hearing is: 
~ Granted under the following rest~tions: 
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Dated this ~ day 
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Request to Obtain Approval to Broadcast AND ORDER 
and/or Photograph a Court proceeding 
